Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Esta publicación cientíca en formato digital es continuidad de la revista impresa
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197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.41 N° 78
Julio
Septiembre
2023
ISSN 0798-1406 ~ Depósito legal pp 198502ZU132
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Vol. 41, Nº 78 (2023), 326-344
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Identication of new threats to the
national security of the state
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4178.23
Ivo Svoboda *
Mykhailo Shevchuk **
Oleksandr Shamsutdinov ***
Pavlo Lysianskyi ****
Oleksii Voluiko *****
Abstract
The objective of the article was to identify new threats to the
national security of countries and, at the same time, to determine
the adaptation tasks related to their identication. The synergistic
approach, comparative legal analysis methods and foresight were
the main tools of this research. Manipulation actions involving
deep forgeries are spreading rapidly. Autonomous weapons with
articial intelligence are used to create negative fake events.
Criminal use of users’ smart devices to create a unique behavioural prole
has been detected. New cyber threats to Ukraine’s national security during
the military conict are characterized by attempts to disrupt critical
infrastructure. It is concluded that “cyber looting” has emerged with the
use of social engineering methods. The activities of the Belgian Center for
Cyber Security (CCB) are a positive example of the identication of new
cyber threats in the countries of the European Union EU. Furthermore,
CCB performs activities related to the identication, monitoring and
analysis of online security issues. Coordination between relevant services
and agencies, public authorities, private sector and academia is ensured.
Keywords: cyber warfare; deep forgery; cyber security; social
engineering; cyber resilience.
* Associate Professor, Guarantor of Security Management Studies, Department of Security and Law,
University of Regional Development and Banking Institute, AMBIS, a.s. Vyská škola, 180 00, Prague,
Czech Republic. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0941-4686
** Candidate of Science of Law, Doctoral Student, Department of Constitutional Law, Administrative
Law, Financial Law, Leonid Yuzkov Khmelnytskyi University of Management and Law, 29000,
Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7549-6344
*** Ph.D. in Law, Leading Researcher, Interagency Research Center on Problems of Combating Organized
Crime at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 03035, Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9325-9227
**** Graduate Student, Department of Political Theories, National University “Odesa Law Academy”,
65009, Odesa, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3997-9335
***** Candidate of Juridical Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Legal Support of the
Activity of the National Guard of Ukraine, Kyiv Insitute of the National Guard of Ukraine, 03179,
Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0894-5004
Recibido el 25/04/23 Aceptado el 17/06/23
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Identicación de nuevas amenazas a la seguridad
nacional del Estado
Resumen
El objetivo del artículo fue identicar nuevas amenazas a la seguridad
nacional de los países y, al mismo tiempo, determinar las tareas de
adaptación relacionadas con su identicación. El enfoque sinérgico, los
métodos de análisis jurídico comparado y la previsión fueron las principales
herramientas de esta investigación. Las acciones de manipulación que
involucran falsicaciones profundas se están extendiendo rápidamente.
Se utilizan armas autónomas con inteligencia articial para crear eventos
de falsos de carácter negativo. Se ha detectado el uso delictivo de los
dispositivos inteligentes de los usuarios para crear un perl conductual
único. Las nuevas amenazas cibernéticas a la seguridad nacional de Ucrania
durante el conicto militar se caracterizan por intentos de interrumpir la
infraestructura crítica. Se concluye que ha surgido el “saqueo cibernético”
con el uso de métodos de ingeniería social. Las actividades del Centro para
la Seguridad Cibernética de Bélgica (CCB) son un ejemplo positivo de la
identicación de nuevas amenazas cibernéticas en los países de la Unión
Europea UE. Por lo demás, CCB realiza actividades relacionadas con la
identicación, seguimiento y análisis de problemas de seguridad en línea.
Se garantiza la coordinación entre los servicios y organismos pertinentes,
las autoridades públicas, el sector privado y el académico.
Palabras clave: guerra cibernética; falsicación profunda; seguridad
cibernética; ingeniería social; resiliencia cibernética.
Introduction
The evolution of information and cyberspace is the main factor in the
development. Globalization has led to a strong dependence on electronic
communications. The reshaping and redenition of technological processes
have caused large informational changes in dierent countries (Cristea,
2020). The consequences of the application of 5G technology, articial
intelligence, and the Internet of Things may become a threat to national
security (Li and Liu, 2021).
In the same context, the role of interstate competition and conicts
worsened. The narratives have been denied with the use of digital diplomacy
and subversive disinformation operations (Devanny et al., 2022). A new
battleeld was created, in which military operations involve sophisticated
digital technologies (Ştefănescu and Papoi, 2020). The online activities of
special services, armed forces and related non-state actors have become
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Ivo Svoboda, Mykhailo Shevchuk, Oleksandr Shamsutdinov, Pavlo Lysianskyi y Oleksii Voluiko
Identication of new threats to the national security of the state
increasingly intense. Countries began to prepare guidelines for cyber war.
