

# Media and Conflict Dynamics in a Globalizing World\*

**Flor María Avila**

*Institute of Philosophy & Law, University of Zulia*

*E-mail: fmavila@katamail.com*

**Mark Chingono**

*Department of Political & Administrative Studies*

*Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Botswana*

*E-mail: fmavila@katamail.com*

**María Sultan**

*Institute of Strategic Studies, Pakistan*

*E-mail: fmavila@katamail.com*

**Qodir Djuraev**

*Department of Political Science*

*University of World Economy & Diplomacy*

*E-mail: fmavila@katamail.com*

## Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of media on conflict resolution in a globalizing world. What role does the media play in conflict resolution? Why and how do some conflicts receive international attention and positive media coverage, while others are ignored or portrayed negatively? This study cannot provide definitive answers; instead it seeks to invite further discussion by highlighting the significance of a

---

Recibido: 23-05-00 • Aceptado: 27-07-00

\* Este trabajo fue presentado y exitosamente discutido por los autores en el Departamento de Paz y Resolución de Conflictos de la Universidad de Uppsala, Suecia, durante el programa Internacional Avanzado de Entrenamiento en Paz y Resolución de Conflictos 2000.

few select cases of successful and unsuccessful conflict resolution. Its conclusion is that human rights violations are often used by international media for ideological purposes instead of focusing on the actual victimization of people by those who control the institution of violence.

**Key words:** Media, conflict resolution, globalization, UN intervention.

## Los medios masivos y la dinámica de conflictos en un mundo que se globaliza

### Resumen

La meta de este estudio es examinar el impacto que los medios de comunicación masiva ejercen sobre la resolución de los conflictos en un mundo que se globaliza. ¿Cuál es el papel de los medios de comunicación en la resolución de conflictos? ¿Cómo y por qué reciben algunos conflictos una atención internacional y cobertura positiva en los medios, mientras que otros son pasados por alto o se retratan de forma negativa? Este estudio no pretende proveer respuestas definitivas; más bien, resalta el significado de algunos casos seleccionados de resolución de conflictos, tanto exitosos como no exitosos, con el fin de promover discusiones adicionales. Se concluye que frecuentemente las violaciones de los derechos humanos son utilizadas por los medios internacionales de comunicación con fines ideológicos, en vez de enfocarse sobre la actual victimización de las personas por aquellos que controlan la institución de la violencia.

**Palabras clave:** Medios masivos, resolución de conflictos, globalización, intervención de la ONU.

### 1. Introduction

The communications revolution of the last century has far reaching implications for conflict prevention and resolution. Globalization, characterized by the simultaneous integration

and disintegration of the world political and economic system, is an inevitable consequence of this revolution. Remarkable breakthroughs in information technology and transport systems have led to the emergence of an informational society worldwide. Daily and everywhere people are being bombarded by information about happenings and developments in other parts of the world. This information, both good and bad news, has motivated people, governments, non-governmental organizations and international organizations to act and/or intervene in resolving conflicts in other countries. The study seeks to explore the extent to development influences the peace process and its aftermath. The theoretical perspective underlying study is that information and knowledge are *'the mother of action'*. Yet information can be *'manufactured'* and manipulated by politicians and those who control the media for specific purposes. Thus success or failure of conflict resolution can be presumed to influenced to some extent by both the quality and quantity of information available to actors.

## **2. Globalization and the Media**

A technological revolution, centered around informational technologies, is reshaping, at accelerated pace, the material basis of society. Economies throughout the world have become globally interdependent, introducing a new form of relationship between economy, state, and society, in a system of variable geometry (Castells,1996:1). In this new informational mode of development "the source of productivity lies in the technology of knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol communication (Ibid.:17). What is specific to this informational mode of development is *'action of knowledge upon knowledge itself'* as the main source of productivity, social change and conflict generation or prevention.

Globalization is fuzzy/slippy concept. It seems to mean different things to different people, at different times and in different places. Therefore, it is imperative to delineate its defining fea-

tures at the outset. Essentially, globalization is characterized by a dialectical process of integration and disintegration of economic, political and cultural systems of the world. Riding on the back of science and technology, this process has intensified the struggle between the old and the new, the interpenetration of opposites and the break-up of established frames of references of thinking and doing things. In a sense, it is a motley mixture of crying contradictions of conflict and cooperation, love and hatred, regeneration and degeneration, progress and pollution. In particular, the innovations in information and communications technology have shrunk the world into 'small' global village. This means that, what happens in one part of the village affects the rest of the village. The conduit by which this happens is the media, which is both a manifestation and facilitator of globalization. Schramm (1980:618) aptly notes that: "the world consists of individual and national actors, and since it is axiomatic that action is based on the actor's image of reality, international action will be based on the image of international reality..."

Mass media, television, cinema, magazines and newspapers are power factor. We can summarize their potential as attracting and directing public attention; Persuasion in matters of opinion and belief, influencing behavior, structuring definition of reality, conferring status and legitimacy, informing quickly and extensively.

Based on the above assumptions, the study seeks to identify the connections of the media to globalization, and to international action in conflict resolution. This involves an examination of the operations of the media (newspapers, radio, television and the internet) in facilitating international intervention in conflict resolution in the selected countries. It also assess the potential of the media in precipitating the degeneration of political conflict into violence and warfare. For instance, as shall be shown below, in some cases the media has had the effect of weakening the state, thereby making international intervention much easier.

### **3. Methodology**

This study is based on a comparative case study of Haiti, Kashmir, Mozambique and Tajikistan. The following analysis provide a historical background, dynamics, consequences and conflict resolution efforts for each of the countries.

### **4. Cases Studies**

#### **4.1. Mozambique: Conflict Resolution, Peacemaking and Consolidation**

##### **4.1.1. Background**

For nearly three decades, from 1964 to 1992, Mozambique was at war. First, Portuguese intransigence in granting independence to the country led to a ten year armed liberation struggle that ended in 1974. The lull that followed independence in 1975 was short-lived as the country entered into another more vicious civil war against the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR, also known by its Portuguese acronym as Renamo, or Matsangaissa - the name of its first leader). The later was allegedly created by the Rhodesian settler regime in pursuit of its national interests; it seems there were also legitimate grievances that created fertile ground for the emergence and expansion of such rebel insurgency (see Chingono, 1996).

Underpinning the importance of geo-politics in conflict generation, prevention and resolution, the Rhodesians created Renamo as a 'fifth column' in their hot pursuit of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) guerrillas (and refugees) who had their rear bases in Mozambique. Also Mozambique's imposition of sanctions, in line with the United Nations resolutions, against Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 gave its western neighbor further cause to destabilize the country. When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980, Renamo was inherited by the South African white apartheid regime. With

South African support, which was meant to cripple Mozambique's ability to support South African liberation movements and to maintain white racist supremacy, Renamo graduated from being a mere *'Matsanga outfit'* into a formidable force that forced Frelimo to backtrack on its radical ideology of 'socialism with a Mozambican face'. The peace process that led to the 1992 cease-fire under the Rome Agreement, and subsequently elections in 1994 was arduous and last twenty-five months. Many actors, local, regional and global, from politicians, men of the cloth, businessmen, foot soldiers in the main protagonists armies, to the war weary masses were all involved in their different ways. The media played a particularly important role, not only in highlighting the activities of these actors, but by also getting Mozambicans' plight on the world picture, thereby inducing many other actors to be involved.

#### **4.1.2. The Causes, Dynamics and Consequences of the War**

The actual causes of the Mozambican civil war will remain a contested issue. On the one hand, the Frelimo government and its sympathizers claim that Renamo was a proxy force of the Rhodesian, and later South African, destabilizing strategy. Rhodesia and South Africa, then the remaining bastions of white supremacist rule in Africa, viewed the Mozambican revolution as a threat to white domination and privileges. Indeed, the independence of Mozambique catapulted the country into a springboard for revolutionary violence and warfare in the region. Frelimo supported, both morally and materially, the liberation movements of South Africa and Zimbabwe, the African National Congress (ANC) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) respectively.

