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The Iraqi-Iranian War (1980-1988) And The International And Regional Situation

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Abstract

The Iranian-Iraqi war has received a great deal of attention both internationally and regionally, because the geographical location of these two countries is very important for the presence of oil wealth in the world, especially on the Gulf countries, in addition to the great oil resources found in the ground in the war mikkid. This war was a competitive struggle between two different states in every way. Each side of the conflict has goals and objectives in the region that are trying to achieve them, and they were completely convinced that when one of them gets what he wants, it is necessary not to achieve that for the other side. The Iraqi-Iranian differences did not remain before the start of the war in accordance with the concept of international conflict, which is often through conflict or transition to threat and pressure and bargaining and containment, but what happened, the differences between the two countries has become clear and sharp through the media and verbal conflict . This conflict and conflict resulted in a military confrontation that lasted from 1980 to 1988, which caused a great deal of damage to both countries. The regional, Arab and international countries were far from observing that war and tried to intervene in order to influence the stirring up of that war. Intervention diplomatically or militarily and even the use of political means.

La guerra iraquí-iraní (1980-1988) y la situación internacional y regional

Resumen

La guerra iraní-iraquí ha recibido mucha atención tanto internacional como regionalmente, porque la ubicación geográfica de estos dos países es muy importante para la presencia de riqueza petrolera en el mundo, especialmente en los países del Golfo, además del gran petróleo. recursos encontrados en el suelo en la guerra iraquí-iraní. Esta guerra fue una lucha competitiva entre dos estados diferentes en todos los sentidos. Cada lado del conflicto tiene metas y objetivos en la región que intentan alcanzarlos, y estaban completamente convencidos de que cuando uno de ellos obtiene lo que quiere, es necesario no lograrlo para el otro lado. Las diferencias iraquí-iraníes no se mantuvieron antes del comienzo de la guerra de acuerdo con el concepto de conflicto internacional, que a menudo es a través del conflicto o la transición a la amenaza y la presión y la negociación y la contención, pero lo que sucedió, las diferencias entre los dos países ha llegado a ser claro y agudo a través de los medios y el conflicto verbal. Este conflicto y conflicto dio lugar a una confrontación militar que duró desde 1980 hasta 1988, que causó un gran daño a ambos países. Los países regionales, árabes e internacionales estaban lejos de observar esa guerra e intentaron intervenir para influir en la agitación de esa guerra. Intervención diplomática o militar e incluso el uso de medios políticos.

We will address this through two studies:

First: the US position on the developments of the war.

Second: The international position on the developments of the war.

Then the conclusion and the list of sources

The first topic

The American position on the developments of the war

The political situation that took place in the region at the end of the 1970s included political changes in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the start of the war between Iran and Iraq and the negative attitude of political decision-makers in both countries vis-à-vis the United States of America.

Together, these circumstances put the US political decision-maker with

several possibilities.

The first possibility is to leave these forces operating in accordance with their political programs that are diminishing with American interests.

The second possibility is that the United States will occupy the region in accordance with the Carter Doctrine.

The third possibility is to invest the state of conflict or to invest in the state of conflict existing among the countries of the region.

The latter option is more realistic than the other two possibilities, especially since the region contains a range of border and intellectual disputes between its countries, especially the Iraqi-Iranian dispute, ie, the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war at its stated time and within the regional and local conditions and inputs it posed did not pose any danger to The interests of the United States of America in the Gulf region. On the contrary, the outbreak of war has created conditions that serve US interests and the interests of its allies.

The strategic interest of the United States is the continued flow of oil to it and its allies, and as the continuation of the war between Iraq and Iran generates the need for more oil exports to meet the needs of war, the continuation of the war guarantees the interests of the United States of America. Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, US President Carter, who witnessed the first months of the war, called on all countries, including the Soviet Union, to refrain from interfering in the war and threatened to use military force if they needed to protect their interests in the region. The principle of Carter (5).

