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Saudi-Turkish Relations During The Reign Of King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz. Motivations And Challenges

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Abstract

The research tries to dismantle the interconnected public image between the motives and challenges that shape the course of Saudi-Turkish relations, their nature and the dynamics governing them. Relations have developed since the arrival of King Salman bin Abdul Aziz in the Kingdom in January 2015, but they have not witnessed a complete consensus or strategic alliance. Living under the influence of several factors, including what is political, including historical or national, in addition to external influences, whether regional or international, on the other hand, relations have not seen a total break despite the challenges faced in many regional and international files, has witnessed a series of tides, what it is characterized by complexity and contradictions. For their part, the parties are always in dire need of rapprochement and cooperation, while their interrelationships are marked by a degree of skepticism and mistrust, and vary on some of the central issues in the region.

Relaciones Saudita-Turcas Durante El Reinado Del Rey Salman Bin Abdul Aziz. Motivaciones Y Desafíos.

Resumen:

La investigación intenta dismantlar la imagen pública interconectada entre los motivos y los desafíos que dan forma al curso de las relaciones entre Arabia Saudita y Turquía, su naturaleza y la dinámica que los rige. Las relaciones se han desarrollado desde la llegada del Rey Salman bin Abdul Aziz al Reino en enero de 2015, pero no han sido testigos de un consenso completo o una alianza estratégica. Viviendo bajo la influencia de varios factores, incluido lo político, incluso histórico o nacional, además de las influencias externas, ya sean regionales o internacionales, por otro lado, las relaciones no han visto una ruptura total a pesar de los desafíos que enfrentan muchos regionales e internacionales. archivos, ha sido testigo de una serie de mareas, lo que se caracteriza por la complejidad y las contradicciones. Por su parte, las partes siempre necesitan urgentemente un acercamiento y cooperación, mientras que sus interrelaciones están marcadas por un cierto escepticismo y desconfianza, y varían en algunos de los temas centrales de la región.

Research importance

Saudi-Turkish relations are characterized by great complexity. They are two forces that have an influential regional role in the region. Its spiritual status as a state sponsor of the Two Holy Mosques, and a great economic power is one of the countries that control oil prices globally, while Turkey is a major player in several regional and international files, through the Ottoman legacy as well as These developments make the file of relations between the two countries very important because of its repercussions on the entire Middle East region and on all outstanding issues.

Research goals

The research aims to analyze the dimensions of the rise and fall of Saudi-Turkish relations and to identify the motives and challenges that govern these relations and the policies of the two countries and intersections. It also aims to dismantle the interconnected public image between the motives and challenges that shape the course of this relationship and its nature and the dynamics governing it, presenting its course and its current challenges and future inevitability.

Problematic search

The problem of research is determined by the following:

There are great elements of rapprochement and many areas of cooperation that promote Saudi-Turkish relations, but there are many challenges facing these relations and their future prospects?

A set of sub-questions is divided from the problem:

What are the motives of the rapprochement between the two countries?

What are the areas of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey?

What are the challenges facing Saudi-Turkish relations?

What is the future probability of the relationship between the parties?

Research hypothesis

The hypothesis that the research seeks to prove, is that the regional and international rhythm will control the rise and fall of Saudi-Turkish relations in the foreseeable future, despite the existence of motives and areas of great importance and rapprochement and bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

Research Methodology

To achieve the objectives of the research, the researcher adopted more than one method, including the analytical approach to describe and analyze the motives of convergence and the most important areas of cooperation and the most important challenges facing these relations and then the forward-looking approach in an attempt to explore the future of Saudi-Turkish relations.

Structured research

The research is divided into three sections, the first of which is devoted to explain the motives of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The second topic was to show areas of cooperation between the two countries, while the third topic was devoted to the most important challenges facing the Saudi-Turkish relations and their future prospects, and a conclusion.

The first topic: motives of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Turkey

The most important drivers can be listed as follows:

1- Geopolitical motives, due to the presence of major threats to their national security (the Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia, and the Kurdish threat to Turkey), the two countries decided to neutralize their differences and to seek participants to help them in the face of these threats. To the extent that

Saudi Arabia needs a major regional military force to counterbalance Iran (Turkey has the second largest military in NATO), Turkey needs the support of a large economic and moral strength of the size of Saudi Arabia to face attempts to tamper with its national security, especially since Turkey depends on 80 percent of its energy needs. Both Russia and Iran represent a real security dilemma that Saudi Arabia can help alleviate, if necessary. In light of this, it can be said that Saudi Arabia and Turkey have no choice but to cooperate, to control the regional chaos, which is part of the strategy of Iranian expansion and Russian return to the region and American retreat from it (1).

2 - The beginning of the reign of the Saudi monarch “Salman bin Abdul Aziz” gave a preliminary impression that Saudi Arabia decided its options and on its way to ease its hard-line policies towards political Islam and the Arab Spring, and give absolute priority to confront the expansion of Iran, and this constitutes a critical turning point in regional balances, because it will affect the nature of the Saudi moves on the one hand, and because it removed the obstacle that was standing in the face of Saudi relations regionally on the other hand, especially with Turkey, represented in Saudi relations with the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has issued leading indicators in this direction. With the fall of the Yemeni capital to the Houthis in September 2014, it became clear to Saudi Arabia the costs of engaging in a simultaneous bilateral confrontation with Iran and its allies in the region on the one hand, and with Turkey and nearby Islamic currents to prevent it from taking advantage of the conditions of the Arab Spring on the other. While Iran has almost clamped down on the kingdom as a result of its approach to control of Yemen through its Houthi allies, having become the most influential in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. In the shaking of confidence in US policies, it seemed very difficult to confront Iran and contain its growing regional influence without the help of a regional pole the size of Turkey (2).