Furthermore, this ideological orientation led the west to view as a Soviet ally/satellite. In the context of the Cold War and super power rivalry, the country became a legitimate enemy of the west. The United States of America (USA) blacklisted the country, banning development assistance under section 512 of the Foreign As-

sistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act. In addition a number of private US citizens lobbied and raised funds for Renamo (Minter 1994), just as other Western right-wing anti-communist politicians, foundations and wealthy individuals (Berman, 1996). For its part the Communist block provided Frelimo not only with military hardware, but also with technical support. Frelimo and its allies dismissed Renamo as a surrogate army of its more powerful neighbors. Renamo, in its defense, insists that it was Frelimo's failure to address its legitimate grievances that forced it to take up arms and wage a guerrilla war. These grievances include among others, the marginalization of traditional and religious authority; forced collectivization: central control of the economy and; regimentation of society.

There were many perceived incompatibilities at a local, regional and global level. Locally, the perceived incompatibilities arose from a combination of interrelated political, economic and social factors. For instance, '*socialism with a Mozambican face*' tended to vitiate the desires of local capitalist entrepreneurs, while authoritarian modernization that of traditionalists. At a regional level, the incompatibilities were Black people's quest for freedom and independence, and white racists' desire for maintaining their hegemony and privileges. At a global level, Mozambique was viewed as a Soviet ally, and therefore got caught up in the struggle between capitalism and '*communism*'. A combination of all these factors fueled the conflict and expansion of the war from mere banditry to a full-scale civil war that almost paralyzed the socio-political and economic system of the country. After South Africa's take over of Renamo at Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, Renamo rapidly grew from a mere Matsangaissa outfit into being into a formidable force in the battlefield.

During the war, many people died, lost their beloved ones, some were crippled, and many others are traumatized. Hundreds of homes, schools, clinics, collective farms, vehicles and roads were destroyed. The '*grassroots war economy*' that emerged,

which involved illegal and underhand economic activities, was not only beyond the state's revenue base, but also negated state authority. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Frelimo of the much needed military, financial, technical and ideological in its war against western-backed rebels. These developments, coupled with a military stalemate, Frelimo was forced to backtrack on many of its radical principles and policies. By introducing economic and political liberalization, allowing private enterprise and traditional and religious practices, Frelimo effectively ideologically disarmed Renamo. Or alternatively, Renamo won the war, as most of its demands, including that of a multiparty political system and proportional representation which it put forward as a condition for cease-fire, were met. Whichever way one looks at it, the point is, by time when the Rome Cease-fire Agreement was signed in 1992, conditions on the ground were ripe for the settlement of the conflict.

#### **4.1.3. The Peace Process: From Nkomati to Rome**

Many actors, local, regional and global were involved in the long peace process that led to cease-fire in 1992. Locally, the Frelimo government, Renamo, soldiers from both armies, the church and the masses all contributed in their different ways to the peace process. At a regional level, the neighboring countries, especially South and Zimbabwe, also played a crucial role in fueling and ending the war. Globally, the end of the 'Cold War' permitted the United Nations, international non-governmental organizations and even private businessmen to contribute towards the peace process.

**4.1.3.1. The Frelimo Government.** In 1984, by which time 9 of Mozambique's 10 provinces had come under Renamo attack, President Machel signed a non-aggression agreement, the Nkomati Accord, with South Africa. The two states agreed, "...to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and in fulfillment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other" (Berman, 1996). But the Nko-

mati Accord did not permit the government to defeat Renamo. On the contrary, Renamo insurgency escalated, forcing the government to unsuccessfully establish a dialogue with Renamo using South Africa a go-between.

**4.1.3.2. Renamo.** After the Nkomati of 1984, and especially in the late 1980s when it became evident that apartheid was on its way out, South African assistance to Renamo decreased considerably. In the US, the publication of the Gersony Report in 1988 (see below) swunged public opinion against Renamo, and its anti-communist supporters within the US government “who had successfully blocked or thwarted the Reagan Administration’s efforts to support Maputo were finally outmaneuvered ... (Berman, 1996).

In addition to losing foreign financial and military support, Renamo was also rapidly losing its soldiers; many became refugees in neighboring countries, some responded to the government’s amnesty and others became independent bandits or pirates. The devastating drought of the late 1980s and early 1990s enormously undermined Renamo’s capacity to wage war. Many people believed that the drought was God or the ancestors’ punishment for continued violence and warfare. In other words, God or the ancestors caused the drought in order to end the war. Thus by the early 1990s, and especially after the Renamo Party Congress held at its headquarters in Gorongosa in June 1989, in which Dlakama had consolidated his position, Renamo “*was well positioned to commence negotiations*”.

**4.1.3.3. Regional Actors.** Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe play a crucial role in the peace process, and in particular by bring Chissano and Dlakama together. With upwards of 20 000 troops at the height of the conflict, Zimbabwe could hardly afford the US1 million a day that this adventure cost. Opposition political parties, liked the doomed Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), made political mileage in their campaigns against the ruling

ZANU Patriotic Front (PF). Moi also play his role by arranging the Nairobi talks. Similarly, developments in South Africa were auspicious for the settlement of the conflict.

**4.1.3.4. Global Actors.** As noted above, after the end of the 'Cold War', and the introduction of wide ranging economic, political and social liberalization, the US started supporting the Frelimo government. Political turmoil within the communist block, and Gorbachev's Perestroika, meant that continued support for Frelimo would be not forthcoming. The Community of Sant'Egidio of Rome played also an important role, initially as official observer, and later mediator of the peace process.

**4.1.3.5. Consolidating the Peace.** The direct intervention of international actors, in particular the UN, guaranteed the sustainability and consolidation of an otherwise fragile peace. In Mozambique, and through a "*complex, multifaceted and highly innovative strategy*", the UN broke new ground in conflict resolution by successfully bringing together a formerly socialist Government, committed to a one-party state, and an anti-communist rebel group (United Nations, 1995). The instrument by which this achieved was the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which had upwards of 7000 military and non-military personnel deployed in the country to monitor the peace process. The mandate of the UN was to verify and monitor the implementation of the Rome Cease-fire Agreement. In the end ONUMOZ ended up undertaking additional tasks at the request of the parties. Disagreements on a number of aspects of the electoral process and other issues created a deadlock that forced the UN Secretary General to intervene directly in October 1993 persuade "all the parties to work on negotiating a solution to outstanding issues" (UN, 1995). In spite of these disagreements, the two parties' respect for the cease-fire without serious breaches, was essential in consolidating the peace. Humanitarian assistance, provided both by the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), was indispensable in building a climate of trust

and cooperation between contending parties and among returning refugees. Humanitarian assistance and emergence relief, especially from Nordic countries, had began during the drought of the 1980s. By the end of the war the country was literally invaded by western NGOs who numbered more than 170. Demobilization of government and rebel forces and integrating them into a new national army was also essential in consolidating the peace. In a nutshell, the elections in 1994, which brought Frelimo back to power albeit with a narrow margin, were a culmination of a major success story in United Nations peacemaking, peace-keeping, and humanitarian and electoral assistance (UN, 1995).

#### **4.1.4. Getting in the Picture: The Media and Conflict Dynamics. The Radio and TV**

Central to the activities of all the actors involved in the Mozambican peace process was the media, in all its forms. Different forms of the media, especially newspapers, the TV and radio played a vital role in providing the requisite information for action and intervention. In Mozambique, as many people were either too poor to buy newspapers or illiterate to read, the radio was the major source of information and news. As a matter of fact, radio transistors were and still are a common and most valuable possession, even among the poor. Through the '*grapevine*' or the street people's radio, any interesting news was quickly spread throughout the war weary community. Certainly the 8 radio stations in the Provincial towns provided civilians, combatants, politicians as well as NGO with useful information on developments both in the battlefield and the Rome Peace process. Radio stations from neighboring countries, south African and Zimbabwean in particular, were also another source of important news and information.

Information on developments in the battlefield was vital for survival, and planning for exit or assistance routes. Similarly, news on the peace process gave many people hope and, even the courage to organize and put pressure on the main protagonists.