The United States announced that it would intervene if Iran closed the Straits of Hormuz or stopped oil exports, meaning that its position on the war was linked to the impact of the war on its interests. In November 1984, the UN Security Council passed resolution 552, The need to respect the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and to refrain from any action that would lead to the obstruction of navigation in the strait.

The events of the 1980s in the Gulf region and the Iran-Iraq war forced the United States to develop a security strategy for the Gulf region. This resulted in the so-called Carter principle, which required the United States to protect the region from any Soviet invasion. In 1983, The deployment of rapid deployment forces as a combat formation is the task of planning and implementing military operations in the Gulf. It took only a short time for this force to become a unified command that would assume the same mission and was called the Central Command. And the Central Command faces the responsibility of defending the region against any external attack

or regional threat emanating from Iran.

The Carter principle of Gulf security states that: “Any attempt by any external force to control the Persian Gulf is an attack on the vital interests of the United States of America. Such an attack will be repaid by any appropriate means, including the military response.”

The reaction of the leaders of the region to this principle, in some of them very welcoming and fearful of others, expressed their deep reservations about it. They stressed that the security of the Arab Gulf is the responsibility of its countries, as it is part of the Arab national security. Reservations are considered by everyone in the Gulf States as an explicit American commitment to protect them and protect their country and oil.

Iran did not care about the United States of America’s proposals through the Carter Doctrine, and even intensified its rhetoric by closing the Straits of Hormuz. Some western circles expected that there is a US plan to respond in cases of closure of the strait: the destruction of the Iranian Navy, control of the strait and stop any Iranian forces moving 20 kilometers from Strait Hormuz within Iranian territory itself, as a Pentagon official said: “Closing the Gulf will be a challenge to industrialized countries and we will not overlook it.”

The United States’ war policy has been one-sided for both sides: neither side wins, but none of them must be defeated, as Henry Kissinger pointed out when he said the war was over: “Neither side has the right to win either side” (11).

Therefore, the most important objectives of the US strategy towards war include:

- Prolonging the war to drain the human, economic and military resources of two important states in the Middle East, while at the same time endangering US interests. Iraq has its national approach and its position against Israel, Iran with its Islamic approach and its declared enemy of America and Israel.

- Consider war as a way to prevent two Third World countries from emerging from backwardness and moving to the level of industrialized countries. This war is a means of breaking up the Middle East in order to divide it not only in relation to the Arab Mashreq countries, but also from the Islamic belt countries stretching from Pakistan to the Mediterranean basin.

The US political position on the Iraq-Iran war can be traced back to the cold-blooded handling of Iran over the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran after the Iranian revolution. But this attitude did not last long. In all forms of military assistance. The Carter administration took advantage

of Iran's need for military support and resisted it in return for releasing the hostages it held.

With the arrival of US President Ronald Reagan to power, the situation changed completely. He took over the presidency on 20/22/1981, which came one day after the end of the hostage crisis and their full release. Therefore, his administration took a tough stance toward Iran, A serious attempt to improve its relationship with him (14).

Some US official sources said that Reagan would make radical changes in the US position toward Iran and would be prepared to fight a war against it if necessary. But he told a news conference he was not thinking of retaliation against Iran, but the issue of a settlement with the Iranian government Difficult to achieve (15).

“The United States will not supply Iran with any weapons that have already been contracted,” US Secretary of State Alexander Hague said, criticizing the former US administration for trying to free the hostages in return for a weapons deal with Iran. Despite Iran's knowledge that the Iranian side is committed to negotiating with the United States and its biggest Satan, President Reagan - in the words of the Iranians themselves - Reagan said: “I am the Great Satan, as Iran and the two horns call me, but I am prepared to talk to them. Jeb Khomeini to ask whether he wants to sit with me or not? Because I have disappointed he thinks the absence of two centuries on my head, and in spite of all this, I am ready to talk with any member of Iran) (17).

