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Universidad del Zulia
Facultad Experimental de Ciencias
Departamento de Ciencias Humanas
Maracaibo - Venezuela

The Political Scene In The Gulf Countries Before The Events Of September 11, 2001

Ass. Prof. Rafid Ahmed Mohammed Amin

**Collage of Arts – Tikrit University
Salah Al-Deen – Iraq**

Abstract

The end of the Second Gulf War, the liberation of Kuwait, the removal of the Iraqi army from it, and the return of the legitimate government to the capital of Kuwait were not the end of the political and security instability in the Arab Gulf states, but the consequences of the security situation extended beyond and beyond, as it reflected on the Gulf-regional relations, as well as Destroying the infrastructure of Iraq and Kuwait and draining large sums of imports from Arab countries in the Arabian Gulf.

Despite the traditional character of the Kuwait crisis, the United States planned to contain the region in anticipation of the potential security threats ahead to secure energy supplies first and devote its influence second, in the sense of controlling the region's capabilities and absolute control to the extent that it does not need any future international cover as it was keen to secure this cover in the Gulf War In 1991, the United States acted in the context of its presence in the region to act unilaterally to counter potential and perceived threats to US interests in the Gulf region.

Resumen:

El final de la Segunda Guerra del Golfo, la liberación de Kuwait, la retirada del ejército iraquí y el regreso del gobierno legítimo a la capital de Kuwait no fueron el fin de la inestabilidad política y de seguridad en los estados del Golfo Árabe, pero las consecuencias de la situación de seguridad se extendieron más allá, como se reflejó en las relaciones regionales del Golfo, así como en la destrucción de la infraestructura de Irak y Kuwait y el drenaje de grandes sumas de importaciones de países árabes en el Golfo Árabe.

A pesar del carácter tradicional de la crisis de Kuwait, los Estados Unidos planearon contener a la región en anticipación de las posibles amenazas de seguridad para asegurar primero los suministros de energía y dedicar su influencia en segundo lugar, en el sentido de controlar las capacidades de la región y el control absoluto en la medida que no necesita ninguna cobertura internacional futura, ya que estaba ansioso por asegurar esta cobertura en la Guerra del Golfo. En 1991, Estados Unidos actuó en el contexto de su presencia en la región para actuar unilateralmente para contrarrestar las amenazas potenciales y percibidas a los intereses estadounidenses en La región del golfo.

Introduction:

The US presence in the Arabian Gulf region continued after the liberation of Kuwait at all levels, and began to formulate its policy in accordance with the outcome of the Second Gulf War of the victory of the United States of America to impose a *fait accompli* policy on the Gulf states and direct their policies in a way that does not contradict with the policy of the United States of America. The Arab Gulf is capable of doing otherwise because it emerged from the Kuwait crisis and is at its worst.

It is important to review the political and security situation in the Arabian Gulf after the liberation of Kuwait and before the events of September 2001 and the political and security changes that have taken place in the region and how these events reflected on US-Gulf relations.

We will address this through two topics:

The first is the weakness of the GCC policy after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

Second: the instability in the Gulf-Gulf relations.

Then a list of sources and conclusions.

The first topic

Weakness of the GCC policy after the liberation of Kuwait 1991

After the end of military operations in the Persian Gulf following the liberation of Kuwait, the United States of America continued its pressure on the countries of the region, especially Saudi Arabia, to make the US military bases permanent (1).

In the context of the policy of using intimidation against the Saudi political system, the US press has been accusing Saudi Arabia. The New York Times pointed to the increasing importance of radical conservatives or radical Islamists in Saudi Arabia, and that the growing trend is directly linked to the presence of US forces in the country since the Kuwait crisis. 1990 when the presence of these forces was temporary (2).

The United States continued to target the political system in Saudi Arabia when it presented Osama bin Laden as the most dangerous man in the world and monitored his movements since the Kuwait crisis in 1991 through his goals and objectives, as well as asserting that he aims to get Americans out of Arab and Islamic countries, and formed the front The global Islamic jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders as a means to achieve this goal, bin Laden emphasizes the need to strike Americans and American interests around the world (3).

