Revista de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales. FEC-LUZ 
Ethics, which is defined as the good habit of the subject, since there 
is no subject in this digital world as we know it, as expressed in the previous 
lines, but rather a fluidity of subjects, is characterized in another dimension, 
whose ontic frameworks also remain to be defined. Some philosophers, such 
as  the  aforementioned  Han  (2022),  prefer  to  say  that  it  disappears:  in  the 
digital society  there  is no communicative  reason. On the contrary, a digital 
rationality  is  imposed.  Let  us  leave  the  political  aspects  for  another 
opportunity. 
These ideas serve to introduce us to the subject that concerns us in 
this  editorial.  The  question  of  whether  or  not  communicative  rationality 
prevails in the digital world or whether it is bypassed by the so-called digital 
rationality,  as  Byung  Cul  Han  calls  it.  To  ask  about  this  communicative 
rationality  could  be  considered  a  meaningless  question.  It  would  not  be 
possible to think that human beings, that species that prevails in the world 
precisely because it is endowed with speech, and thus with a communicative 
power  through  reason,  do  not  possess  precisely  this  power  of 
communication  derived  from  reason,  since  our  sense  of  being is  not  only 
shaped by logos, which, in the words of Heraclitus, and which is later taken 
by Aristotle, makes being as such a rational being; that is, as a being endowed 
with communicative power through logos that makes us human. 
Communicative rationality, precisely because of the ontic and ethical 
characteristics  described  above,  is  based  on  the  idea  of  communication 
(Habermas, 1999). This principle of identity present in reason points to the 
idea of argumentation; that is, the question of convincing the participant in 
the communicative dialogue that is engaged in, that the reasons, put forward 
with good arguments, indeed, with the pretension that they are the best, can 
be accepted as valid in order, consequently, to make the decisions that derive 
from the statements that conform it. For this same reason, communicative 
rationality  demands  ethical  rules  during  the  very  process  of  arguing,  from 
which  all  communicative  ethical  theories  (the  aforementioned  Habermas, 
1999 and 1998; Cortina, 2010, etc.) are derived. 
This is what Byung Chul Han (2022) points to. Communicative ethics 
loses strength as a normative entity in the context of digital rationality. The 
former demands arguments, while the latter imposes itself as a totality. And 
this  is  the  crux  of  the  matter,  as  my  teacher  of  Theory  of  Legal 
Argumentation,  the  excellent  professor  José  Ignacio  Beltrán,  would  say, 
almost forty years ago; or that other great of philosophical dissertation, who 
was  another  great  teacher  and  friend,  Álvaro  Márquez-Fernández.  Digital 
rationality finds itself in an environment in which ethics can be conspicuous 
by its absence, if we lose the state of alertness that we must maintain in this 
context of dilution of the entity; or of disappearance, in the traditional sense 
of the term.