In June 1982, US Defense Secretary Kasper Weinberger said that “any victory by Iran on Iraq would not be in the interest of the United States of America.” Foreign Minister George Schultz said: “Any victory by Iran on Iraq is undesirable from the American point of view. (18).

In 1983, the Reagan administration reiterated its commitment to the need to ensure safe navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, even if the use of armed force had to be used against Iranian threats to close it. Reagan warned the Iranian government in February 1984 to consider closing the strait when he said: (Not a force that can make us allow the closure of this strait, we are determined to remain open to navigation and away from any threat). “(19) The United States imposed its restrictions on US imports in September 1984 on US exports to Iran, such as some types of aircraft, its spare parts and engines, as well as technological exports. The Reagan administration continued to impose restrictions on US imports of Iranian goods in all its forms, Which accounted for 90 percent of the total imports in 1987. The US Senate met on September 29, 1987 and decided by a 98 percent majority to

impose a ban on oil purchases and impose more restrictions on US exports to Iran. And Ronald Reagan in his official statement of 27 October 1987. In 1987, as well as a reaction to US policy against Iran, the latter intensified its bombardment of Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers, as well as a US ship called Samuel Roberts. The Kuwaiti government resorted to the United States requesting that oil be transported to US tankers.).

Although the logic of the balance of power imposes on the United States to support Iraq after Iran launched its attacks during the Iraq-Iran war, Washington - as we said - did not lose hope of restoring relations with Iran, where some of the advisers of President Ronald Reagan, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane said that Iran remained the most important geopolitical region in the Gulf region and sought an opportunity to reopen a dialogue with Tehran. They also achieved President Reagan's desire to free American hostages held by Lebanese Shiite groups as a prelude to rapprochement with the Republic. Except Despite the opposition of the foreign and defense ministers to this initiative, President Reagan agreed to open a secret channel to arm Iran. The channel passed through Israel during 1985-1986 in return for the release of the American hostages held in Lebanon. (Contra) against the Marxist regime in Nicaragua. The Iran-Contra scandal was revealed by a Lebanese newspaper in 1986, thereby severing the relationship based on the principle of arms versus hostages. It is worth mentioning that it is important to go back to the background of this scandal when it began when the Newsweek magazine published in its issue of 12/22/1986 reported that the United States of America, through Israel, sent US weapons to Iran despite the decision to ban arms exports About American hostages held in Lebanon, with the knowledge of US President Reagan himself.

The seriousness of the situation is that US President Reagan, with his consent, and his signing of the administrative order to send weapons to Iran in secret, violated the 1979 US presidential decision banning the export of arms to Iran. 24 He also deceived international public opinion in general and the United States in particular By insisting on his false statements to impose a ban on the export of arms to Iran, whether from America or other countries of the world producing weapons, and also violated his administration's clear directions on improving relations with Iraq and condemning all acts of military aggression, and Reagan in this behavior has also violated the policy A constant which is laid its foundations by himself in dealing with terrorists, which boils down to the principle of (make sure that terrorism does not benefit from the activity, if it is found Khatefoa

hostages, they can sell their hostages will not crimes) stop (25).

The scandal emerged when one of the hostages held in Lebanon was released on 2 September 1986, two days before the US midterm elections. About a week later, President Reagan sought to establish contacts with Iran to improve relations with it and try to launch The remaining American hostages were released (26).

The US National Security Council, led by Robert McFarlane, has held several meetings to seek a more effective policy toward Iran and to ensure that it is not lost because of the war with Iraq, Khomeini's deteriorating health and the internal power struggle in Iran if he dies. , And the possibility of leading Iraq to the Arabian Gulf in the case of victory, knowing that the US administration in the meantime did not have any contacts with influential elements within Iran, so the US National Security Council decided to provide Iran with weapons through US allies and not by random.