3. The Syrian Crisis At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, there was a Saudi-Turkish consensus on the need to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which is contrary to what Russia and Iran want. The two countries sought to reach a settlement whereby Riyadh works more closely with Ankara in Syria in exchange for taking Turkey made a harsher stance toward Iran, and Turkey already made a series of harsh statements criticizing Iran’s “sectarian” policies in the Middle East, initially declaring its support for Saudi military intervention in Yemen, and its willingness to provide logistical assistance to the process if necessary, and joined a coalition. Saudi

Islamic who t M announced at the end of 2015 (3).

4. The collapse of the Arab regional system The collapse of the political system in Iraq as a result of the US invasion, and the fall of Syria in a devastating conflict after it turned into an arena for regional and international competition, and Egypt's inability to take a leadership role in the Arab world and the region in general, led to the complete collapse of the structure of the regime Arab regionalism that prevailed after World War II. To the extent that the absence of an effective Arab force was a catalyst for Iranian expansion in the region, it was a catalyst for a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement to meet the above-mentioned challenges; Saudi Arabia could no longer rely on the Arab triangle (Egypt, Syria, Iraq), which in the past had played a role in preventing Iranian expansionist attempts. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia could not rely on their alliance with Washington to counter the Russian-Iranian alliance, especially after the United States and NATO expressed their unwillingness to help Turkey except in self-defense if there was a confrontation with Russia, whether in Syria or even in Syria. The Waterways in the Black Sea (4).

5. The decline of the Arab Spring momentum, which diverged the views of the two countries on its implications for regional security. While Riyadh saw it as a major threat, not only as a conservative state opposed to the revolutionary act in principle, and feared its repercussions on it, but because Saudi Arabia also believed that there is an understanding between the United States and Turkey allows or does not oppose the arrival of Islamic currents to power in the countries of the "Arab Spring", And give it a chance to break the culture of the opposition, and Turkey is a model in governance and management. Turkey saw the Arab revolutions, particularly in Syria and Egypt, as an opportunity to enhance its presence in the Arab world and to take a leading role at the regional level (5).

6. The fact that King Salman and his Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman came to power in Saudi Arabia gave them the ability to employ all elements of their soft and solid power to protect their regional interests. The ruling team, which has fairly long chances of survival, means regional players such as Turkey will have to deal with it.

7. Common threats, reflected in the weakness of the central state in the countries of the region, the conflict of identities and the prevailing atmosphere of instability. This is the ideal environment for the expansion of the "non-state" player, and Iran because of its regional and international isolation and suffocating economic sanctions, can no longer move on the international arena through the use of tools of the "nation-state", which

means that it has lost the effectiveness of using the tools of the regime International; to influence players in the international arena. As a result, Iran has resorted to moving through the concept of the “non-state actor”, such as groups, parties, and organizations, as an alternative tool of the international system, with the aim of influencing the behavior of states, and is also an ideal environment for the expansion of the most “non-state” player It is dangerous and hostile to both Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the organizers of the so-called Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. The policy of regional axes is also a factor that consumes the influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkey and benefits Iran;

8. Turkey’s internal transformations, after the Turkish local elections in March 2014 and the presidential elections in August of the same year, in which the Justice and Development Party won the majority of seats, and Erdogan presided over the Republic, the Turkish people said his speech in support of the party and its leader Erdogan and was a referendum on the popularity of the party and its president Erdogan is expected to run for a second term in office, allowing him to play an active role in Turkish politics. In addition, the PJD’s chances of retaining power for a relatively long time, while continuing its policy of restoring Turkey’s historical and cultural depth of active engagement in the Middle East, are high. All this will help convince the countries of the region, especially Saudi Arabia, to deal with the Turkish player (7).

9. Regional Developments Regional developments are forcing Saudi Arabia and Turkey to re-calculate each other, in order to accelerate the convergence of the two sides, which intersect in some files. Saudi Arabia is a balancing country in the region, Turkey is suffering increasingly regionally after the failure of its bets on the “Arab Spring.” The Russian-Turkish confrontation in Syria and the revival of Kurdish aspirations there, raises fears in Ankara of its loss out of the Syrian conflict. In addition, Turkey needs Arab cover for its military operations in Syria against the Kurds along the Euphrates River, which Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states can secure.

10 - Saudi Arabia is one of the most important economic partners of Turkey in the Middle East and Arab countries, where the two countries have economic and trade relations and huge investments, and do not lose sight of Erdogan’s calculations that Saudi short-term financial deposits in Turkish banks since the Saudi-Turkish crisis over Egypt and so far, contribute Significant in the failure of the collapse of the Turkish national currency against foreign currencies, and thus strengthen the popular balance of Erdogan within Turkey. The Turkish economy also needs to secure its

share in the promising Saudi and Gulf markets, which is facilitated by rapprochement with Riyadh (8). As a result, the two sides recognize that joint cooperation and increased opportunities for rapprochement are necessary to meet the level of regional challenges and transformations.

The second topic: Areas of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey

We can refer to the most important areas of political, economic, military and cultural cooperation between the two countries.