Saudi public discontent with the presence of the American forces on the land of the Two Holy Mosques after the liberation of Kuwait was manifested in the attacks on Riyadh, 1995, and then the eastern city of Khobar in June 1996, which killed 19 US soldiers and bombed headquarters. The US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the bombing of the USS call in November 2000 in Aden, southern Yemen.

In April 1995, the FBI in the US city of Oklahoma was hit by an explosion that the US media linked to Arab and Muslim groups as men of Middle Eastern origin who were seen leaving the building by car shortly before the explosion.

One of the secretions of the second Gulf war was that the Arab rhetoric against Israel seemed less intense in the Gulf states, and for the first time appeared Gulf writings expressing sympathy towards Israel, calling for full normalization with it unconditionally, after it became clear that the Arab danger was more serious and more dangerous than it caused. The Israeli threat was evident when Qatar began direct contacts with Israel by a handshake between the foreign ministers of the two countries on the

sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in October 1993. [6] A secret meeting was held in London on 22 January 1994 between the Qatari minister and both the Israeli Foreign Minister and the Minister of Energy Moshe Shahal, which was strongly denied by the Qatari government in January 1994, as well as in the Israeli press about the State of Qatar's agreement with Israel.

The State of Qatar took a major step in its relations with Israel when it was announced on March 1, 1996 that Qatar would allow Israel to open a section to take care of its interests in Doha as a first step towards normalizing relations between the two countries.

The United States agreed to the coup by Prince Hamad's son, Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in 1995. The coup leader, Sheikh Hamad, expressed full readiness to implement the American conditions once he took office.

- Achieving a US-Qatari security agreement for the presence of US air forces in Doha and the establishment of a military air base.

- To allow the participation of US oil companies in the Qatari gas industry, and the gradual abandonment of Japanese, French, British and Korean oil and commercial companies.

- Stay away from cooperation with Iran and abandon the water and gas agreement signed in October 1991.

- Openness to cooperation with Israel so that Qatar is one of the first countries to allow Israelis to operate in the Gulf and that this is done quickly (9).

Sheikh Hamad began to implement the conditions of the United States of America and they began to support them, as they worked to strengthen the button of the new emir by announcing joint military exercises with the Qatari forces (10).

It must be said that the Arab Gulf states, after the liberation of Kuwait, took modest steps that did not reach the level of high coordination among their countries in order to build regular military forces capable of protecting Gulf security from regional dangers, and remained in place and did not achieve a shift in the same direction but the self-development of their respective armies. Separately, in 1994-1995, the United Arab Emirates was active in the development of its air force as part of a plan to replace its old French-made Mirage-5s with other US F16s, and ordered 64 Apache helicopters.), The purchase of four naval frigates for about \$ 2.1 billion The same year, also bought eight British aircraft (Super Lennox) worth up to about 200 million pounds (11).

The events, occupation and liberation of Kuwait have resulted in a lot of negatives on the GCC countries, especially in the economic aspect, as these countries are burdened with the purchase of a lot of weapons and military equipment in an attempt to build a military self-force, and the fact of the fact that this self-power is not so high that Be able to react aggression from a regional state.

The UAE is the third country inspired by the pressure of its differences with Iran over the three islands, and the developments that may manifest in the foreseeable future, as the UAE government concluded a deal with a US company to strengthen the military communications system, as well as another deal for missiles and purchase Tanks, military vehicles and a range of electronic reconnaissance aircraft (12).

Iran exploited the state of collapse in the Arab Gulf states due to the events of Kuwait and its secretions, which led it to declare and recognize for the first time, and in 1996 specifically that it deployed missile batteries in the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates, and also claimed by a senior Iranian official that there is no expansionist ambitions in the Gulf (13).

In a statement to the commander of the Iranian naval forces, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, announced the announcement of large-scale military exercises in the waters of the Persian Gulf, considered the largest of the Iranian navy since 1979, and participated in the exercises 10,000 troops and 100 navy and forty fighter aircraft and helicopters were carried out in seven stages in order to show the strength of the Iranian fleet. 14).