Some Reagan administration officials objected to providing arms to Iran as Secretary of State George Schultz, who said: "This move will encourage terrorism." Defense Secretary Kasper Weinberger also said: "If the Iranians do not get what they want, they will threaten to expose this scandal. In contrast, Reagan's position emerged immediately after the scandal was announced on 12 February 1986: "An American would make a grave mistake if Khomeini, an 86-year-old adult, died without having prepared for this by making contact with the elements of the Iranian regime that would succeed him (28).

In analyzing the behavior of US foreign policy, especially the Iraq-Iran war, the dominant model reveals three axes of US strategy. The first is that US policy is a separate world from its domestic policy; secondly, it is largely concerned with its security; and third, economic interests play an important role. In the determination of its foreign policy, all linked to the concept of power and interest in maintaining the balance of power in areas of international conflicts affecting US interests.

In any case, the United States and Iran did not confront each other immediately after the fall of the Shah, but the two countries maintained diplomatic relations, and each took a step to reassure the other, and Iran's consent to pay its debts to the United States is proof of this.

It has become known to everyone that any event in the world finds its resonance in the two superpowers, but the strength and impact of this resonance remain connected to the importance of the place of that event. Areas are important for the two superpowers in terms of their natural and strategic resources or geographical location. The Soviet behavior in the Middle

East in general and in the Arabian Gulf region in particular was determined by the Soviet Union, like other countries in the world, which sought to achieve its interests and maintain its national security, and resorted to using the same tools adopted by a group of countries As a basis To deal internationally at some point, although the intellectual framework is different in this context.

There are a number of variables in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf, which give the general strategic lines a special or distinctive formula in the decision-making process associated with this region, both for the former Soviet Union or for the Western Camp and the United States, Therefore, Iraq and Iran were important for the former Soviet Union.

The second topic

The international position of war

In the first year of the Iran-Iraq war, the former Soviet president, Leon Barr, gave a speech to the Indian parliament on January 10, 1980, at which the main points were 31.

- No military bases in the Arabian Gulf and adjacent islands, or the dispatch of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction there.
- Not to use or threaten to use force against the Gulf States and refrain from interfering in their internal affairs.
- Respect for the sovereign rights of the States of the region over their natural resources.
- Do not create obstacles or threats to normal commercial exchange or the use of sea routes linking this region with other countries.

“His country is a loyal defender of the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace,” he added.

The former Soviet Union, which was cautious in the regional crises in the Persian Gulf region, began when the Iran-Iraq conflict began on the border. Since the first weeks of the war, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko has asserted the neutrality of the Soviet Union, describing the conflict between Iraq and Iran as meaningless, Folds for both countries, and his country will stand neutral from the Gulf War.

A senior Soviet official described the war between Iran and Iraq as the strangest dispute in the history of mankind. Former Soviet president Leonid Bargenev called on the parties to the conflict to go to the negotiating table and warned that the United States would take the war as a pretext for military intervention in Iran and the entire region. 34).

“They are the people who are not happy with the agreement of the anti-colonial forces in the Middle East, including those who want to take control of the Middle East and the Near East,” he said. “We believe that, This age can not and can not be the way to settle the conflict between states and it becomes even more dangerous if this war is in a sensitive area like the Middle East.

The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of Russia noted that this war is very useful for the imperialists who dream day and night of restoring their positions in the region.

The Soviet leaders went to establish good relations with the new regime in Iran as they went to stop the processing of weapons to Iraq. As the Iraqi defense minister pointed out, “We have not received from the Soviet Union or a single cartridge since the beginning of the war and until now, (37).

This position of the Soviet Union prompted Iraq to find alternatives to obtaining arms and not relying on it. This was confirmed by the Information Minister of Iraq to Al-Nahar newspaper on June 21, 1982, saying: “Iraq henceforth will not discuss comprehensively the weapons from the Soviet Union” 38).

The Soviet Union has offered to supply Iran with weapons since the beginning of the war, and former Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Rajai informed the Soviet ambassador in Tehran of this content. The Iranian prime minister asked the ambassador not to send weapons to Iraq. The Iranian defense has visited the Soviet Union to purchase weapons, aircraft, SAM 6 and SAM 7 radar and anti-aircraft missiles. This approach was confirmed by the Iranian ambassador to Moscow at a press conference held at his embassy in Moscow, With Soviet weapons in exchange for arms shipments to Iraq.