First: Political relations

Saudi-Turkish relations witnessed a new phase of rapprochement and cooperation after King Salman bin Abdul Aziz took over in Saudi Arabia on January 23, 2015; Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed the Turkish presidency on August 28, 2014. A few months after the two leaders came to power in their countries, they laid solid foundations for a growing relationship, which they developed and laid out their frameworks and features through successive summits. Eight Saudi-Turkish summits were held during 2015 and 2016, bringing together leaders of the two countries. The four summits during 2015 are: three with the Saudi King, one on January 29, 2015 in Saudi Arabia, the other on the sidelines of his visit to the Turkish city of Antalya, November 2015, and a summit in March 2015 in the capital Riyadh, and finally a summit in Ankara, in April 2015, with Prince Mohammed bin Naif, when he was crown prince. The summits of the first year of King Salman's rule culminated in the two countries agreeing to establish a strategic cooperation council during President Erdogan's visit to Saudi Arabia on December 29, 2015.

In the second year of the reign of King Salman, the growing cooperation between the two countries culminated in the signing of Riyadh and Ankara on 14 April 2016 in Istanbul on the minutes of the establishment of the Saudi-Turkish Coordination Council, in the presence of King Salman and President Erdogan. Following the fifth summit between the two sides. The importance of these summits comes from the weight of the two countries and the convergence of visions of the two sides towards many of the files of the region. This is what President Erdogan said during a press conference held at the Ataturk International Airport in Istanbul, prior to the start of his Gulf tour, when he stressed that his country views its relations with Saudi Arabia in a strategic angle, especially "we attach great importance to its security and stability." (9). The two countries' positions in the political field are characterized by coordination, consultation and exchange of views on issues of mutual interest and prospects of cooperation between the two countries. The two countries agree to confront the scourge of ter-

rorism in all its forms and call for making the Middle East region free of weapons of mass destruction. As well as discuss the developments of events on the regional and international arenas.

Despite the multiple crises and renewed crises in the region, the views of the two countries remained identical to address these crises, especially the events in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, in addition to cooperation in the face of terrorism, Saudi Arabia supported Turkey's efforts in all measures taken to protect its security. Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to stand by Turkey after the failed coup attempt, where King Salman bin Abdul Aziz telephoned the Turkish President, congratulating him to return things to normal after the attempted military coup witnessed in Turkey, declaring Saudi Arabia welcomes the establishment of security and stability in Turkey led by the government. The Saudi government expressed its officials' solidarity with the Turkish government and people after the terrorist attacks in Ankara on October 10, 2015, February 17, 2016, and March 13, 2016 and condemned the bombings. The two countries became partners in an attempt to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad's rule in Syria, and while maintaining partnership in Syria, Erdogan supported the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen. "Despite all the problems, we are trying to create the conditions for dialogue, and we are not adversaries. On the contrary, we stand with Saudi Arabia in the face of any threat against them, whether from Iran or Iran," AKP spokesman Aktay said in an interview. United States (11).

The most prominent feature of this distinction was the announcement of the establishment of the "Strategic Cooperation Council" between the two countries, as a step more advanced than the step of the Joint Higher Committee between the two countries, which allows the ministers of the two countries to meet annually; A higher governmental level shall be consulted in the endeavors to increase the volume of trade exchange between the two countries. It focuses on joint cooperation projects in several areas mainly security, military, political, economic, commercial, investment, energy, education, cultural affairs, and medicine (12). The first session of the Turkish-Saudi Coordination Council was held in Ankara on February 7 and 8, 2017, chaired by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüd Çavuşoğlu and then Saudi Arabia's Adel al-Jubeir, marking a new start in the course of relations between the two countries towards broader prospects and stronger relations. Al-Jubeir described in a press conference with his Turkish counterpart, the first meeting of the Saudi-Turkish Coordination Council, which was attended by more than 49 bodies in different sectors of the two

countries as “constructive and fruitful.” Al-Jubeir affirmed that there is a perfect identical viewpoint between the two countries regarding the Palestinian issue and the importance of finding a solution according to international resolutions, the Libyan file and confronting terrorism, extremism and interference in the affairs of states. With regard to security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, he explained that cooperation exists, and the Kingdom supports the Turkish efforts in countering terrorism and Turkey supports the Kingdom’s efforts in countering terrorism. He added: “We believe that the PKK” PKK “and the organization of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party” The Turkish Foreign Minister said that Turkey sees the security and stability of the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, of its security and safety, stressing that there is a consensus between Ankara and Riyadh on various issues. Ankara also supports the Arab military alliance, which is a member of the Riyadh has led it since March 26, 2015, to support legitimacy in Yemen, and their views are identical on the need for a political solution to the Yemeni crisis.

Turkey was the first foreign country to be invited as the guest of honor of the fourth exhibition to support local production (AFED 2018) in the Kingdom, which was held in Riyadh between 25 February - 3 March 2018, where a Turkish delegation headed by Dr. Ismail Demir, Head of the Presidency of Defense Industries Its membership is also represented by representatives of Turkish national defense companies. On the other hand, the former Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir participated in the emergency summit meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on Jerusalem, which was held on 18 May 2018 in Istanbul. The Minister of State and Advisor to King Salman Prince Dr. Mansour bin Muteb bin Abdul Aziz visited Turkey on July 9, 2018, to participate in the inauguration ceremony of Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan as President of the Republic.

