Revista de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales
© 2022. Universidad del Zulia
ISSN 1012-1587/ ISSNe: 2477-9385
Depósito legal pp. 198402ZU45
Portada: Crónicas A y B
Artista: Rodrigo Pirela
Medidas: 40 x 60 cm
Técnica: Tinta y acrílico sobre Papel Fabriano
Año: 2012
Año 38, Regular No.99 (2022): 15-20
ISSN 1012-1587/ISSNe: 2477-9385
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7502657
Revista de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales. FEC-LUZ
EDITORIAL
The philosophy's legacy to
our time
: Aristotle, Rawls and Bioethics
Bioethics training has become increasingly necessary in the current
challenging circumstances of our future as a species. It is no coincidence
that national and international institutions and organizations emphasize;
today more than in the recent past, the idea of preserving human life as
we know it, including life in general and everything that fosters it. Great
humanistic scaffolding has been rebuilt globally to carry forward the idea
of maintaining the human lifeworld as we know it, precisely because the
human foundations are increasingly compromised by virtue of the
scientific and technological developments that have brought about the
current state of technoknowledge. And when we speak of human
foundations, we are referring to the core issue that makes our nature
precisely human nature. Human life is the life of the species, and this is
so, thanks to the sociality that characterizes us precisely because we are
endowed with reason, language, and something that is essential to both,
our spirit of life.
There cannot be human life without the rationality that
characterizes it; nor can there be human life without the materiality
proper to every entity that possesses extension. However, an element that
is present in the idea of human being is precisely the one that shows it in
the three-dimensionality by which Aristotle characterizes it: matter, form,
and soul. Inert matter has no soul, according to the philosopher; but
every entity that possesses movement has one, distinguishing, as we
know, three stages of the essence of human life: the vegetative soul, the
sensitive soul and the rational soul; the first two are in the rank of the
irrational. It should be noted that inanimate beings do not possess a soul;
this is only proper to animate beings. Of the linving beings, called
anímate, at least the human being possesses these three “Aristotelian”
souls. The others possess them alternately.
In this way, Aristotelian rationality is highly related, or better,
consubstantiated with the emotionality of life; that is, the problem of
emotions is interrelated with rationality. However, what I want to
emphasize here is the fact that the soul is a vital part of the philosopher's
conception of the shaping of the material world in which the human
being finds himself contextualizing his existence. The irrationality of the
soul really has to do with the vitality of life; that is, the sensitive soul and
the vegetative soul are two essential moments of the existence of human
life. However, it is emphasized in his conception that the vegetative soul
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is proper to every living being to procure nourishment, or even, its
deployment as such a living being. The other, the sensitive soul, is proper
to living beings by which they deploy their appetites (their "desire" for
action), fulfillment of their desires or their existential will, and even, as
mentioned before, emotions: it is proper to all animals, including non-
rational ones.
Thus, those two souls are unified in the human being together
with the third category of the classification shown by Aristotle: the
rational soul. In reality, what we are dealing with here is that the so-called
"instincts" of survival, if we understand well the three-dimensionality of
the soul, are present in all living beings. It is the reason why we see, for
example, the beaver building a dam to feed and procreate, or birds
constructing, by intricate designs, their nests to nest and procreate their
chicks. However, we see humans building bombs to destroy cities and
lives (their niches), or designing industries that are highly harmful to the
planetary ecosystem. Truly, in the light of Aristotelian essentialist
philosophy, this human reason is not very understandable. If the rational
soul is the one that allows us to know, in Aristotelian terms, the eternal,
the perfect and the immutable, we do not understand how it is that the
instrumental reason that characterizes scientific thought proposes to
develop knowledge that is capable of deconfiguring existence; that is, of
destroying it.
However, what I want to highlight here is the idea of the
ontological question that is present in Aristotelian philosophy in order to
understand a little of the underlying problem that is unfolding like gas in
the environment about the dimensions of human living matter. Its
materiality, being constituted by that three-dimensionality mentioned,
places us on a safe path to be able to deploy life without further ado. But,
in spite of this, we think of the transformations that are taking place in
the context of the existence of inert matter and also in living matter.
From this perspective, we see a rather steep road ahead due to the speed
with which the present technique is modifying living matter, even seeking
the fusion of matter, form and rationality from the new matter created.
This fusion, which operates within the principles that inform life
(described by biology as the science of life) is really a problem that is
about to present its own dilemmas, in the light of the Aristotelian logic of
life.