“We are buying military equipment every time we see our interest in that,” he said. “There is an agreement to send a large number of military and civilian experts, The first batch arrived in Tehran, so Iran was able to recover its military build-up due to Soviet military aid, and the Soviets equipped Iran with spare parts for their Soviet weapons.

Information emerged that the Soviet Union gave its full weight to Iran in its war against Iraq, supplying Iran with a large number of information, military equipment and experts in the first year of the war, not only in direct form but also indirectly. Iran obtained tanks Soviet state through an Arab state.

The cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran did not continue at the same level for several reasons, including Iraq’s strong ability to repel Iranian

attacks on its borders and the strength of the home front, and its position for peace and an end to the war and Tehran's response to these calls. Now, with the Iraqis, the Iranians have tried to overthrow the Iraqi regime for four years, but what has happened is that the regime has remained steadfast as a tree. Despite all the hurricanes it has faced, it has not lost a single fruit, and we believe that the defeat of Iraq is a defeat for the Arabs. 42).

The Soviet Union also reconsidered its assessment of the Iranian revolution as directed against the US presence, when it was confirmed that there were relations between Iran and Washington or there were US weapons reaching Iran, and there was also an armistice between Iran and Israel. Has remained the road and has been floundering at the crossroads brought to it by the internal and international reaction, events are taking place in the opposite direction initiated by the Iranian People's Movement.

The Soviet perception was that the new regime in Iran would help to reduce US influence in the region, which could have been dissipated by Iran's continued relationship with the United States. The Soviets said they had picked up the first reference to US and Israeli aid to Iran from Newsweek, The US military plans to continue supplying Iran with all the equipment it needs to sustain the war against Iraq and keep the conflict going, which means instability in the region and gives an excuse to mobilize a US military presence in the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet Union considered the Iranian position of the Tudeh Party to be directed against the national elements in Iran. Iran's desire for war reprisals from Iraq helped to escalate the common chauvinism campaign in Iran and provided an opportunity for unjustified repression against Iranian patriots, To physically cleanse them of satisfaction in Washington, and to push some US officials to turn a blind eye to some of the minor crimes committed by the Iranian leadership in the first phase of the war.

The Soviet Union also realized that the Iranian regime was pursuing it through the Afghan issue and freezing the pumping of gas, and considered Iran a base for attacks against neighboring countries.

He also realized the lack of credibility of the new regime and its national and revolutionary claims, and shelved many promises to improve the conditions and standard of living that the Iranian government lavished on it following the overthrow of the Shah.

Although the relations between the Soviet Union and Iran are less than they were, the Soviet Union tried to keep the bridges open with Iran and try to take advantage of opportunities to expand its influence in Tehran, and the Soviet Union will defend the sovereignty of the countries of the

region to be the cushion of their fate, Good with Tehran (48).

It seems to us that the Soviet Union viewed the Iran-Iraq war as a war between two neighboring countries with important ties to the Soviet Union, but it seems that the Soviet Union showed more inclination towards Iran, especially at the beginning of the war by supplying it with multiple aid. The war showed significant Iraqi superiority, and the Soviet reservation to Iran emerged after its conviction of Iranian-American-Israeli relations.

The Turkish political situation is characterized by extreme sensitivity to the political and military events and conflicts in the region, including its position on the Iran-Iraq war, which was characterized by a policy of war and terrorism. Its neutrality, its foreign policy, involved non-interference and the search for a peaceful solution and cessation of the war.

Turkey sought to develop its relations with all the countries of the region, including its main interests, and tried to contribute to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is essential in the regional conflict. Besides, the Gulf became more important after the oil crisis, Iraq is one of the factors affecting peace in the region.