Turkey has taken a number of recent steps that can be counted efforts to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Summit in Mecca, and a phone call from President “Erdogan” on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr to King “Salman” and Ankara condemned the Houthi attack on the Saudi airport Turkish “Mevlut Cavusoglu” that his country separates the killing of Khashoggi from its bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, and that relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey reached a better level after the accession of King “Salman bin Abdul Aziz” to his post. Gavishoglu said that President Erdogan’s initiative to call King Salman before Eid al-Fitr is an indication that there are no problems in the bilateral relationship with Saudi Arabia, stressing that

“we have removed the Khashoggi killing from our relationship with Saudi Arabia.” (15) Despite all the crises facing the two countries’ relations, President Erdogan continues to maintain a friendly relationship with King Salman. He said that King Salman is not responsible for the killing of Khashoggi or the siege of Qatar.

Second: Economic relations

The economic relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey have witnessed remarkable growth, as Saudi investors succeeded in gaining a distinguished position in the Turkish economy, while Turkish investors benefited from the implementation of major infrastructure projects in the Kingdom, most notably the project of renovating and operating Prince Mohammad Bin Abdul Aziz Airport in Medina. , In partnership with a Saudi company.

The most important indicators that reflect the nature of economic relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey:

Growth of trade

The volume of trade exchange between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in 2019 about 6 billion dollars after the volume of exchanges 8 billion dollars in 2012, and affected by trade between the two countries as a result of the Syrian crisis. Saudi exports to Turkey amount to 2.5 billion dollars, against imports from Turkey by 3.5 billion dollars. In the last eight years, trade between Saudi Arabia and Turkey totaled \$ 50 billion. The data show that the average monthly value of Turkish exports to Saudi Arabia reached \$ 270 million between 2014 and 2017. In the context of increasing cooperation and development in relations, the Saudi-Turkish Businessmen Forum, held in November 2017, called for facing regional economic challenges, enhancing joint investments between the two countries, and establishing bridges of cooperation between private sector companies and institutions in various fields, in order to learn about the latest technologies and exchange opportunities. The two sides look forward to increasing the volume of trade exchange between them to By 2022, Saudi investments in Turkey are estimated at more than \$ 11 billion, and are concentrated in the real estate sector in particular, which owns the largest share of foreign shares in the Turkish real estate sector, where the sector accounts for about 25%, or 249 companies, and Ankara aspires to Increase the number of Saudi companies in their country. Saudi investments in Turkey include industry, energy and food. On the other hand, the number of Turkish companies in Saudi Arabia amounted to about 200 companies until 2016 with an investment of \$ 642 million. To support and encourage trade relations between the two countries, an active Saudi-Turkish business council, comprising

businessmen from both countries, is active. Economists believe that Turkish companies can play an important role in supporting the goals of the Kingdom's Vision 2030, which aims to dispense with oil as a major source of income in Saudi Arabia.

Recovery of tourism

The number of Saudi tourists arriving in Turkey in the first half of 2018 increased by 35% compared to previous years. The number of Saudi tourists to Turkey in recent years has increased significantly, reaching an average number in 2014, 2015 and 2016 to 250 thousand tourists per year. The number of people visiting Turkey in 2018 rose to 620,000 Saudi tourists, according to Turkish Ambassador to Riyadh Erdogan Kok. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, ranks sixth among the countries where Turks live outside their countries. The number of expatriates in Turkey more than 100,000 expatriates, mostly working in the fields of dentistry and professional work such as barbershops, restaurants and gas shops (17).

Diversity of trade

The fields of trade between the two countries have diversified, and the most important exports of Turkey in the fields of electronic products and food industries, construction and communications, electrical, clothing, equipment and machinery, packaging, building materials and decoration, textiles, leather, machinery and machine tools and parts, carpets, cars and parts.

While exports from the Saudi side were organic chemical products, metal products, plastics and articles thereof, aluminum and articles thereof, and fruits (18).

Increase the volume of investments for companies

Turkish businessmen submitted projects worth \$ 1 billion in 2015 in vital sectors such as construction, infrastructure, health and telecommunications. The number of Turkish companies in the Kingdom reached about 200 companies by 2016 with an investment of \$ 642 million and the number of joint projects between the two countries is about 159 projects. Of these, 41 are industrial projects and 118 are in non-industrial fields and parts thereof. There are about 800 Saudi companies operating in Turkey with a total turnover of US \$ 17 billion and a capital exceeding US \$ 600 million. The total number of companies opened in Turkey in various sectors during the last five years amounted to 310.019 companies,

Saudi projects in Turkey

There are 25 Saudi companies investing in the field of technology worth

\$ 100 billion in Turkey, large and medium projects, and Saudi Aramco signed memorandums of understanding with 18 Turkish companies at the end of 2016 in line with the Saudi Vision 2030, as well as commercial exchange companies, real estate companies and agricultural and active and growing projects. At the level of Turkey (19).

In light of the economic conditions experienced by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the economic factor plays a vital role in defusing inter-political differences. Saudi Arabia is facing economic pressures following the decline in the world oil price, in addition to its military and economic involvement in Yemen. On the other hand, Turkey is facing internal political challenges, high inflation rate, and the instability of the exchange rate, which was the last stop in August 2018, where the Turkish lira reached historic lows, and unlike the Saudi economy, the Turkish economy is a product based on industry, production, tourism and investments. Thus, the need for Saudi investments and companies in Turkey is an important factor in how Turkey deals with Saudi Arabia. All this explains the keenness of the two countries for political and diplomatic communication, even in light of their inter-crisis, and to maintain the minimum level of relations. The diplomatic representation so far between the two countries at the highest level, has not been reduced, despite the successive crises that almost rocked these relations.