“Iran, which has fought an eight-year war against Iraq to defend 100 meters along the Shatt al-Arab, which draws the border between the two countries,” said an Iranian official in the mid-1990s, assistant commander of the navy Admiral Abbas Mottaj, and looking at Iranian disregard for the Gulf states. Ready to wage an eighty-year war to defend its islands in the Gulf. “

Iranian policy in the 1990s was keen to exert pressure and underestimate the Gulf states after neutralizing Iraq. An Iranian official said: “The Iraqi threat is no longer present and neighboring countries in the south are small and weak and cannot pose any threat, but the only threat It could come from outside the region, namely the presence of foreign forces in the Gulf, where 50 foreign warships, especially US warships, dock. “Iran is in its interest to maintain the status quo on the three UAE islands,” an Iranian official said clearly. For what Ali is This is in the interest of all countries in the region, including the UAE ”.

The United Arab Emirates seems to have realized the extent of US pressure on it and worked to determine defense spending, which did not exceed 5% of government spending compared to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with the UAE suffering from funding problems and low oil prices and expenses of the Gulf War, and also sought to follow It is called the "Offset" system whereby part of the arms transactions within the UAE are invested in joint industrial projects.

The economic pressures on Kuwait started following the repercussions of the Kuwaiti crisis and topped the Kuwaiti concerns and appeared more urgent in the budget of the fiscal year 94-95, where the Kuwaiti government presented the budget and estimated the net deficit at about 1.753 billion Kuwaiti dinars and the equivalent of 6.2 billion dollars, but the Parliament estimated these The budget succeeded in persuading the government to bring about further cuts in spending, and Kuwait attempted to increase the volume of non-oil revenues.

Kuwait purchased a number of anti-aircraft missiles (Stinger) from the United States of America and the purchase of a number of other US missiles worth \$ 1.9 billion, and Kuwait received most of these deals in 1994 (19).

The above, through the large spending, which we have seen examples of the previously presented and presented to us shows two scenarios, the first relates to the huge money spent on armaments in the Gulf States and intended to deplete state resources to buy weapons, which directly affects the constituents of States and at all levels, economic The second scenario has created an obsession with fear among all the Gulf countries of brother and neighbor. Iraq and Iran, which are close to the Arab Gulf countries, constitute the largest part of that fear and that the Kuwait crisis remained in mind.

Former US National Security Adviser Martin Indyk's proposal for a double containment policy in May 1993, a key goal of US policy toward the Gulf states, calls for the isolation of Baghdad and Tehran by providing a security network for the region to prevent attempts by both regimes. (Rogue) to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process under the auspices of the United States of America or the threat of access to energy resources in the region, and this policy justification for Iraq, failing Iraq to comply with UN resolution 687, which requires Baghdad to destroy all weapons of mass destruction Amal is a direct challenge to the regional system and the international community, and the Iraqi political system's persistent obstruction of the work of UNSCOM weapons inspectors has prompted the

United States to launch a series of air strikes on Iraq culminating in Operation Desert Fox in 1998.).

The American researcher Phoebe Mar poses about Iraq as a potential challenge to the Gulf Cooperation Council states after the liberation of Kuwait questioning the trends of Iraqi foreign policy, especially when Saddam Hussein continued to rule after the Kuwait crisis and gives a number of general perceptions, including:

The first scenario: Saddam Hussein is still in power and possesses a compelling political force depending on his loyalists from his clan, the party, and the military and police institutions. To regain full strength.

The second scenario: Whatever the means to overthrow Saddam Hussein, whoever succeeds him will most likely be from the same political circles that ruled Iraq in the recent past. They have a greater sense of responsibility than their predecessors, which poses a future danger that they will take power over themselves, meaning that the danger in the new government will continue and cast a shadow on the domestic and regional levels. Arabic (21).

For their part, the Arab Gulf states differed in assessing the seriousness and sensitivity of Iraq, depending on the experience of each Gulf state in its relations with the Iraqi political system, but its overall or final outcome was particularly negative for Kuwait, which suffered a severe occupation in 1990. And the question of assessing the seriousness of the threat or threat is relative, depending on how close the Gulf States or distance from Iraq geographically (22).