In the light of this policy of Turkish neutrality from the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Turks were keen to emphasize this neutral stance and their desire to end the war, but Turkey's search for a political role is trying to emerge from its return to its eastern roots and to improve its relations with the Middle East. And five years after the beginning of the war to strengthen its regional role among the countries of the region and its Western allies. In confirmation of this, the Turkish president's declaration during his visit to Saudi Arabia in 1984, expressed his readiness to go to Tehran if such Work is necessary for it War, and visit Turgut Ozal to Iran in April / 1984, he tried to ask the idea of Turkey's mediation, but his visit has not achieved anything in this area, because Iranian officials have refused to do such a role Turkey (50).

The Turks tried either through their membership in the Committee of Good Islamic Attempts or through their unilateral move to mediate an end to the conflict. This move is due to the fact that the atmosphere of tension caused by the war affects in one way or another Turkey, as the continuation of the war and the dangers of its expansion must be a concern for fear and anxiety. Turkish officials, especially as they fear being a party to the conflict if their circle expands by virtue of their Middle East orientations, may resort to Turkey out of the neutrality of a party and thus become entangled in this conflict, which can take on an international character. Officials, the Turkish president He said: "We are a spoiler of the Iraq-Iran war, and we are concerned about this, and Turkey has made and continues to make

every effort to end this war peacefully.”

“We are deeply saddened by the war between two friendly countries and it is our greatest wish that this suffocating war ends for two brotherly and friendly countries, a war that threatened the natural well-being of both countries,” one Turkish politician said.

The Turks benefited from their neutral role in that war to secure Iraq and Iran’s need for Turkish goods and facilities, which means that the Turkish-Iranian relations continued to develop with the development of the economic side. This in turn reduces the chances for Turkey to play the role of neutral mediator in resolving the conflict. Turkish Prime Minister: (Their accession to the Islamic mediation committee was believed to be more effective in putting an early end to the war, and Turkey is determined to make every effort to stop this conflict), but there is another statement to Prime Minister Ozal clarifying the role Turkish future in the “Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states should be well aware that their future and stability in the region depend on the stability of Turkey, which has become the main stabilizing factor in the Middle East in the wake of recent developments in Iran.”

Based on the above, the Turkish position maintained a policy of keeping the stick in half in a way that would secure a regional role in the future while preserving its relations with the two warring countries. In general, Turkey’s position was not far from the position of the United States and Western countries, To look at Iraq and Iran and thus reduce the Soviet role in this conflict to the extent that does not give him strategic priorities in relation to the Middle East.

The international relations are based on the interests of countries, some of them to the other, since economic relations can not be separated from political positions, and that the principles interact with these interests affect and are affected by, and hence can discuss the position of any country in the world of events to find an explanation for that position of those events , And can examine the Japanese position of the Iran-Iraq war according to those data.

Japan supported Security Council Resolution 479 on September 28, 1980, on the cessation of hostilities. The Japanese government later expressed its concern about the continuation or expansion of military operations in order to ensure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and reiterated its call for no third party to intervene in the conflict, In this context, the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers called on the United States of America on 29 January 1980 to exercise caution in equipping Iran with

military equipment.

Japan has shown its official willingness to play any role that would contribute to stopping the fighting between Iraq and Iran, but its efforts in this direction are not commensurate with its international standing as the third largest economic power in the world. The importance of stopping the war between Iraq and Iran for Japan's national security, and showing Japan its continued interest in ending the state of war and restoring stability in the region.

During a visit to Iran and Iraq in August 1983 by Japan's Foreign Minister, Shantaruabi, in a bid to end the war, he ran into a tough stance from Iran, which led to the failure of his efforts. A senior Japanese official at the Foreign Ministry said: (Japan has informed Iran that it is completely wrong if it assumes that the war of attrition with Iraq could lead to its defeat, and Iraq has the advantage of being able to attack Iran with advanced weapons). Japan's political efforts during the war years focused on bilateral contacts with Iraq and Iran, which resulted in Japan declaring that it would consistently play an increasing role in promoting a political climate that would lead to a settlement of the conflict.