Third: Military Relations

The qualitative transfer witnessed by the Saudi-Turkish relations has increased the pace of joint cooperation in all fields, including the military field, and bilateral relations have acquired a military dimension since 2013 (21).

The two countries sought to exchange experiences and mutual understanding in the field of military training, where 2016 witnessed four joint military exercises between them. The Saudi Air Force participated in the "Light in June 2016" exercise at the Konya military base in central Turkey, and was the third military exercise involving Saudi Arabia and Turkey in two months. About two weeks after the conclusion of the exercise "Eagle Anatolia 4- 2016 ", and (EFES 2016), who conducted in Turkey and participated with Saudi Arabia.

The Anatolian Eagle 4-2016 is the world's oldest and largest joint combat air combat exercise. The EFES 2016 is one of the largest military exercises in the world in terms of the number of troops involved and the breadth of the war scene for the exercise between Ankara and Izmir. Turkey also participated in the "Northern Thunder" exercises, northern Saudi Arabia,

between 27 February and 11 March 2016, with the participation of forces from 20 countries, as well as the forces of the “shield of the island”.

In cooperation with the Saudi Company for Development and Technical Investment “Technia”, the Turkish company Asilsan for Military and Electronic Industries has established a company specialized in advanced electronic defense industries in Saudi Arabia. Assilsan explained that the new capital of the company is \$ 6 million, adding that the joint company aims to manufacture, design and develop radars, electronic warfare equipment, visual vision, and meet the needs of Saudi Arabia and the region of these equipment. It also aims to qualify the Saudi human cadres in this field, as well as provide maintenance and development services related to its fields for the military and security sectors, and this is a very important breakthrough in the cooperation between Riyadh and Ankara, in the military industries related to the response to electronic wars (23).

As part of the Saudi-Turkish counterterrorism cooperation, Saudi Air Force fighter jets landed at Incirlik Air Base on February 26, 2016, as part of the International Coalition to Combat ISIS. Saudi Arabia, in mid-January 2017, hosted a conference of chiefs of general staff in 14 countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, Nigeria, the United States and nine other Arab countries, and all confirmed in their conclusion their support for the operation of the ‘Euphrates Shield’ to fight ISIS. Turkey is a prominent member of the Islamic Military Coalition to Combat Terrorism, announced by Saudi Arabia.

Fourth: Cultural relations

There is a mutual and mutual desire between Saudi Arabia and Turkey in cultural cooperation and exchange of visits since the signing of the cultural cooperation agreement in 1976, and the opening of the Saudi cultural days in the capital, Ankara, which included images of Saudi cultural, literary and artistic reality embodied in exhibitions, lectures, evenings, concerts and artistic performances, which gave a good impression of culture. The Saudi arts have left a positive image of the common features of two Muslim peoples who meet in several elements including history, religion and common destiny. The strengthening of cultural relations is supported by the Saudi and Turkish leaderships. It is a necessary and essential support to activate and enrich these relations. Here comes the role of Saudi and Turkish cultural institutions to invest this political support to strengthen cultural relations between them (25). Saudi Arabia receives annually, and throughout the year, tens of thousands of Turks to perform Umrah and Hajj, their religious visit can be invested to provide some of the Turkish

culture in the Saudi cultural center through official and private cultural platforms such as literary clubs, universities, cultural forums, and others. Visits to Turkish intellectuals and pilgrims who wish to perform pilgrims to some of the Kingdom's cultural landmarks, and to organize intellectual and cultural dialogues between Saudi and Turkish intellectuals. The seasons of Hajj and Umrah are a great opportunity for the Muslim peoples in general to meet, dialogue and converge in order to reach an Islamic cultural movement that highlights the conscious, enlightened and tolerant Islamic culture. On the other hand, thousands of Saudis travel to Turkey every year as tourists. In a similar way, the influx of Saudi tourists to Turkey to introduce Saudi culture can be invested through prior coordination, by holding lectures, seminars and concerts by Saudi tourists to introduce features of Saudi society culture to Turkish society. Tourism is a manifestation of culture, and cultural tourism is an essential part of the tourism industry. Accordingly, the seasons of Hajj, Umrah, and tourism seasons can be used to organize cultural events that highlight the cultural richness of the two countries.

The Saudi-Turkish cooperation in various political, economic, military and cultural fields has left a deep and positive impact on the two governments to strengthen, activate and deepen their bilateral relations.

The third topic: the challenges facing the Saudi-Turkish relations

Saudi-Turkish relations face a number of important challenges that have had a major impact in making these relations between the tides and the most prominent of these challenges:

First, the Syrian crisis

The Syrian crisis has been a strong motive for a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement in order to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whether in political, military, logistical coordination or training of armed opposition groups. However, as the Syrian issue worsened, and turned into a regional and then international conflict, the two countries no longer combined the efforts of the two countries and motivated the rapprochement between them. Therefore, the motives of each of them differed in supporting the opposition. Turkey supported forces that it considers close to it in a neighboring country of strategic importance to it. While Saudi Arabia supported the opposition in Syria against the expansion of Iranian influence. The Saudi-Turkish rivalry and the support of both rival opposition factions seeking to overthrow Bashar al-Assad's rule have fragmented the Syrian opposition arena and squandered its efforts in side battles that prolonged the confrontation, turning it into a costly and bitter civil conflict.