In any case, Iraq, after the removal of its troops from Kuwait and the destruction of the bulk of the military machine of his army, he was subjected to constant American pressure and through the United Nations and the so-called (UNSCOM) inspection and monitoring.

The inspectors were expelled from Iraq in December 1998 and the focus of public debate in the West turned to moral justification for continuing a stringent economic sanctions regime against Baghdad. An American politician claimed that lifting the sanctions would quickly shift the program from (oil for food) to Oil vs. tanks)? Thus, he believes that sanctions are the only way to contain the Iraqi political system and thus (liberate the Arab Gulf region from fear) (23).

Surprisingly, this view defies Scott Witter, the head of the UN weapons inspector in Iraq, saying that “economic sanctions will strengthen the position of the Iraqi political system rather than undermine it” and concludes that: “Iraq can no longer threaten Israel and its neighbors. And that the

current US policy is extremely naive and does nothing to deal with thousands of internal and regional issues that affect the behavior of the Iraqi leadership (24).

The second topic

The state of instability in the Gulf-Gulf relations

The post-liberation phase of Kuwait is characterized by political interactions and events that have raised many question marks regarding the prevailing concepts and formulas that affect the future of the security situation in the Arab Gulf states.

The defeat of Iraq and its expulsion from Kuwait have had many effects at various levels, and the strength of Iran's position. Turkish-Israeli is also one of the consequences of this collapse.

Some of the Arab Gulf countries sought to violate the political cordon imposed on Iraq as a result of its invasion of Kuwait and the consequent political effects imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council. The relations of some GCC countries with Iraq witnessed an important qualitative development. Oman was the first country to open its embassy in Baghdad on May 21, 1991 and never closed the Iraqi embassy in Amman. Qatar resumed diplomatic relations with Iraq in October 1992, and participated in the exchange of official delegations with Iraq.

Some GCC countries have promoted the importance of reconsidering the Gulf position on the sanctions imposed on Iraq. The regional stadium provided that it carries out international resolutions and settles all outstanding issues, first and foremost the Kuwaiti prisoners file (27).

If the stage that paved the way for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was that of Saddam and a conflict that invaded it, the societies of the six GCC countries suffered from the repercussions of the second Gulf crisis, although this was done to varying degrees between the tides. Other political tensions in the Persian Gulf have been a direct cause of the consequences of the Kuwait crisis. Period From 1994 to 1999 (28).

On the other hand, the GCC societies witnessed political developments in the direction of strengthening political participation during the period of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, but they soon fell as the US administration retreated to fulfill its promises when President George W. Bush announced after the liberation of Kuwait the "New World Order" project. He allegedly democratized regimes in the countries of the world, especially in the Middle East, especially the Arab Gulf states, and the coolness of the Clinton

administration, which was a priority for strategic considerations (29).

Iraq remained a security concern for the Arab Gulf states through the secretions of its occupation of Kuwait, so it poses a challenge to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries because of its borders with Kuwait and the access of Iraq to the waters of the Persian Gulf, most Iraqis, including the Iraqi opposition reject the borders set by the United Nations Commission after the war It is expected that pressure will continue to negotiate on these borders to give Iraq more land overlooking the Gulf, including the islands of Warba and Bubiyan, regardless of the regime in power and even if a new regime comes fears and doubts remain between the two countries for a period of time. Night (30).

It can be said that the fundamental problem facing the Arab Gulf region and threatening its stability after the liberation of Kuwait is to focus on political conflicts between countries and ignore internal political conflicts as they lead to political conflicts between countries, for example, the Iraq-Iran war, which was the result of internal political tensions in Iran They overthrew the Shah's rule and brought another radical regime that the Gulf states considered a threat to their legitimacy, which pushed them to the highest levels of security, military, economic and political cooperation to the extent that many expected that the crisis facing the region would push the GCC states Melting into one political entity to meet the challenges of the stage (31).