However, the Japanese political effort in this regard has not been limited to issuing some joint statements based on the need to end the Iran-Iraq war, settle the dispute between the two sides by peaceful means, and show deep concern about the continuation of the war and its dangers to peace and stability in the region.

The Iran-Iraq war has enjoyed a large share in the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council because of its proximity to the battlefield and the effects of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its reflection on those countries. This led Gulf governments to stand by Iraq and provide it with all the requirements of that war.

In view of the limited military capabilities of these Gulf states, they tried to rely on the diplomatic side in the beginning to contain this war without neglecting to strengthen their defense and security capabilities and coordination among them. However, the development and expansion of the war forced these countries to choose the party that serves their interests (59).

The war has attracted the attention of the GCC summits and the main aim of the conferences was to try to stop the war as a threat to the security of the region.

At the summit held in Riyadh from 10 to 11 November 1981, the Council discussed the ongoing war and supported the Islamic endeavors emanating from the Islamic Conference, the efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement

and the efforts of the United Nations.

When Iran began its massive attack in March 1982, the capitals of the GCC countries witnessed intensive diplomatic activity. The GCC countries' attitude during the war years developed with the development of its course. The more the impact of this war on the security and interests of the GCC, the more politically and diplomatically (62).

Therefore, the Council held extraordinary meetings of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council, followed by two closed meetings on 15 March 1982 and at the request of Kuwait to discuss the developments of the war. However, Iraq criticized the meetings of the First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan in March 1982 (63).

The Gulf states began to support and support Iraq in practice after the failure of diplomatic efforts, despite the fact that they continued to end the war as a result of their confrontation with the continuing Iranian rejection. The Gulf states were in a dilemma, so the most acceptable options for the GCC countries, From its point of view - does not deviate from either the choice of neutrality between them or the shift towards assistance to Iraq, but within the limits that do not provoke Iran or force it to expand the war by dragging other parties neutral to it.

The Organization of the Arab Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have been in favor of Iraq because it is consistent with the nature of their relationship with it as an Arab state and coincided with significant changes in Iraqi foreign policy towards the countries of the region and their allies.

The Gulf states considered the issue of balancing the two threats to their interests and security because they viewed both parties as a threat to the security of the region. Iraq has expansionist intentions. Iran, after raising the slogan of exporting the Islamic revolution, threatened Gulf security. Has a collective acceptance or commitment Gulf, but was a Saudi decision in the first place and joined by Kuwait (66).

The rest of the Gulf states declared neutrality and did not join any of the parties such as the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman. Oman has followed a policy based on the following:

- Developing its relations with both Iraq and Iran and not neglecting the neighborhood with either.
- Rejection of all calls to cut ties with Iran and refused to sign a rejection of sanctions against it.
- To play a role to mitigate the war and alleviate the complications resulting from it, while Oman refused to boycott Iran, refused to grant military

facilities to Iraq.

In contrast to Oman's position, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait adopted support for Iraq until the aid reached 200 billion dollars, as well as helping it by following an oil policy that harms Iran by flooding the oil market to reduce prices. And export (68).

In response to this apparent Saudi-Kuwaiti bias toward Iraq, Iran began attacking neutral and neutral ships in the Gulf in the spring of 1984, which had a significant impact on the reactions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as the fighting became a vital artery. (Iran's oil tanker) at the Saudi port of Ras Tanura, carrying about 210,000 tons of oil. Iran also threatened that it would not leave safe shipping routes in the port of Ras Tanura. The Gulf closed the Strait of Hormuz, raising the concerns of the Gulf States Arab and Western allies, especially the United States of obstructing the passage of the region's oil to the outside (69).

Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal visited Tehran on March 19, 1985. He met with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in the presence of officials from both sides. After the meeting, an official source in the Saudi delegation said that the talks dealt with issues related to the security of the Gulf region, Iraqi-Iranian conflict and the risks it poses to the region.