On the other hand, the balance of military forces on the ground is in favor of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and effective international and regional attitudes have receded from the idea of the departure of Bashar al-Assad, and the possibility of integrating it in a transitional phase and even beyond. Now an official public statement expressing its abandonment of support for the opposition and the demand for the departure of “Bashar”, but preliminary indications indicate that there is a relative decline in the Saudi position in this regard, especially with the raised the claim of former Saudi Foreign Minister “Adel al-Jubeir” Syrian opposition To accept that Bashar al-Assad remain in power (27), Saudi Arabia is demanding that the Higher Negotiating Body expand its forces to include other opposition groups supported by Russia and Egypt. [28] It is likely that there will be new Saudi engagement in the Syrian crisis, especially as the intra-Gulf crisis intensifies, and Saudi Arabia needs to calm some Other regional files.

On the other hand, Turkey has actually retreated from the idea of supporting the opposition in order to overthrow the regime, and focus on the Kurdish threat, which is the greatest threat to Turkish national security, and the operation of the Euphrates Shield launched by Turkey on 24 August 2016 (29) can be considered as the most prominent station for this development. Where Turkey abandoned the overthrow of the regime of “President Bashar al-Assad,” and announced that its military intervention in northern Syria; in order to face the threat of Daesh and Kurdish only, with the consent and Russian approval. The Turkish-Russian agreement went into several agreements, starting with the agreement to get the opposition out of Aleppo after its military defeat, followed by agreements on the areas of de-escalation in Astana with Iranian participation and the absence of Saudi Arabia, then the agreement on the entry of factions of the “Free Army” supported by land from Turkey. And from Russia to Idlib province, in order to remove the HTS (which includes a number of factions led by the Fateh al-Sham Front) from the province, and to include them in the low-escalation areas.

Turkey’s assertiveness in dealing with the Syrian crisis, which is based on its abandonment of the issue of the departure of President Bashar al-Assad, its focus on confronting the Kurds, agreement with Russia on this and areas of de-escalation, as well as Saudi support for the Kurds in the eastern Syria region, are reasons for the looming relations Saudi Arabia is currently Turkish (31). All this indicates that the Syrian file is no longer a motive at the present time for the need of the two countries to each other and consensus for it, and therefore will not be a file for rapprochement

even in the foreseeable future.

Second: the Gulf crisis

The convergence of relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey after the arrival of King “Salman bin Abdul Aziz” in the Kingdom, was the result of the change of Saudi central objectives towards the crises of the region, after the Kingdom was under the era of “King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz” give priority to the danger of Arab revolutions The Muslim Brotherhood at the expense of the Iranian threat in the region, which resulted from the Iranian expansion in the region, especially in the Yemeni arena, King Salman came to change these objectives by giving priority to the Iranian threat, and a Saudi openness to the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the Yemeni Brotherhood “, Which resulted It brought him a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement, until the inter-Gulf crisis came to express a new and different approach, combining the danger of the idea of political change with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian threat at the same time. Thus, although the Gulf crisis did not lead to a radical change in Saudi-Turkish relations so that there is still a degree of cooperation and rapprochement between the two countries, but it is no longer as it was after this crisis. On June 5, 2017, several countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Yemen, Egypt, and the government of eastern Libya) announced the severance of their diplomatic relations with Qatar, justifying their interference in their internal affairs and supporting terrorism. (32) Once the crisis erupted, it began to talk about their impact on the partnership. Will Saudi Arabia continue to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, or will it join Qatar against Saudi Arabia? Turkey has adopted a gradual stance in dealing with this crisis. At the outset, it adopted a neutral stance. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that he regretted the disagreement between Qatar and other Arab countries and called for dialogue to resolve the conflict. However, on June 7, 2017, the Turkish parliament passed a bill allowing the deployment of Turkish troops in Qatar. Hence, Turkey began to abandon its policy of neutrality, moving to align with Qatar in this crisis, and in confirmation of its position in support of Qatar, Erdogan said on June 9, 2017, that Turkey will continue to support its Qatari brothers, and will not leave them alone (34).

There are several motives behind the Turkish position in support of Qatar,

- 1- It is the fragility of the Turkish-Gulf alliance, with the exception of its alliance with Qatar; due to the negative Gulf view, which is apprehensive to Turkey, then a country aspires to a dominant regional ambition.
2. Turkey joins Qatar in supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas,

and Turkey fears that it will then be confronted with the same tools that Qatar has faced. Consequently, Qatar's defeat is a defeat for Turkey on this premise.

3 - Erdogan's conviction that one of the Gulf states is behind the failed coup attempt, which took place in Turkey on July 15, 2016, may be motivated to retaliate against him, which leads him to line up with Qatar in the confrontation. On June 9, 2017, Erdogan stated that he knew very well who was happy in the Gulf when Turkey was overthrown. (35)

4 - Economic hardship related to the Qatari gas sector, and the possibility of exporting through pipelines passing through Turkey and then to Europe is not far.

Because of this crisis, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Turkey faces several problems, as Turkey has sought to use the crisis in its favor, by pushing a new Ottoman agenda that expands at the expense of the Gulf Cooperation Council (36). As a result, the most prominent Saudi newspapers launched a stinging attack on Turkey and charged it with serious accusations, amounting to supporting terrorism and intervening in the affairs of Arab countries to destabilize them. Saudi Arabia threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey to curb the "Turkish expansionist policy."