The end of the Second Gulf War and the liberation of Kuwait were not the end of the security concerns of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and these countries were forced to re-establish their security calculations and start activating the unified security entity known as Al-Jazeera Shield Forces, but this was not achieved.

- Mutual mistrust between the GCC countries because each country believes that the joint security entity will lead to a waiver of some of its sovereignty for regional considerations.

- The usual external positions for the development of Gulf defense capabilities, after the Gulf Arab countries separately concluded bilateral agreements with the United States, Britain and France, these countries have a desire to disrupt any Gulf attempt to collective defense (32).

The question arises as to how to discuss or expect solutions through which the Arab Gulf states can find a general security system for the Arab Gulf states. At first glance, it seems possible to achieve this through the political and security dimensions, and because of the uncertainty, accuracy and durability of the relations that govern the Gulf States. Among them on the

one hand and between them and the countries of the region such as Iraq and Iran on the other hand, because of the differences of views between the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council in building a security defense force as well as the difference in their political perspective to deal with the countries of the region after the events of Kuwait.

Despite the defeat of the Iraqi aggression in the Second Gulf War and the reduction of fears of regional threats and the opportunity for the presence of Western security in the Arabian Gulf, the lack of relative constraints has led to different trends in the means of achieving Gulf security.

The first trend: - It is based on the conclusion of bilateral defense treaties with the United States and some Western countries, especially Britain and France, and Kuwait was one of the Gulf countries to conclude such defense treaties for fear of renewed regional dangers.

The second trend: - is based on regional security and means not to exclude any country in the region in the security participation - including Iraq and Iran - which is not achievable at least for the time being.

The third trend is based on the impossibility of establishing Gulf security in isolation from the Arab national security. Therefore, the GCC countries should cooperate with the Arab countries through an Arab mechanism that can find solutions to the security and defense problems in the region. Damascus into a realistic formula in the sense of turning it from a theoretical framework into a practical reality.

Among the internal dangers that negatively affect the Gulf security, the phenomenon of population dislocation and lack of self-power despite spending huge amounts in the purchase of the latest weapons and military equipment, in addition to the risks associated with development and contrary to the common saying that development in any society is a safety valve for him, but development in Gulf societies have led to threats that threaten and continue to threaten the security of these societies. In this regard, we point to the large Asian labor force with advanced lines that seek to achieve the goals of their countries, as is the case with the Iranian elements. Even intervening on the pretext of protecting their working children outside their borders, it is not unlikely that the dangers of such workers will worsen in the future when generations of foreign communities emerge that may demand the participation of Gulf Arabs in their political decision.

The repercussions of the Kuwait crisis continued and cast a shadow on the Gulf security side through the fear of regional countries - Iraq and Iran - so Riyadh has always improved its relationship with Tehran and this has

become an internal issue in the GCC countries. The United Arab Emirates expresses its concern over the lukewarmness of the GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, in supporting the claim of the United Arab Emirates to sovereignty over its three islands, which Iran has occupied since 1971. On July 5, 1999, in a speech before the Saudi Shura Council, King Fahd affirmed that the growth of relations between Riyadh and Tehran not only serves the interests of both countries, but also stability in the region and the entire Islamic nation.

We can say that what led Riyadh to be relatively open to the government of Tehran, is what brought the decade of the change in the depth of the Iranian interior, for the first time subject to the religious issue in Iran to reconsider and even dare to conservative Islamists from the political system since 1979 and labeling the stalemate and deterioration on all The people are pushing the reformist movement to the forefront of events and inciting it towards more steps that will rid them of the looming past and escape from the ideas of the Islamic Revolution that lacked many important and necessary formulations about the priorities of civil society, and in the midst of this atmosphere of confusion and confusion. Society, and indeed the entire state, has fallen into internal economic collapse and external isolation imposed from within.

The Arab states in the Persian Gulf realized that Iran is not the biggest devil that Iraq has long warned of, and that they can talk to them about the questions that characterized their relations with them as hostile. This conception opened wider horizons in Arab-Iranian relations in the Gulf regional system.