Activist groups in London, such as the Mozambique-Britain Society, relied heavily on the media their campaign to raise public awareness of the Mozambican crisis, and hence need for conflict resolution and peace. It is difficult to asses the impact of international broadcasting services and TV channels on their audience.

#### 4.1.5. Newspapers

There are three local newspapers in Mozambique, *Mediafax*, *Agencia de Noticias* and *Mozambique News Online*. The readership of these news outlets was largely limited to the urban elites during the war. This was due to a number of reasons which include high illiteracy rate, poverty and, in the countryside, transportation problems caused by the war. But as already noted, any interesting news beat was circulated among the war weary community by word of mouth. Thus one can surmise that the local newspapers also played a role in educating people about the peace process, and helped them in making 'informed' decisions and actions. It is difficult to assess the impact of the international newspapers on its readers. Nonetheless, an examination of international news coverage of the conflict and peace process.

Table 1  
**International News Coverage of the Mozambican Conflict,  
July-December 1992**

Newspaper	Human Rights	Victims	Peace Process	Other
IHT	9%	9%	73%	9%
Times	6%	6%	77%	11%
Africa Report	20%	30%	20%	30%
The Economist	0%	25%	75%	0%

Thus the small sample of news papers analyzed, based on opportunity sampling, only give a crude indicator of the correlation of international news coverage and intervention. As Table 1

shows, the main theme covered in the selected newspapers during the period under consideration was the peace process. For instance, of the 10 articles of the International Herald Tribunal (IHT) found in the archive, 8 out of 11 were on the peace process, 1 on victims and 1 on human rights. Similarly, 77 per cent of the Times were on the same theme, as compared to 6 per cent on both victims and human rights. Before the beginning of the peace process, refugees and international humanitarian assistance were the favorite subjects of these papers. This is perhaps because humanitarian aid is apparently less political and controversial, especially in Western countries where the Christian-Judeo ideology is dominant.

In the US, the publication of the Gersony Report played a fundamental role in changing US public opinion towards Renamo and, US policy towards Mozambique. The Report was commissioned by the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs to report back on "the causes for the steep escalation in refugees and displaced persons reportedly fleeing large parts of Mozambique (Berman, 1996). The 300 per cent increase in the number of Mozambicans seeking refuge in neighboring countries during the past 12 months, contained in the Report, is said to have raised eyebrows (Berman, 1996).

## **4.2. Haiti: Conflict Resolution, Peacemaking and Consolidation**

### **4.2.1. Background**

The first democratic elections were held in December 1990 in Haiti, where Father Aristide won with the 67% of the vote in UN observed elections. He represented the national leader of the Lavalas movement (prodemocracy) in Haiti. These elections were the first free and fair polls in Haiti's history and would not have been possible without electoral assistance from the U.N. and OAS.

In his government's period, Aristide tried to push progressive legislation to streamline the economy, improve tax collection and reform agriculture. He also planned to initiate vast reforms in the army, police, judiciary and state-run industries. In other words, he initiated a political and social reform in Haiti's society, but he didn't have supported by the parliament, which consisted largely of representatives of the traditional political organizations. President Aristide was overthrown in a military coup d'état on 30 September 1991. The military forces overthrew president Aristide on September 30, 1991. The military was supported by the economic and conservative elite of Haiti's society. The leader of the Coup was General Raul Cedras.

#### **4.2.2. Incompatibilities**

During his government, Aristide hadn't had a reliable majority in the National Assembly and the control of the nation's army or police. His government program was designed to meet public expectations, specially of the poorest ones by rooting out corruption, ending the traditional bureaucratic system in the public field and smuggling. In fact, Aristide had the support of masses and *Social Justice* was his priority (NACLA, 1991). Other program of his government was to make efforts against the drug mafia. Besides, he tried to demilitarized Haiti, separating army from the police. But the business elite in Haiti didn't like the social reforms proposed by him. In fact, on September 21,1991, Aristide warned Haiti's rich that he would soon launch a program for sharing the wealth and he addressed the U.N. General Assembly, advocating the right of all to eat and work.

#### **4.2.3. Conflict Dynamics. Global Actors**

In front of this situation, the OAS reacted and voted to impose a diplomatic and economic embargo against the military government and UN General Assembly condemned the coup on October 11,1991 and the illegal regime's use of violence, military coercion and violation of human rights. One of the sanctions taken by

states, was the US embargo on all commercial traffic to and from Haiti in November. Since this period, both international and regional organizations started to make efforts to allow Aristide return to power and restore democracy in Haiti. On February 23, 1992, it was signed in Washington an OAS-mediated accord under which the coup plotters would be granted amnesty, but unfortunately it was rejected in April by the Haitian Supreme Court.

During 1992, the country was governed by a provisional executive and legislative (President Nerette and Prime Minister Honorat) and in May, the Parliament signed the Villa d'Accueil accord that called for a government consensus. On September 1992, arrived the first OAS civilian monitoring missions. Since December 1992, diplomatic efforts by special UN Envoy and other sought to bring about the restoration of constitutional government in Haiti. Faced with intransigence on the coup leaders, in June 1993, the Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo against Haiti. These sanctions were later suspended following the conclusion of an important agreements between the parties in conflict, "*the Governors Island Agreement*" and the "*New York Pact*" which offered a solution to the crisis and a beginning of national reconciliation. The agreement consisted to allow Cedras retirement before his return on October 30 and provide an amnesty for everybody involved in the coup. In return, the parliament would enact a reform of the army and the police under the supervision of an UN mission. The UN would also lift the embargo on Haiti prior to Aristide's return. On 23 September 1993, the Security Council authorized the establishment and immediate dispatch of the United Nations Civilian Mission (UNMIH) for a period of six months, which has the purpose to assist in modernizing the armed forces and establishing a new police force. (Kumar, 1998). Faced with the refusal of Haiti's military regime to implement the Governors Island Agreement, the Security Council re-imposed its oil and arms embargoes on Haiti in October, 1993.

Thereafter, in may 1994, the Council adopted a set of severe economic sanctions against Haiti.

On 31 July 1994, The Security Council adopted the Resolution No. 940(1994), which authorized Member States to form a "multinational force" under unified command and to use all necessary means to bring about an end to the illegal regime in Haiti. According to this, a US led-Multinational Force was authorized to accomplish this. After the withdrawal of this force, the task of maintaining a secure environment would be taken over by the UN Mission in Haiti, a full-fledged peacekeeping operation. (Kumar, 1998). On 15 October 1994, after the departure of the Haitian coup leaders, President Aristide returned to Haiti and resumed his functions, after three years of exile.

#### **4.2.4. The Media and Conflict Dynamics**

**4.2.4.1. Local Media. Newspapers. Radio and Television.** After the downfall of the dictatorial regime of President Duvalier in 1986, the media press was developed and many new publications were established. In 1993, Haiti has a important numbers of periodicals, dailies and foreign news bureau, according to its population (6,5 millions approximately), such as *Le Matin*, *Le nouvelliste*, *L'Union*; *Balance*, *Haiti en Marche*, *Haiti Progrès* and *Haiti Observateur*. In 1989, there were estimated 29 radio stations and one television stations, but many of them were closed after the fall of President Aristide in 1991 (Regional Surveys of the World, 1993).

**4.2.4.2. Some main features about the role played by media in Haiti during the conflict:** Local media in Haiti was controlled by the authorities of the facto regime. The international media reported that the military force took the control of radio stations in Haiti, controlling the flow of information to the communities and limiting the right to inform and to receive information. Haitian radio stations had come under systematic and violent attacks from the army and police (Washington Post Serv-

ice – 28.10.1991). It was also described that local media situation was dramatic and some of the radio stations were reduced to transmit only entertainment programs. Because of these controls and attacks, many radio stations were forced to close after the fall of President Aristide.

As a result of other aspects of local media was that the military regime incited people to violence and stir up factionalist fervor and the television had been broadcasting anti-American and anti-Aristide rhetoric (Times, 1/10/1994). the strict censorship imposed to the media by the military authorities, the vast majority of Haitians had no reliable sources of news and the UN and OAS sent a lot of civilian missions to monitor the human rights situation in Haiti and to inform about what was happening in the country.