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Saudi Arabia of being un-Islamic and heretical. In addition, Turkey deployed forces to defend the government of Qatar against a coup attempt by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On March 1, 2018, MBC Saudi Arabia stopped broadcasting dubbed Turkish series to Arabic for the sake of higher Arab interest. Also in March, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman referred to Turkey as part of the "Triangle of Evil" alongside Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Third: Relationship with the United States of America

Turkish-American relations are tense as a result of the US position in support of the "democratic forces of Syria" in the face of IS, and increased tension after the failed coup attempt, after the United States refused to extradite Turkey, the cleric "Fethullah Gulen," which Turkey accuses of masterminding the coup attempt, And condemn the file of human rights in Turkey after this failed attempt. US-Turkish tension has seen new successive stops, where it has moved into a phase of escalating executive measures. The impact of US-Turkish tension on Turkish-Saudi relations can be seen in two angles,

- The role of the United States as a mediator, can resolve differences and strengthen relations between two strategic allies, and since the US-Turkish

relations are tense, the US ability to play this role is weak.

2 - The United States may use Saudi Arabia to quarrel with Turkey, in light of the tension between Turkey and America. This was evident earlier in Trump's role in pushing Saudi Arabia to strengthen its relations with Iraq in order to crowd out Iranian influence in Iraq. Just as Saudi Arabia has a common goal with the United States in the face of Iranian influence, they also have a common goal in quarreling with Turkey. Through coordination with the United States to support the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (40).

Fourth: the Khashoggi crisis

The crisis of the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 is one of the most serious and serious crises that threaten Saudi-Turkish relations now, which can in one way or another determine the future of strategic relations between the two countries.

Since the early days of the crime, Turkey has sought through all means and methods not to turn it into a direct political and economic crisis with Saudi Arabia, in order to maintain relations between the two countries, where Turkey worked from the beginning to internationalize the case through its media strategy to make the demands of the investigation and punish officials international. In order not to be a direct political crisis between the two countries, and has already succeeded in making pressure on Saudi Arabia come from the United States and European capitals, which made it difficult for Riyadh to count directly crisis with Turkey only, also gave Turkey a large time space for Saudi Arabia to submit his novel In "saves water and her face" and to emphasize that what happened does not reflect the official policy of Saudi Arabia and that the crime was carried out by young Saudi officials without the knowledge of senior leadership. In turn, after the incident, Prince Mohammed bin Salman rejected the idea of a dispute with Turkey, saying that "many of them are trying to drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia and Turkey. ... They will not be able to do so as long as there is King Salman, Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdogan."

Riyadh had admitted at the end of October 2018 that a security team had misbehaved in Istanbul, which led to the killing of the Saudi journalist, and detained 18 Saudis involved in the case, then on December 5, 2018, the Turkish judiciary issued an arrest warrant for the former deputy chief of Saudi intelligence, "Ahmed Asiri and Saud Al-Qahtani, an adviser to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, on suspicion of involvement

in the crime and Turkey demanded Saudi Arabia to extradite the accused for trial in Turkey, but the Kingdom refused and insisted on the completion of the trial on Saudi territory. On January 3, 2019, the Saudi Public Prosecution demanded the death penalty for five defendants and the case is still under trial in Riyadh. Riyadh also agreed to form a joint Saudi-Turkish working group. The public prosecutor in Riyadh indicated that it had previously asked its Turkish counterpart to provide them with evidence and evidence, including all the sound recordings held by the Turkish side related to this issue, and to sign a special cooperation mechanism. With the Turkish side, to provide them with the results of investigations in accordance with the provisions of the regime, and to request their evidence and evidence to support or contradict with the findings reached for the benefit of them (42). However, after weeks of talks and maneuvers, Riyadh was convinced that President Erdogan's demands were far greater than the price it had prepared to pay. The trial in Istanbul is the site of the crime. Almost a month after Khashoggi's murder, Erdogan directly accused the Saudi government of killing the journalist. "We know that the killing of Khashoggi came from the highest levels of the Saudi government," Erdogan said. He also said that "masters of puppets behind Khashoggi's death" would be revealed.

Despite the lapse of the incident and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia taking all legal proceedings against the defendants, where they were charged with murder and facing a death sentence by hanging in Riyadh, these investigations did not satisfy the "Erdogan," who has been using the case politically to pressure Riyadh in several cases. One threatens an international investigation into the incident. On January 24, 2019, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavah Çoşlu confirmed that it was time to open an international investigation into the Khashoggi case, stressing that President Erdogan had given orders to turn the issue to an international level, but Riyadh rejected all calls for internationalization of the case. Former Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir at the conclusion of the 39th Gulf Summit held in Riyadh on December 9, 2018, his country refused to extradite any of its citizens to Turkey or any other country, and was the position of "al-Jubeir" to respond to the request of Istanbul Prosecution to hand over five Saudi citizens to start an investigation For their involvement in the killing of Khashoggi.

The president renewed "Erdogan" in an interview on February 15, 2019, his country intends to continue to internationalize the case and stressed that his country has information and documents on the incident has not

yet disclosed and will seek to bring this case to the International Tribunal. Agnes Kalamard, commander of the UN team to investigate the death of Jamal Khashoggi at the country's consulate in Istanbul and left Turkey on February 8, 2019, said she had not received all the information she had requested from the authorities in Turkey. On January 24, 2019, the United Nations announced the launch of an unofficial international investigation into the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. UN Special Rapporteur Agnes Kalamard on extrajudicial executions began her visit to Turkey on January 28, 2019 to begin investigations into the incident. The UN rapporteur noted that she is conducting an investigation on her own initiative in accordance with the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur, as there are no indications today that the United Nations and its member states intend to conduct an official international investigation into the killing of the Saudi journalist, as announced by the Secretary-General of the United Nations "Antonio Guterres said that he could only initiate an official international investigation into the incident at the request of the General Assembly or the UN Security Council, so the UN investigation to date is unofficial, and Guterres praised the measures taken by Riyadh to investigate the case. (44) .