As part of its diplomatic drive to besiege Iraq, Kuwait's efforts to bring Iran and the GCC members closer together. President Rafsanjani was proud of his successful efforts to restore relations with Saudi Arabia in particular, and the opening of a maritime line between the UAE and Iran in October. 1993 despite their differences on the issue of the three islands.

This warm atmosphere in Iranian-Gulf relations has been translated into a series of high-level visits, and culminated in the February 1998 visit of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani to Saudi Arabia, which formed an important basis for a serious dialogue that has been lacking for many years. Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz to acquit Iran of old accusations (40). Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with Iran have gone in reverse with Iraq. The leadership of the political movement in the Persian Gulf as a whole can be conceived as such in a clear historical revenge for the situation before the Second Gulf War. 41 Inter-coexistence between

Iraq and the GCC states, and no strategic planning, no matter how accurate, can accommodate their ambition together and can not be tamed in any way.

Fear remained an inherent concern for Gulf politicians during the 1990s with Iran, despite the qualitative improvement in their relationship.

After the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's nuclear efforts gained momentum as part of an Iranian effort to rebuild a comprehensive military force to compensate for the enormous losses during the war. Russia and China held talks with Rafsanjani, who was then chairman of the Shura Council until Moscow agreed to export \$ 2-4 billion worth of arms to Iran as well as cooperation. The nuclear field (42).

The Russian-Iranian cooperation marked the beginning of the most important qualitative shift in the Iranian nuclear program since late 1992, which provided Iran with its needs for larger nuclear reactors and not limited to small-scale research reactors. Beginning in November 1994, when Iran announced that Russia had approved an agreement amounting to (780) million dollars to complete the Bushehr reactor. This agreement was actually signed with Russia on 8 January 1995. Russia has already started to implement its agreement with Iran and sent 150 technicians to Iran. The Bushehr reactor, in addition to (2000) Russian workers and the training of five hundred Iranian technicians (43).

From all the security developments in the Arab Gulf region, especially after the end of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, it has resulted in many repercussions on the countries of the entire region, including the fact that Iran was provoked by the United States when it was described as the axis of evil countries. Because the United States is always the strongest, we find it moving things and acting in its interest, taking advantage of everything that happens in the security field in the Gulf States.

The American presence in the Arab Gulf region in the period after the Second Gulf War has become a welcome presence and is working to modernize the oil installations and expand some of them and enter the fabric of the oil industry in all its details (44).

The dream of absolute control over energy sources (oil and gas) occupies a high importance in the folds of the American political mind, and this dream has been achieved as a result of the military and political changes that hit the region after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the siege of Iraq and its absence from the energy market and even prevent it from acting with its natural and financial resources And the implementation of UN and Security Council resolutions related to the invasion or liberation, and thus

the Americans tightened their control over oil and gas and even financial resources, which also flowed as a result of the oil and price boom of energy resources, and fortunately for Americans that the Arab financial resources The US presence and joint defense exercises have boosted demand for US weapons, with Gulf contracts with the United States exceeding \$ 50 billion in size. In the first place on the products of companies of the United States of America (45).

Conclusion and conclusions

The dense presence of the United States provided the opportunity to control the political and security events, make the most of the line of internal differences and try to lead those differences and their results to enhance their political and military influence. The region, even coordination began at the highest level when some of the Gulf states announced without shame or hesitation to receive US troops in permanent bases in the Gulf States and the best example of this is the State of Qatar, which declared this openly during the day.

The US policy towards the Gulf states continued from domination to depletion of wealth. Thus, the leaders of the GCC states realized that meeting with the US strategy corresponds to all their objectives, because they are fully aware that they failed to build the necessary military power despite the huge spending on armament. This understanding has led Qatar, for example, to move towards the United States in the region and the GCC.

Changing the political behavior of the United States does not in any way mean the lack of other means in the pattern of relations between them and the countries of the region, where the US interest in all those countries in the military aspects, and the United States also engaged in a comprehensive review of its strategy in the Gulf region and rearranged the front Its allies were to stand up to all possible influences, such as in Washington on September 11, 2001, where the two towers were destroyed, and the United States realized - as it wanted - that the consequences of that event would be on terrorism, its fight and its financiers.

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