**4.2.4.3. International Media.** On the other hand, Haiti's conflict took an important place in the international media. It was covered by the main international newspapers (such as Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, Times), even though it was restricted the freedom of information during the illegal government period in the country. Besides, NGO such as Amnesty International and the civilian UN-OAS missions established in Haiti contributed to report to the world what was happening in the country during the facto regime. The findings presented in the analysis of the main sources of the International Media, during the years of the conflict (since 1991-1994) show that the most important issues for the media in the coverage of Haiti's conflict are:

*a) Violations of Human Rights:* Human rights violations during the illegal regime took the attention of the international media. According to it, several human rights violations were made by the security forces and by the FRAPH (paramilitary thugs organization), which included several political murders, more than 10,000 extra judicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbi-

trary detentions, systematic beatings and tortures. NGO such as Amnesty International and the civilian UN-OAS monitors made a lot of reports about the human rights situation during Haiti's conflict.

Reports of human rights violations increased considerably during 1993 and 1994. Most of the violations described were related to the embargo's consequences and the excess and authoritarianism of the facto officials that beat mainly the poorest people in Haiti's society and pro-Aristide activists or supporters. The deployment of several UN civilian mission and human rights observers during these years also contributed to the denunciation of these violations. During this period, human rights violations took an important place in the issues of media, including reports of expulsions and attacks against human rights monitors. From our point of view, these reports contributed to legitimize US military intervention in Haiti in front of the international public opinion.

*b) Victims of the Conflict.* The victims of this conflict reported by international media were several, including common persons suspected of having pro-Aristide or prodemocracy tendencies, journalists, pro-Aristide or prodemocracy activists or supporters and high officials (judges, ministers).

The Haitian refugees also had a wide coverage by media, specially during 1991 and 1993. More than hundred boats and 30,000 people returned to Haiti by the US coast guard were reported. It was also reported the US aid-camps to house the refugees at the US base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to the press, it was a placed were the refugees were treated as a criminals and the basis human rights were violated by the US camps officials. They were isolated, in communicated and tortured. In 1993, media reported hunger strikes, its protests against conditions on the leprosy Island and the US Government's indifference. Besides, media reported the Court Decision that ordered the President B. Clinton to free Haitians in Aids camp. Although this

decision that condemned the White House for operating the world's only HIV prison and the reports of human right violations in this place, United States changed refugee policy several months after this, in 1994.

According to the analysis we found that this issue was not coverage properly by the international media because it was mainly focus on quantitative aspects and as a product or consequence of the bad economical and social situation in Haiti during the facto regime, but it didn't emphasize on human rights violations by the US Government that avoided the fulfillment of international treaties of refugee protection which allowed the Haitians refugees to ask and receive political asylum in US. Besides, United States avoided the statutes of the UNHCR, but this organization and international media rarely confronted US refugee policy.

Other aspect of the refugees situation that was not well coverage by media was the inadequate procedures applied to the Haitians that were asking political asylum in United States, that restricted the right of this people to receive political asylum. (NACLA,1992)

*c) Superpowers. International and Regional Organizations.* Since the beginning of the conflict in 1991 and during it, the international media reported widely the international superpower intervention, in this case, United Nations and its role in the conflict. The main aspects covered by media were: the repudiation of the military coup and the facto regime, the economic and oil embargo imposed by UN to Haiti and others sanctions, the deployment of UN civilian missions in Haiti, the UN plan to restore democracy in Haiti, the US invasion and military intervention.

As a result of the analysis, we can say that international media was focus on the role of the UN, as an important actor and the only one capable to solve the Haiti's conflict and restore democracy to this country. The media linked the abuses of human

rights in Haiti by the military forces as a justification of the use of force by UN in Haiti, such as the US military intervention as a mechanism to pressure military's authorities to agree in Aristide's return.

In 1993, international media reported embargoes sanctions imposed in Haiti by the UN. Besides in 1994, it was dramatically described the effects of these sanctions in Haiti's society, specially in the poorest classes, as a result of the intransigent of the military leaders to restore democracy. In the same year, it was also reported the military intervention and the US invasion, as a justified mechanism to restore democracy in Haiti.

The role of the OAS was also covered by media, specially during the firsts years of the conflict (1991-1992), the resolutions taken by this organization such as the constitution of a civilian mission and the approval to impose a trade embargo in Haiti, as a mechanism to pressure the facto authorities to make an agreement.

*d. Peace Talks.* The international media reported the peace talks since the beginning of the conflict until 1994. The first organization that initiated the peace proposals and talks with the facto authorities was the OAS. To this purpose, OAS sent delegations and special envoy to propose peaceful solutions to the crises. Media also reported that the facto leaders refused to negotiate because they said that during Aristide's government were committed several human rights violations. According to the military position, the coup was justified as a correction of the democratic process and to end an autocratic style of government. The peace talks between the parties in conflict were continued during 1992 and 1993, specially in this last year, in which the process of negotiations concluded in an important agreement known as the ***governor island accord***. During this year, international media contributed to create an international consensus about the necessity to implement economical restrictions in Haiti in order to pressure

the illegal government to find a solution to the conflict. In fact, media reported the success of economic sanctions in Haiti. It is observed that the media didn't focus widely the severe social and economical consequences of the embargoes, including that they enriched the elite class in Haiti, reduced Aristide's supporters to misery and demonstrated the impotence and ineffectiveness of these sanctions.

Media also reported an important fact to the peace process that was the recognition by the Haitian Parliament, on 15 June 1993, of Aristide as the constitutional head of State and agreed to restore him to power under certain conditions. Unfortunately the peace talks were canceled in November 1993 after the defy of the army authorities to fulfill the *governor's island accord*. During 1994 the peace process was temporally frozen by UN, specially after the expulsion of UN-OAS human rights monitors ( more than 100 observers). We can also say that in this period media was concerned in describing the military invasion of US in Haiti. In fact, as shown by media "*the military action is the only way to end the crisis quickly*" (Newsweek, July 18, 1994). "*For both moral and practical reasons, it is very much in America's interest to stop the suffering of the Haitian masses and thus cut off the flood of both people heading toward Florida*" (Newsweek, July 18, 1994).

It is clear that international media analyzed, is dominated by US's interest rather than been a place that should converge different ideologies and countries positions. In fact the military intervention, approved by UN but made by US forces, was reported by media as the unique solution to restore democracy in Haiti. According to this, United States tried to emphasize in the public opinion the *multilateral dimension in its military activity in the Caribbean* in recent years (Panama, 1990, Grenada, 1993), including US intervention in Haiti. In all of these interventions, United States had made several efforts to give legitimacy to the military action, making it and act of collective regional security rather than an unilateral US intervention, not convenient for the

public opinion that criticizes US hegemony and imperialism in Latin American countries.

During 1994, media described the UN decisions and US military intervention and plans (that included more restrictions and sanctions to Haiti), justifying its actions on the huge amount of human rights violations committed by the facto regime authorities and the necessity to restore democracy in Latin American countries. As shown in Table 2, we can see in the international media a lot of reports of victims (including refugees), most of them killed or tortured by the military authorities and several human rights violations. In table No. 2, in "other" section, we included the big superpower intervention, UN and US, so we can conclude that military intervention took the fifty percent (50%) of the international media's attention during this year.

Table 2  
**International News Coverage of the Haiti's Conflict  
January-December 1994**

Newspaper	Human Rights	Victims	Peace Process	Other
IHT	1,25%	10%	2,50%	16,25%
Times	3,75%	11,25%	0%	15%
The Economist	1,25%	5%	2,5%	12,50%
New Digest	1,25%	0%	0%	7,50%
Newsweek	0%	3,75%	0%	2,50%
Total	7,5%	25%	5%	55%

### **4.3. Tajikistan: 1992-1997.**

#### **4.3.1. History of the Conflict**

The conflict in Tajikistan evolved out of an ideological and political power struggle following the country's independence in 9 September 1991. Tajikistan was possibly the least prepared of all

Soviet Republics for independence. Territorial, cultural and political cohesion within the republic were weak. Communications between the regions were poor, with 90% of the mountainous. Clan networks have influenced political affiliations reinforcing intra-Tajik divisions and inequalities. The Khojend clan held political and economic power between 1929 and 1992, with a brief hiatus in the 1940s. The Kulyab clan dominated the security structures, whilst the democratic-Islamic movements which emerged in the late-Soviet period, have obtained the majority of their support from the economically and politically underrepresented Garm and Pamir regions.