All of the above makes us think about a core issue from the
current ethics of science that bioethics has become, even present since its
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origins with Fritz Jahr (MARTIN SASS, 2011): the relationship between
technology, nature and life. This relationship, which in modern science
was clear, in the current context of technical deployment is increasingly
blurred. The creation of matter that is not in the printed program in the
genetics of life in general, but also the fusion of matter and thought that
is occurring in the so-called artificial intelligence technologies, are just
two examples of the challenges that arise from the development of new
technologies (which at other times we have categorized as digital
technologies, or as disruptive technologies). But the most important thing
that is happening within the human structure is the one that goes in the
way of modification and alteration of human nature itself, through
genetic engineering, despite the prohibitions, for example, of cloning and
genetic modification at the germ level.
Interpreting Aristotle's philosophy in the light of these changes in
the panorama of technical deployment implies observing the question of
science from the ontological point of view of bioethics, precisely because
it deals with the modification of the environment by means of human
action, something that the philosopher did not contemplate; firstly,
because it deals with the modification and creation of entities; and
secondly, because it deals with the application of a logic of intervention
that threatens the niche itself and the very existence of humans and the
ecosystem. As for the first, if we consider genetic modification, what
would we be talking about, whether of new matter or of the creation of
souls; and as for the second, because what has been said goes against any
logic of survival, which Aristotle could not have thought of, as indeed he
did not think. These questions are not clear, not even at the propositional
level as a problem; that is, we do not understand the problem yet.
Therefore, what we are thinking about is that it is not an ethical problem,
but an ethical- ontological problem.
As can be seen from the above comments, we are witnessing the
transit of what human empiricism would be incapable of thinking; or
even of conceiving: to transit from the statements of being to those of
ought to be, but in the sphere not of thought but of action. That is, to
cross the lines that mark the territory of ontology with those of ethics. In
this way, a new line of thought is being created that is conceived from
this ontos/ethos relationship. Bioethics, from Aristotelian ontology, is
visualized as an ontological-practical but also theoretical-practical
discipline, from which human action is reflected upon in the sense of its
"essence" as such, to use the Aristotelian terminology that describes
action. The current transformation of existence, referred to in the
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previous paragraphs, is conceived as a challenging phenomenon of
philosophical intelligence, for which we must begin by outlining the lines
that allow us to travel along these eventful paths of the transformation of
life. This is what bioethics is called to do.
And it is precisely for this reason that we take a leap in time from
those moments lived by society in Aristotle's time, to interpret our reality
and thereby define, or at least attempt to do so, our research problem, a
matter that escapes these thick lines of my own thinking (at least, it is an
attempt). Aristotelian philosophy is being the object of new readings
from these lines of reflection, as attested by the Chilean master Alfonso
Gómez-Lobo (2006), who reinterprets the metaphysics of this classical
philosopher from the perspective of the essential unity that constitutes
the human embryo and the adult that unfolds from this essential nature
of life. And precisely what it is about, as the Chilean states, is to find
interpretative solutions to the ontological questions arising from the
transformation of the human genome, and its essential manifestation as
life as such, a question that bioethics deals with precisely as a
philosophical discipline, rather than as an ethical discipline, although also
as such.
From all of the above I want to bring back the idea of the
reinterpretation of philosophy in general as a product of what I have
indicated at the beginning, the problem of the transformation of nature
and of human nature. And in this connection, another essential aspect
derives that is of vital importance to understand, namely that of human
sociability and the discussions on the rules for a better life, if this is
possible, judging by the socio-political events of the last forty years. The
subject of human sociability would not seem to be a subject for bioethics,
but for ethics as such a primordial or original discipline. But it is precisely
there where the change takes place. That is to say, we enter into a new
way of living from the very moment in which we are considered as part
of the complexity of life. Life and human life as a whole are integrating
elements of the individuality of each one of us. Our genetics is in the
same sense socially complex.
The above reasons lead us to think about how to establish balance
and harmony within the framework of techno-scientific processes which,
due to adverse consequences, imply a certain destabilization of social
networks, and of which classical ethics is already beginning to show signs
of theoretical wear and tear in the face of the brittle nature in which
conflicts arise; especially social conflicts, such as health care, education,
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basic infrastructure for a dignified life such as roads, bridges, but also
technological endowment and reform of education programs for a new
citizenship, which arises hand in hand with the processes of socio-
technical transformation.