The Saudi initiative came in fear of its economic interests in the region, especially after its carriers were targeted by Iran, although the Saudi policy orientation clearly showed its keenness to keep the war going and that neither of the two countries is victorious or defeated. "If Iraq is defeated, all the facts are turned upside down," he said. "We will not allow the defeat of Iraq or the defeat of Iran."

However, the fears of the Persian Gulf countries increased after the victory of the Iranian forces in the occupation of the Faw Peninsula in early 1986, this military success was accompanied by the return of Iranian threats to the Gulf Arab states.

The GCC leaders had the idea that Iran would not stop the war. "The GCC countries doubt Iran's intentions towards the countries of the region after The invasion and occupation of some Iraqi areas, especially in the Fao peninsula, accompanied by threats received by Iranian officials directly and indirectly, and after analyzing these threats we saw that we have the right to doubt the orientation of Iran in its relations with the Gulf States.

We conclude that the Iraq-Iran war ended on August 8, 1988. It was the bloodiest war and wasted many billions of dollars and its losses spread to the rest of the region, especially the Gulf countries that supported Iraq.

It is strange that this war did not result in a specific result that can be adopt-

ed only by the weakness of the capabilities of the parties to the conflict and the Gulf Arab states, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (74): -

- This war began in the context of a complex international situation witnessed a heated race between the major powers for control of the Gulf region, represented by the US-Soviet conflict.

- The GCC countries have not asked Iraq to protect it from the Iranian threat, either in the years of the Shah or in the years of the Islamic revolution, although Iran was viewed with fear and caution because it has many reasons to fear Iraq with political, economic and expansionist ambitions towards its neighbors.

- The cautious tendency towards dealing with Iraq, which is in the assistance of a very large amounts, and Gulf leaders believe that their assistance to Iraq in its war against Iran and contribute to the construction of his army was a large reason for Iraq to enter Kuwait after the dispute between the two sides on the nature of this aid Is a gift or a loan.

- This war represented the most serious contemporary phenomenon in the Gulf region and planted the seeds of tension in the region and led to the justification for the American military presence, which is affected by its stability and internal security.

- This war has intensified and intensified the strong motivation of the Arab Gulf countries to arm their military forces too heavily to be ready for any future positions difficult may threaten its security and stability.

In general, the Iraqi-Iranian war brought a new variable in the way of the general regional system and became one of the main variables in the political, social and security stability of the Gulf states as a regional sub-regional framework.

In addition, the Gulf States sought to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to counter the possible repercussions of the Iraq-Iran war and as a result of it and a reversal of the dangers facing the region.

Conclusion

The impact of the war directly on the GCC countries, and the Arab countries and Turkey were far from that war and the war produced some results as follows:

1 - The Gulf position at the beginning of the war and at the official level was largely neutral and tried to keep the stick from the center close to Iraq on the one hand and fear of the oppression of Iran on the other, and even the courtship between the regimes of the Cooperation Council and Iran were not hidden .

2. The GCC countries became fully exposed at the political and diplomatic levels by their position on the war. Their diplomatic efforts were in line with the developments of the war and we did not find a firm and principled Gulf position until the United States gave signals to these countries to intervene.
- 3 - One of the secretions of that war was the clear Arab division, which continued throughout the years of the war, and even continued after the end.
4. The war has weakened both countries and at all levels and created a great gap that has withdrawn on all the peoples of the region and so far
5. The war went beyond its military character to the economic and oil nature, and it also created complex political tensions, ideological conflicts, crises and border problems that never ended and reached a state of almost racist war (Arabs and Persians).
- 6 - This war will remain for years to come as the worst types of war in the modern era because it has been and still produces its chronic consequences to this day.
7. The war and its political, economic, and military damage were not much worse and more devastating than the human psyche in both countries. It killed most of the brave young men who fought to defend their countries, whether in Iraq or Iran.

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