After independence political competition between democratic, nationalist and Islamic groups, including the Democratic Party, Rastokhez and Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), and the ruling former- Communists led to Central Asia's first contested Presidential elections, in November 1991. These were won by Rahmon Nabiev, the former-Communist Party First Secretary, who promptly sought to restore the dominance of his clan, the Khojent. Popular protests in the capital, Dushanbe, in the spring of 1992 led to concessions, and the establishment of the National Reconciliation coalition, which included the aforementioned secular democrats and Islamists. The reformists ousted the President and for a brief period in the autumn of 1992 assumed governmental responsibility.

By the late 1992, politics became increasingly fictional and violent. During intense conflict in the 1992-93 winter, conservative Kulyabi and Khojent militias, with increasing brutality and Russian assistance, restored the former-Communists to power. It is estimated that at least 50,000 people were killed and 5000,000 made refugees in this period. A Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force, was deployed in the Republic in October 1993, alongside the already stationed Russian 201<sup>st</sup> Motorized Division and Federal border troops, all of whom have to

varying extents assisted the government in operations against the opposition.

*Numerous national and international media reports of the war* reveal accounts of dismemberment, torture, summary execution and infanticide. 17,000 houses were looted and destroyed by fire, or demolished with make shift bulldozers fabricated out of agricultural machinery. Multitudes of people escaping the violence fled to and from Dushanbe and at least retreated to the Eastern autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan (also called the Pamirs), About 60,000 Garmis and Pamiris crossed Amu Darya river that forms the borders between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

Sporadic fighting continued, especially along the Afghan-Tajik border between Afghanistan-based opposition forces and the Borders troops, Imomali Rahmonov's appointment as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and subsequently President saw the Kulyab clan consolidate power and attempt to erode the political position of their former allies, the Khojent and ethnic Uzbeks. After a series of failed cease-fires, an accord was signed by Rahmonov and Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in Moscow on 27 of June 1997. This has acted as the basis for further agreements between the parties including the proposed integration of armed opposition forces into government units and on parliamentary elections. Low level violence remains endemic and local militia leaders relatively autonomous, and consequently the prospects for peace are uncertain.

### **5.3.2. The role of Media in Tajik Civil war**

The media played a crucial role in the escalation as well as the solution of the Tajik conflict. It is useful first of all to introduce the main media, which had important impact in the conflict. We can consider the main actors and their media as follow: a) Tajiks, divided in two camps (Government and UTO) and their media b) Russian Federation and its media c) CIS neighbors of

Tajikistan (especially Uzbekistan) and their media. d) Foreign countries and their media.

*The media of Tajiks, divided in two camps.* As it was mentioned before Tajikistan Government was ruled in 1992 by Russian oriented, former Communist authorities. From the outset of the civil war on 28 of June 1992 it was clear that the Tajik authorities wanted the assistance from Russia. Pro-governmental Tajik media reflected all appeals of the Government calling for "immediate stop of all demonstrations and for armed intervention from Russia" (Narodnaya gazeta, Dushanbe, 29 of April 1992) Opposition media, mainly newspapers in contrary, condemned those appeals. In those newspapers Tajik identity was made and validated with their deep attention to the question of Tajik culture, territory and especially language. This opposition movement found its social expression and mobilized many intellectuals, both from rural and urban communities.

The immediate prelude to the civil war was a series of demonstrations that began at the end of March in 1992 in Dushanbe. These protests were precipitated by supporters of Democratic and Islamic alliances. Especially the supporters of Lali Badakhshan movement that sought greater autonomy for the Gorny badakhshan Autonomous blast. The Pamiris had come to Dushanbe to protest against the threatened removal of Minister of Internal Affairs, the Badakhshani who had refused to enforce the state of Emergency ordered by the Supreme Soviet. Lali Badakhshan was quickly joined by supporters of the other 3 opposition groups, Rastokhez, who renewed their earlier demands for the banning of the Communist party and added a call for the resignation of Nabiev, who was seen as dismantle of what little opposition had achieved the previous autumn. From the media articles in Tajikistan published in 1988-1992, i.e. before the escalation of civil war we can analyze the political renewal and strong anti-Soviet/Russian feeling. The national intelligent, hard pushed to mobilize themselves, were faced with the "essential work" (*The Wormeaten*

*Empire* in A. Tahir's *Way bar ma* (Woe to us, in *Duniya*, #1, May 1991, p.4) of reconstructing the national identity, a task, which, in the early days, devolved upon official writers and poets.

*Russian media: reflections on unclear position of Russian Government.* Russian media played a crucial role in escalation of Tajik civil war. Many articles, published in *Pravda*, *Moscow news*, as well as a great number of TV channels, such as *ORT* (Russian Public Television) had negative influence in fragmentation of Tajik society and provoked anti-Russians spirit among Tajik intelligence. The official position of Russian Federation was not clear at the beginning of Tajik conflict. Most of media sources supported Tajik opposition. *Moscow news* was leading newspaper among many others, which published many provocative articles, interviews with the leaders of Tajik opposition, etc. In 1993 also Russian "democratic" media debated the virtues of continuing by Russian troops to guard the Tajik-Afghan border in the pages of *Moscow news*, *Nezavisimiya gazeta* and others. Meantime some other media sources, such as *Izvestia*, *Trud*, *Krasnaya Zvezda* supported official government of Tajikistan. Russia still was hesitating with whom collaborate in Tajikistan and to be more involved in Tajik conflict. Finally the assault of 13 July 1993 when 26 Russian soldier were killed in a border post #12 attack by mujahidins from Afghanistan and Tajik opposition forces Russia decided to not further contact with UTO. After this attack Russia was obliged to define its geopolitical priorities more clearly.

After this incident Russian media changed suddenly the spirit of all news and articles to the pro-governmental orientation. For example, Interfax news agency announced in 19 July 1993: "Defending Tajik section of the border is defending the backbone of Russian security. The Russia border guards hold the key to Russian and CIS security" (Interfax news agency, 19 July 1993).

*Media of Uzbekistan: strong support to Tajik government.* Conflict in neighboring states clearly require political and mili-

tary responses. Uzbekistan's behavior towards the Tajik conflict has been partially motivated by justifiable threats to its integrity and stability. It was confronted by acute regional, as well as, internal security problems. Intra-Uzbek divisions, along regional lines, economic and social dislocation resulting from the USSR's collapse, the presence of sizable minority communities, and the instability of neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan all presented Uzbekistan with serious security challenges.

Uzbekistan's official interpretation of the war has provided a means of attacking the ideological challenges to the Karimov government. Uzbekistan has sought to portray Tajikistan's democratic and Islamic movements as radical, inherently unstable and ill-suited for Central Asia in his transitional period. In the Uzbekistani media analysis of events in Tajikistan, it was the proliferation of political movements and demands for "radical" political reforms that were responsible for the collapse into civil war.

The period of transition demands a homogenous identity and the maintenance of strong centralized rule. The Tajik situation is portrayed as a warning of the stability and security that the Uzbekistani population would forsake should they engage in the "pseudo-revolutionary upheavals" which neither Tajikistan nor Uzbekistan are prepared for. Since independence, Uzbekistan has pursued a distinct and assertive regional policy. Until the Taliban's successes in Afghanistan and the rapprochement in Tajikistan, this policy had been relatively successful. Tashkent's avowed anti-Islamic fundamentalist posture may in fact have aided its recognition by the international community seeking checks against the Taliban.