We find ourselves living in what RAWLS (1995) would say an
original moment, in such a way that it propitiates the emergence of a new
social contract. Rawls' ethics is a neo- contractualist ethics, because
beyond the classical contractualists such as Hobes and Rausseou, he
affirms that the society in course (he speaks of the society of the middle
and last third of the twentieth century), was formed by a contract carried
out by individuals who were covered with a certain veil of ignorance, and
of an original position to negotiate the rights and resources of the
individuals that make up society, but also those of society itself as a
whole. However, in these circumstances as described above, the question
focuses not only on the available resources and economic rights, but also
on how we want to preserve the classical values of society as such.
Beyond the issues of psychological manipulation of individuals,
current liberalism is characterized by constantly keeping society as a
whole prey to technological developments; and that is what I am getting
at. Freedom in terms of techno-scientific development requires that
society as a whole enters into a socio-political process such as the one
described by Rawls in the original position: a series of individuals
representing the interests of humanity (no longer of society), to project
life into the future, notwithstanding the imbalances caused by the
possession of knowledge, in the power of those who by the work of the
dynamics that conforms it is also held, which transforms in all its
instances the social life of the human being, but also this one. In this,
science fiction makes us think of the misfortunes that could befall us in
the event of surviving alongside beings unimaginably of a nature other
than the traditional human one. Transhumanism shakes our foundations.
From the above, it follows that human life, being social, depends
greatly on the way in which we can negotiate the society of the future,
understanding by "negotiate", the discussions that must be held, and are
being held, regarding the use of knowledge for noble purposes, as is to be
expected. Perhaps Rawls' ethics is not the most appropriate to interpret
this aspect of knowledge and its social effects, but we must recognize that
we are facing a change of social and human paradigm, which is why
we can also interpret that we are facing a new "original position",
although no longer of economic and social rights, as in the case of Rawls,
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but of the rights to live in a natural context as it is known today; that is,
without technoscience transforming the human nature of humanity, nor
the natural nature of nature itself.
Thus, from these editorial lines, we outline some of the core issues
that bioethics will have to face in all its splendor as a discipline that deals
with the critique of techno-scientific development, which is how we think
it should be seen, especially since the first developments when it emerged
as a philosophical discipline concerned with the actions of science in
environmental contexts and the dignified treatment of animals; although
it was not until Potter that it began to be seen as a discipline concerned
with bridging the gap between the natural sciences and the humanities,
thus aspiring to respect for human dignity. We think rather that dignity is
towards life rather than towards human life. Thus, the relationship
between Aristotelian metaphysics and Rawlsian socio-legal ethics, appear
as interpretative resources through which we could find answers to the
questions we have not yet asked ourselves.
In this way, that is, by reinterpreting the classics of ethics and
philosophy, we could find answers to these great questions, which are
derived from the current techno-scientific turn and its consequences in
the socio-political, anthropological and ethical-legal spheres, in addition
to the socio-technical questions that always arise from scientific
revolutions, such as the one we are currently going through as a society.
However, we are only at the threshold of the radical transformations that
will come in all areas, so that the society of the future, and the future of
human nature, are in full redesign despite the fact that, in the view of
some interpreters, they are only mere discourses without foundations or
empirical evidence. I believe that we are going through a change of
nature, both socially and humanly, as a result of technoscience and
techno-knowledge.
Dr. José Vicente Villalobos-Antúnez / Editor-in-Chief
ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3406-5000
jvvillalobos@gmail.com
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REFERENCES
GÓMEZ-LOBO, Alfonso. 2006. “Aristóteles y una disputa de bioética”.
En Estudios Públicos, 102, p. 27-41.
RAWLS, John. 1995. Teoría de la justicia. Fondo de Cultura
Económica, México D.F. (México).
MARTIN SASS, Hans. 2011. “El pensamiento bioético de Fritz Jahr
(1927-1934)”. En Aestthethika. Revista Internacional de
estudio e investigación interdisciplinaria sobre subjetividad,
política y arte, Vol 6(2), pp. 20-33. Disponible en:
https://aesthethika.org/El-pensamiento-bioetico-de-Fritz
Consultado el: 30.11.2022
UNIVERSIDAD
DEL ZULIA
Revista de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales
Año 38, N° 99 (2022)
Esta revista fue editada en formato digital por el personal de la Oficina de
Publicaciones Científicas de la Facultad Experimental de Ciencias, Universidad del
Zulia. Maracaibo - Venezuela
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