After Ankara concluded that Mohammed bin Salman, the most hostile in the ruling family, was in fact in control of the Saudi government, and after the possibility of King Salman's removal and further embarrassment, the kingdom's options were limited to either. By directly escalating against bin Salman and thus entering into a direct political and economic crisis with Saudi Arabia, or accepting a solution with bin Salman directly to close the Khashoggi file in exchange for improving and developing political and economic relations extensively. These two options seem harder than some of the Turkish leadership, which has made a strategic decision to avoid direct escalation with Saudi Arabia and maintain relations with it. In light of these difficult options, Turkey seems closer to the compromise of continuing its current policy, which has been followed since the beginning of the crisis, those based on not allowing at all to cover up the crime and the continued pressure on Saudi Arabia, but in a quiet diplomatic manner based on the policy of internationalization and mobilization of external parties and leaks Media to avoid entering into a direct crisis with the Kingdom (45).

In particular, the repercussions of all the differences between Riyadh and Ankara, most notably the Khashoggi killing, will torpedo any signs of rapprochement between Ankara and Riyadh in the short and medium term and warn that the scope of the dispute between the two countries will widen in

the future.

In addition, there are a number of factors that Saudi Arabia considers negatively affect the future of its relations with Turkey, most notably the movements of Turkish foreign policy, the most important of which are:

1- Turkey has excellent strategic relations with Iran, which Saudi Arabia classifies as its main enemy and a source of tampering with Arab national security and interference in the internal Gulf and Arab affairs. Tehran also supports a number of armed militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, which hinder the establishment of stability in these countries. Turkish-Iranian, weakens the Saudi regional position in the face of Iran, as there is a permanent Turkish fear of Saudi support for the Kurds, as well as the continued Turkish-Iranian rapprochement would increase the gap in Turkish-Saudi relations (46)

2. Turkey supports armed groups affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood in western Libya and obstructs any UN paths to a final settlement there, as well as Ankara receives all Egyptian Brotherhood elements that broadcast satellite channels from Turkey inciting against the Egyptian state (47).

3 - Saudi Arabia criticized the ongoing Turkish military interventions in Iraq and Syria, which were represented in the coins “Euphrates Shield August 2016” and “Olive Branch 19 January 2018 ”, and described the Turkish military presence in northern Syria as a “ Turkish occupation ” of Syria and refuses to establish a safe area under the control of Turkey in northern Syria.

4 - Saudi Arabia criticized the establishment of Turkish military bases in Sudan (the rehabilitation of the city of Suakin 2018, Somalia April 2017) in addition to the Turkish moves in Africa and the signing of strategic trade agreements with Algeria, Mauritania and Tunisia during an African tour by the end of 2018, which represents competition.

5 - “Erdogan” exploited the breach of the Qatari-Saudi dispute to establish a military base in the region of “many” in the heart of the Arabian Gulf with a diameter of 30 thousand troops and the number is increasing, and rejects his Foreign Minister, “Mevlik Gavishoglu,” always close the Turkish military base in Qatar and described these demands as unrealistic This is what Riyadh considers a breakthrough for its national security through the presence of Turkish and Iranian military bases in Qatar (48).

6 - obsessed with the competition between Saudi Arabia and Turkey to lead the Islamic world, Erdogan since the beginning of his political career has been seeking to return to the hegemony of the Ottomans and aspires that Turkey is the main center in the Islamic world, which did not agree

with him as the rest of the Arab countries (49). This Turkish external behavior is anti-Saudi.

Conclusion

The development of Saudi - Turkish relations in recent years was based on meeting common challenges such as the Iranian factor, the Syrian crisis and other issues, as well as achieving common economic interests. However, new challenges and the interface of these relations have made it risky. The Iranian factor is no longer the motivation for their rapprochement, after the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement on the impact of the Kurdish crisis, and the unwillingness of Turkey to confront it directly with Iran for political and economic motives. Turkey has backed away from demanding the departure of Bashar al-Assad, and Saudi enthusiasm in this regard has also declined. Also came the Gulf crisis, the Turkish position in support of Qatar in the face of Saudi Arabia and its allies, and the absence of the US role as a mediator for their differences between them. As well as the Khashoggi crisis, to negatively affect their interrelationships levels of improvement and cooperation is declining. Although Saudi-Turkish relations are now tense and politically tense and are not as they have been since King Salman came to power in 2015, these challenges have not led to a sharp escalation in Saudi-Turkish relations. Maintaining a normal level of bilateral relations and a degree of cooperation. There has not been a break in diplomatic relations, or even a reduction in the level of diplomatic representation between the two countries, or a break in economic relations. Perhaps the motive behind the parties' determination to maintain their normal relations so far is Saudi Arabia's keenness not to be hostile to the two regional powers in the region "Turkey and Iran" at the same time, and Turkey's keenness to win Saudi Arabia in the face of Kurdish dangers, and to ensure that the Kingdom does not support the Kurds. As well as inter-economic cooperation. Based on the foregoing, it can be said that the future of Saudi-Turkish relations in the short and medium term will not change much from what it is now, but there is a factor that can push relations to a different path and a new curve, dominated by tension and sharp escalation open to all possibilities, if anyone plays The two parties have papers that are related to the national security of the other party, such as the Kurdish paper for Saudi Arabia or the Yemeni file for Turkey, which is a very unlikely possibility.

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