Uzbekistan and Russia have a relationship in which competition for regional influence and common national objectives often run in tandem. Afghanistan and Tajikistan are the most evident arenas in which this relationship is being conducted. The Russian

government and media have increasingly become aware of Uzbekistan's challenge to its regional supremacy, and diplomatic importance, especially in relation to terminating the Tajik conflict (Segodnya, Moscow, 30 of January 1996). High level visits by Russian officials to Tashkent, Uzbekistan's refusal to allow transit of Russian arms, the potential natural and intellectual resources all suggest Uzbekistan's increased stature as Central Asia's key actor. Russia may in fact be keen to see Uzbekistan assume greater responsibilities towards Tajikistan, as a 1997 *Nezavisimaya gazeta* article implied (Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 of January 1997).

The self-established position as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism which has proved advantageous for domestic political actions, has also encouraged recent improvements in relations with the West, and in particular with the USA. Uzbekistan's pragmatic and autonomous foreign policy has enabled it to be viewed by the USA as "an island of stability" (Starr, 1996) capable of resisting Islamic and Russian ambitions in the region. The benefits for Uzbekistan are twofold. Firstly, its international stature has been confirmed, assisting the promotion of its self-image for internal and external consumption. Secondly, Uzbekistan's centrality to regional affairs has forced the international community to temper its criticisms of the government's domestic oppression.

*Active Iranian media and inactive International media.* Media of other countries, except some Iranian, could not influence neither in escalation nor in the resolution of the Tajik civil war, because those countries were not the main, direct actors in this conflict. Unlike Russian, Uzbek or Iranian, International media could not impact to the ongoing events. Even the most leading Western media was unable to make any influence in the resolution of conflict and in the establishment of the dialogue between Tajik Government and UTO. A large number of international media were inactive, except some braved independent reports of *RFE/RL* (Radio free Europe/Radio Liberty) correspondents. They

were based basically on Russian view and repeated mainly the news coming from Russian news agencies.

After Russia and Uzbekistan, Iran is, obviously, though for different reasons, the country most concerned by the situation in Tajikistan. Iran's Central Asian policy is not compelled to realize itself primarily through Tajikistan. From a geographical point of view Tajikistan seems very remote from Iranian territory. But despite its physical distance, Iran is very sensitive to everything to do with Tajikistan, because of the cultural, historic and above all linguistic affinities between two countries. This sensitivity is not only felt by the Iranian state, but also by the country's population and intellectual elite (including those exiled abroad).

This emotional attachment, whose roots stretch back into the distant past, combines with the ideological considerations on the part of Islamic regime. Of all the Central Asian States, Tajikistan is only one thus far from where Islamist movements have played a relatively important role, with the real capacity to influence the overall political scene. That is why the recapture of Tajikistan by former Communist regime, the return of Russian's influence, the failure of the Islamists and even to some extent that the "democratic" nationalists, were not regarded with pleasure in Tehran. Thus, on 23 December 1992 Iran abandoned its habitual reserve about the internal situation of the Central Asian countries to denounce "foreign intervention in Tajikistan". *The Tehran press* even accused Russia and Uzbekistan of supporting the Communists, who had returned to power and helping the Dushanbe government to carry out brutal repression. Media of Iran clearly and regularly reflected the pro-islamist position of Iranian government.

#### **4.4. Kashmir Conflict**

##### **4.4.1. Historical background**

The Kashmir dispute has been the major cause of discontent between India and Pakistan since their inception in 1947. The

states of India and Pakistan had come into existence due to the recognition of the two nation theory (i.e., Hindus and Muslims are two different nations), both by the British Raj and the Indian National Congress, as under the partition plan of June 3, 1947 (Sattar, 1998). The partition principle dictated that those areas which were Muslim majority areas, were geographically contingent to Pakistan and in democratic elections expressed a will to belong to Pakistan, would be included in Pakistan. The State of Jammu and Kashmir had been one of the 600 princely States in the British Empire. The State had a quasi autonomous status in the sense that it placed a Hindu maharaja over an overwhelming majority of Muslims (Wersing Robert, 1994:23).

The Maharaja of the Kashmir State stalled the decision and signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan, leading to several months of indecisiveness concerning the status of Kashmir which in effect remained independent during this time. However, the Kashmir Muslim Conference, a significant political voice in Jammu and Kashmir, passed a resolution calling for accession to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the Maharaja paid no significant importance to the resolution (Wani A. Mushtaq, 1998). The Maharaja's indecisiveness gave way to panic when some tribal men from the northern frontier of Pakistan came to support the Kashmiri Muslims. The disturbance in the State soon resulted in to a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. India took the case to the United Nations Security Council.

The conflict was taken up by the Security Council in 1948 and as a result the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was established to investigate the facts, work in mediating capacity, and report on the developments in the situation (39,1948 the Resolution of 20 January 1948,S 654). In addition, Resolution 726 of 21 April 1948, called for progressive retreat of force from the State, leading to an atmosphere necessary for a free Plebiscite. In July the UNCIP (United Nation Commission for India and Pakistan) arrived and the cease-fire agreement

came into effect between India and Pakistan, which in effect delineated a cease-fire line. Though the cease fire agreement resulted in the cessation of war between India and Pakistan, the level of tension between the two states has remained high over the State of Jammu and Kashmir .After the war 1948, one third of the State has been controlled by Pakistan. The Kashmir Dispute has been one of the oldest unresolved problem on the Security Council's agenda. However no settlement of the dispute has as yet come into effect hence the aim of this case study is to draw inference as to why the Kashmir issue has remained unresolved especially in the post cold war settings.

India and Pakistan have fought several wars over the issue starting from as early as 1948, 1965, 1971,1984, to the changing nature of tensions and conflict in the 1990's. The region has witnessed a high degree of tension in the last five decades. According to Pakistan the root cause of the tensions remaining high has been India's continued refusal to conduct a plebiscite in the State to a general theorizing that the temporary solution of Kashmir i.e. accession to India be seen as permanent solution to the problem. In contrast, India sees the accession of the State as legal and binding and the efforts made by Pakistan to internationalize the issue as a direct interference in India's internal affairs Each side has contested the legality of the stance taken by the respective sides on account of the interpretation of the facts and the events in the aftermath of the 1948 war and the application of the partition principle to the State.

Shortly after the Maharaja acceded to India he had been succeeded by the Sheikh Abdullah as the head of the State. Whereas article 370 was adopted by the Indian Constituent Assembly, giving a special status to the Indian Held Kashmir the power to conduct foreign affairs, defense and communication were to be given to India, while the rest of the powers were to be exercised by the State. This article of the Indian constituent assembly has given or has resulting in the acceptance of the Kashmiri State as an

autonomous area till the plebiscite is conducted. Over the time the article has been amended so as to give more power to the Indian central government in the internal affairs of the State. As a result New Delhi has been arguing that Kashmir is an integral part of India and the liberation of Kashmir would result in the disintegration of India (Wani Mushtaq, 1998: 81). The latter position is seen as contradictory by the Pakistani side for it sees the argumentation put forward by the Indian side for the legality of accession to India and the State being an integral part of India since partition as two different tiers and positions (Mirza Zaman Khan, 1998). Whereas India has claimed that the legality to subscribe the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir has been ascertained by the establishment of the Indian Constituent assembly of Kashmir, which has come into existence in the Indian Held Kashmir. While Islamabad maintains that the right exercised by India in the valley to conduct elections springs from the abrogation and amendments in the article 370 is illegal. At best the India claims for *de jure* acceptance of the state in the Indian Union can only establish her *de facto* control on the State on the basis of the democratization efforts. The Indian attempt to democratize its *de facto* rule in the valley and the intensive military force has resulted in new dynamic of the conflict that is the eruption of the armed struggle in the Indian held Kashmir, since 1989, introducing the Kashmiri factor in the Dispute (Wersing, Robert, 1994). The linkage of the Kashmir dispute to the Indian national security has been described as a threat to the Indian secularism.

The starting point according to the media has been the kidnapping of the daughter of the Indian home minister in 1989 and the *quid pro quo* taken by the Indian government to set five of the separatist free, from the Indian jails (Ibid). This new element in the conflict since 1989 when seen in the overall framework of the two States claims and positions on the conflict portrays as following. India claims that the struggle had been inspired by Pakistan

Therefore the governor rule transpired by India under Jagmohan since 1990 till 1996 was not only justified but required, as Indians forces in the valley were not fighting Kashmiris but guerrillas/terrorists and infiltrators sent by Pakistan (Amnesty international, ASA/20,/47,/96, 25 October 1996).

The number of Indian troops estimated in 1995 is about half a million in addition to the paramilitary forces. Hence India was fighting terrorism and fundamentalism, as Kashmir is an integral part of India. The following statements and the line of arguments were reported in the local Indian Media, representing the mainstream view that the Struggle was as an extension of terrorism. The militancy would not have acquired the present scale but for outside help (The Hindu, 14 February 1994). The human rights violations are primarily due to the militants and that Pakistan is sending in Afghans and other mercenaries and that it was high time that the European community should declare Pakistan a Terrorist State (The Times of India, 10 February 1994). There is no doubt that Pakistan is involved in supporting aggression and violence in the valley and that the all Hurriyat Conference and parties like Hizbul Mujahadin are not united in their approach. (The Statesman, 3 May 1994). In Kashmir the Human rights violations are due to the terrorists and not by the Indian army or the Indian police. (The Statesman, 26 March 1994). Similarly, arguments are stated that Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and was the prime source of providing indoctrination and training to the terrorists in the valley. (National Herald 24 March 1994). The extent and nature of state violence in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir has been seen in Pakistani media as gross violations of human rights and as an act of state terrorism. The forms of violence appear to have included, recurrent massacres of civilians, widespread torture, involving "cruel and sadistic methods like mass rape, summary executions of hundreds or perhaps thousands of Kashmiri youth suspected of being militants, random killings of bystanders and defenseless

people in their homes by the Indian military, border security forces and paramilitary forces" (Bose Sumantra, 1997: 55).

In this regard inference has been taken by reports in the international NGO's and organizations stating the human rights violations conducted by Indian forces, "India's new government in Jammu and Kashmir threatens armed opposition with extra judicial execution" (Amnesty International ASA 20,47,96 25 October 1996), up to 800 people have disappeared in the Indian held Kashmir (Ibid.). Similarly Pakistan claims that there are no military or terrorists camps in Pakistan and that the proficiency of the separatists has increased due to the long drawn conflict (Wersing Robert,1996:114-24) Kashmir was a long-standing dispute and must be settled through peaceful means and that us could play a predominant role in removing the differences between India and Pakistan (The dawn 27 February 1997).

In short the local media of Pakistan terms the conflict in the overall framework of a dispute left over by the partition and as a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan. Thereby calling the Indian hold on the State as unjudicial, incited by grave Human Rights violations. The resistance movement in the valley is termed as Freedom movement calling international attention and action. The media states also that, in addition to Islamabad's irrevocable commitment to the People of Kashmir. Whereas the Indian media has by in large termed the conflict as settled so far as the legal standing of the dispute is concerned and terms the resistance movement in the State to be totally masterminded by Pakistan and sponsored by cross border terrorism, The human rights violations are excused in the name of fighting terrorism, thereby referring to Kashmir as an integral part of India and something as non negotiable.

The international media's approach to the conflict has ranged from terming it as separatist movement in an Indian State to a militant movement to a dispute between two States left

behind due to the faulty partition plan. Table 3, below, summarizes, the approach of the international media to the conflict.

**Table 3  
International News Coverage of the Kashmir Conflict,  
1997**

Newspaper	Human Rights	Victims	Peace Process	Other
IHT	1,45%	10,21%	27,7%	18,97%
Times	0,72%	8,75%	5,1%	8,03%
Jane's Defense Weekly	0%	0%	0,70%	4,38%
The Economist	0%	2,18%	5,1%	6,57%
Total	2,17%	21,15%	38,6%	37,95%

Table 3 indicates that the majority of the reporting concerns the peace process, and other issues, such as militancy and the Indian-Pakistan rivalry. Human rights violations have received miniscule attention. Furthermore, while the international media reports on the Kashmir dispute rate from the causation of the conflict to the armed resistance in the valley to the human rights violations, the overall percentage of the international media tends to see it either as a domestic problem of India, or as a dispute between India and Pakistan. The focus on the issue and human rights violations is not looked upon in the perspective to incite international attention, or UN intervention. Whereas international human rights organizations state and claim that the "Indian declaration that there is complete peace and amenity in the Kashmir is a big lie" (Amnesty International, ASA/20,10, 1997).

According to a report prepared by the Indian human rights organizations, a total of 1004 persons have been killed in the an average period of one year by the Indian security forces. "Officially these killings are committed during combat but unofficially,

the majority of them have been done in peace time" (report in Kashmir Mirror, 1997, XX). During the years following 1990 reports by the BBC, VGA, VOG and the PTV have narrated the human rights violations in the Indian held Kashmir. In all about 60,000 people have been killed in the eight years of the conflict and several thousands maimed (press coverage of Human rights violations, government of Pakistan 1997-8., see <http://www.pak.gov.pk>). Similarly the killings and disappearances of civilians by the Indian forces in the Indian held Kashmir have been sighted emphasizing the deaths of children, women and civilians, especially when seen in the context of the right exercised by the Indian forces as under the right of extra Judicial killings (Amnesty International, ASA/20, 1. 1998) The "renegade" groups who support the Indian government and are backed by Indian security forces are able to commit human rights violations with impunity, the news release by amnesty international reflected the abduction of journalists, including the correspondents of Agence France Presse (AFP) and Reuters, 19 journalists had been abducted (Amnesty International ASA/20, 33, 96). In addition, various references have been made about the detentions without charge and killings in the custody of the Indian forces estimates ranging from 3007 people to 20,000 detainees (Amnesty International, ASA/33, 5, 1996). Whereas article 21 of the constitution of India protects the right to life and article 32 and 226 provides for the enforcement of all fundamental rights, section 330 and 331 of the Indian penal code forbids torture and the Jammu and Kashmir Public safety acts gives impunity to the Indian armed forces. However the use of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) has aggravated the human rights situation in the Indian Held Kashmir (Amnesty International report ASA/20,5. 1996) the total number of Indian armed forces in the valley amount to 400000 to 600000 (Rohan, Gunaranta, "Will kashmir trigger the bomb?" JDR, August 1, 1998). Human rights violations have been reportedly committed by both guerrillas and the Indian forces however in amore organized fashion by the Indian forces, (human

rights report, July 1999). In summary, despite repeated reports of human rights violations by international organizations, the international media has not portrayed the conflict as a human rights issue but rather as dispute between two states, as a case of a state dealing with foreign aided domestic terrorism, and failing economic conditions.

#### **4.5. A Comparative Analysis of the Case Studies**

Information is power. Its production, processing and dissemination is implicated in power relations. The control of information and information technology is vital in the reconfiguration of power and politics, locally and globally. Dominant social groups can, and invariably do, use the "media as ideological weapons to secure advantages for themselves" (Yermoshkin, 1984) and transpose Western values on the rest of the world. Concern with the dependency of the Third World on the Western media led to the call for a New International Information and Communication Order in 1980. This seems necessary because the ways in which the media present other countries, people and conflict in this case, has fundamental implications for the success or failure of conflict resolution. As UNESCO (1985:7) notes, since the news media are important arbiters of reality, not only at the mass level but also amongst decision-makers, distorted images of the international scene could be a major obstacle for those trying to solve problems at issue. Indeed, it was concern at the way in which the North and South portray each other through their own presentations, as well as the way in which development issues were covered by the media that prompted UNESCO to commission research on the subject in the mid 1980s.

As the case of Mozambique and Kashmir suggest, the mass media remain a powerful ideological tool the dominant social groups use to back their economic and political hegemony. After having been forced to backtrack on its radical socialist policies, and to introduce wide ranging economic, political and social liber-

alization, Mozambique became a darling of the West. Thus by time the peace process began, the once hated 'communist' regime was being portrayed in the Western media in a positive light. In Kashmir, the story is different for a number of reasons. First are the geo-political dynamics of the conflict. The rebels in Kashmir are fighting against a powerful regional ally of the West. Hence the conflict is seen more in terms of a colonial legacy, a dispute left-over by history. The legality of the issue, despite repeated UN Security Council resolutions, human rights violations is often seen as either India's domestic problem, a case of Islamic fundamentalism or intractable dispute between parties. Similarly, the liberation movement is often depicted as a 'terrorist' militancy instigated primarily by Pakistan. Consequently, their attempts to get a positive international image are constantly thwarted by India, with the complicity of Western powers. Because of this, emphasis is on bilateral resolution of the conflict by India and Pakistan, and human rights violation are ignored. Second and related, unlike in Mozambique where Frelimo abandoned its political position under pressure, none of the major protagonists in the Kashmir conflict seem prepare to compromise. Third, and also related, the reluctance to compromise seems inevitable given the balance of power in the battlefield. In short, media coverage of these conflicts was primarily based on a given cultural attribute or set of attributes, to the exclusion of a broader reference to other social structures and processes. As the case of Kashmir suggests, the media also has the potential of precipitating the degeneration of political conflict into violence and warfare, within and between states. Whereas in the case of Tajikistan the focus conflict had remained on the human rights violations and at times with the deteriorating conditions of the Civil war.

The main parties in the conflict had been the government supported by Russian government and the opposition parties. In the initial phase the media of the opposition party on than national revival and the construction of an Islamic democratic State

and the elimination of a communist government. Whereas the governmental media focused on the need for the concentration of power and the human rights violations conducted by opposition parties, Therefore in the initial phase of the conflict the international media supported the oppositions stance In the second phase of the conflict the international media took direct reports from the Russian media and therefore reflected a pro governmental stance this change in the behavior of the international media was seen when the conflict escalated running into the inactive part of the civil war, Thereby eluding to the fact that first the international media supported the opposition so that the state could come out of the soviet Union and than indicated the human rights violations by the opposition parties to justify the pro Russian government Hence the human rights were first used to justify the opposition drive for freedom from the communist elite and than same human rights violations were used against the opposition parties to justify the consolidation of power and to legitimize Russian military presence in Tajikistan. Similar findings can be seen in varying degrees in the case of Mozambique where first the government was seen as violating human rights and latter when the government opposed the door to free market the same human rights violations were laid on the opposition forces. Whereas in the case of Haiti the human rights violations were used to show the legitimacy of the intervening forces and not on the human rights violations conducted by the US authorities and in the case of Kashmir though the onus of the human rights violations in the start of the active part of that Kashmir struggle is placed on the Indian authorities but with eight years into the liberation movement the onus of the human rights violations is gradually shifting to the guerrillas, Secondly unlike in the case of Haiti the human rights violations have not necessitated a case for direct intervention or cause for humanitarian or international concern. The UN established ONUMOZ to regulate the UN operations and it was successful whereas in the case of Haiti the UN sent civilian missions and the UNOAS monitors . Whereas in the case of Kashmir

the United Nations Commission Has existed since early 1950 nevertheless the commission has not only failed to implement the resolutions of the United nations but has over the time failed in the reportation of the violations conducted by the two sides .In addition in the case of each border violation or the violation of the State parties the international media has failed to bring these violations to international attention

## **5. Conclusion**

Media can repress or liberate, unite or fragment society, as well as promote hold back social progress. This makes media an extremely powerful tool, a promoter of certain forms of social, structural and cultural change. Given the power and transformative potential of the mass media, the question of who's reality is presented, who owns it and whose interests it serves, become central to a critical discussion of the impact of the media in conflict dynamics and resolution. The cases studies suggest that the international media uses selective reporting, and uses human rights violations to justify international intervention. However, in the case of Kashmir human rights violations have not led to international intervention because the conflict is seen as an intra state dispute. The legal and moral responsibility of the international community is stronger than in the case of Mozambique, Haiti and Tajikistan, where the dispute was clearly an internal affair, therefore outside the framework of the regular norms of UN intervention.

UN intervention is only justified to intervene in internal conflict if the conflict is a threat to international security. In the above cases of Haiti and Mozambique it is debatable. In Kashmir, the growing escalation in the conflict is a serious threat to regional security. In addition, there exists an international resolution to support the people of Kashmir in their fight for self determination, but still the issue has remained on the backburner of the international media. In short, the international media is bi-

ased, and often plays (to) the tune of the dominant groups in their respective countries. The media works within the established framework of international security and power politics. In conclusion, human rights violations are often used by international media for ideological purposes instead of actual victimization of people by those who control the institution of violence.

### **List of References**

- Abrahamsson, H and Nilsson, A, 1995; **Mozambique: The troubled Transition, From socialist Construction to Free Market Capitalism**. London, Zed Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_, 1996; **The Washington Consensus and Mozambique: The Need to Question the westernised development paradigm in Africa**, Gothenburg, Department of Peace and Development Research Gothenburg University (PADRIGU) Papers.
- Akbar, M.J, 1991; **Kashmir behind the Vale**. Viking.
- Akiner, Sh., 1996; **Conflict stability and development in Central Asia**, in C.J.Dicks ed., *Instabilities in post-Communist Europe*, Carmircheal & Sweet, Portsmouth.
- Amnesty International. 1996. ASA/20/47/96, 25 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. ASA, 20 march.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. New Release, ASA/33 May.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1996. Report ASA 20, May.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1997. ASA, 20 october.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1998. ASA, 20 january.
- Askari. H.M. 1997; **The Dawn**, March 12.
- Berman, E, 1996; **Managing Arms in Peace Process: Mozambique**, New York and Geneva, United Nations.
- Castells, M, 1996; **The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 1, The Rise of the Network Society**, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.

- Chingono, MF, 1996; **The State, Violence and Development: The Political Economy of War in Mozambique, 1975-1992**, Aldershot, Avebury.
- Gunaranta Rolan, 1998; **"Will Kashmir trigger the bomb?"**. Jane's Defense Review.
- Human Right Match Report, 1999, july. "Behind the Kashmir's conflict". See at <http://www.humanrightsmatch.org>.
- Kumar, Chetan. 1998. **Building Peace in Haiti**. International Peace Academy. Occasional Paper Series. London.
- Minter, W, (editor), 1994; **Invisible Crimes: U.S. Private Intervention in the War in Mozambique**, Washington, D.C., Africa Policy Information Center.
- Mirza Khan Zaman, 1998; Profile of the Kashmir Liberation Struggle. In: **Fifty years of the Kashmir Dispute**. /n.p.
- NACLA. 1991; **Report on the Americas. The Elite's Revenge**" Number 3. December. North American Congress on Latin America INC.
- NACLA. 1992, **Report on the Americas. Haitians at Sea. Asylum Denied**. Number 1. July. North American Congress on Latin America INC.
- Ponomarev, V, 1992, "Kolokola Nadejdi" Calls for Hope, *Pravda*, 10-12 May 1992, *Izvestiya*, 7 of August
- Regional Surveys of the World. 1993; **South America, Central America and the Caribbean. 1993**. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition. England, Europa Publications. Report by Kashmir Mirror, 1997. XX.
- Schramm, W, 1980; "Circulation of News in the Third World: A Study of Asia", in Wilhoit, CG and de Bock, H, (eds), **Mass Communication Review Yearbook**, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications.
- Sattar Abul, 1998, Fifty years of the Kashmir Dispute. Diplomatic Aspects. In: **Fifty years of the Kashmir Dispute**. /n.p.
- Starr, F. 1996; **Making Eurasia stable**, Foreign Affairs., Vol.75, Number 1.

- Synge, R, 1997; **Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94**, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace.
- Tahir, A., 1991; **Woe bar ma (Woe to us)** Dushanbe, Duniya, #1, May 1991 .
- UNESCO 1985; **Foreign News in the Media: International Reporting in 29 Countries**, Number 93, Paris, UNESCO.
- Wani, Mushtaq Ahmad. 1998; History of Human Rights Violations in Indian-held. In: **Fifty years of the Kashmir Dispute.** /n.p.
- Wersing Robert, 1994; **India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute on Regional Conflict and its Resolution.** New York. Sr. Martin. Press.
- Yermoshkin, AGN, 1984; **A New Information Order or Psychological Warfare?**, Moscow, Progress.