Training has been conducted to practice cyber tactics such as espionage,
information theft, disinformation, hacking, and malware.
Threats from the virtual environment are spreading to critical
infrastructure, government bodies, communication systems, and citizens.
Fake messages distributed via smart devices form a new space of conict
that does not depend on geographical location (Sługocki and Sowa, 2021).
Deepfakes can contribute to pressure and shaping the process of making
wrong decisions by individuals or organizations (Farid, 2021).
The Russian-Ukrainian war provides relevant information about what
types of cyber threats will appear in future cyber conicts (Guitton and
Fréchette, 2023). The existing and emerging threats require the improvement
of specic means of intelligence and response, continuous increase in their
eectiveness. The response to hybrid threats is implemented through an
integrated process. This process is inuenced by the diculties of their
identication and forecasting because of their mobility and the intensity of
their impact.
The main task of national security organizations is to guarantee the
protection of citizens from relevant threats. The priority is also to preserve
the economic sustainability of national institutions. The tasks of national
security organizations are actions based on assistance to public authorities
responsible for decision-making in the country. They are responsible for
ensuring that the information is correct and up-to-date (Dobák, 2021).
Activities in the eld of national security protection should be based on
timely identication of possible threats and preparation of appropriate
countermeasures.
Particular attention should be paid to identifying vulnerabilities and
strengths of the state and society. Priority should be given to the development
of opportunities for further protection of national interests (Reznikova,
2022). At the same time, it is expedient to update the security environment
transformation vectors. The result will be a statement of strategic goals and
priorities of state policy in the eld of national security.
The military conict on the territory of Ukraine requires quality
solutions in terms of the forms, methods and procedures of using state
resources to achieve political goals in a cross-border context (Semenenko
and Frolov, 2023). The Russian Federation uses military, informational and
psychological, as well as economic and political resources to the maximum
possible extent. The elements of the information technology component
of the hybrid war on the part of the aggressor country are signicantly
strengthened.
The uncertainty of the situation related to the military aggression of the
Russian Federation in Ukraine leads to signicant diculties in the process
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Vol. 41 Nº 78 (2023): 326-344
of policy making in the eld of national security. Emerging and developing
threats lead to the need to identify them, strengthen and revise traditional
security mechanisms. The implementation of adaptive management in the
eld national security is becoming especially relevant.
In view of the foregoing, the aim of this research is to identify new
threats to the national security of countries and new tasks related to their
identication. The aim involved the fullment of the following research
objectives:
1. Determine the current trends in the legislative regulation of national
security protection using the example of cyber security in the EU
and Ukraine;
2. Identify new types of cyber threats and the current state of their
identication;
3. Analyse the implementation of mechanisms for identifying
new cyberthreats using the example of Belgium for the possible
implementation of relevant positive experience in Ukraine.
1. Literature review
The study by Cristea (2020) was used as a background for this research,
which was focused on the role of the evolution of security threats in the
national and international context. Particular attention is paid to the
existing problems related to the implementation of the necessary measures,
which aim to cover each control system. The paper concludes that the result
should be a better understanding of the evolution of threats. The work also
summarized conclusions about the future vision of the technological world.
The need to stimulate users to analyse the components of information
security is emphasized.
The study by Guitton and Fréchette (2023), who conducted a
comprehensive analysis of crisis and post-crisis cyber threats, had an
impact on the author’s position on the issue under research. Attention
was paid to the inuence of the Russian-Ukrainian conict on the nature
of cyber threats. The study also took into account the ndings obtained
by Reznikova (2022) regarding the analysis of the security environment
of Ukraine before the war in 2022. The importance of identifying the
sources of the main threats to the national security of Ukraine for further
forecasting the transformations of the sources of the main threats in the
post-war period is emphasized. It was also emphasized that this activity is
necessary for determining the strategic goals and priorities of the national
security policy.
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Ivo Svoboda, Mykhailo Shevchuk, Oleksandr Shamsutdinov, Pavlo Lysianskyi y Oleksii Voluiko
Identication of new threats to the national security of the state
Devanny et al. (2022) studied the nature of modern threats and their
impact on public administration. It was concluded that there is a need to
focus on cyber security and resilience, and especially on eective cyber
diplomacy. The study by Li and Liu (2021) on dierent types of cyberattacks
of the new generation is worth noting. The authors present new trends and
latest developments in the eld of cyber security, as well as analyse security
threats and challenges. An increased number of cases of cyberattacks,
which may have military or political goals, has been noted.
Farid (2021), Boháček and Farid (2022) considered issues related to
state and individual protection measures against deepfakes, ethical use
of deepfakes as a weapon. Particular concern about the use of deepfakes
against world leaders during armed conicts has been noted. The
importance of using an identity-based approach to protect world leaders
from fake imposters was emphasized. It was concluded that this approach
captures distinct facial features, gestures and voice.
The study by Dobák (2021), who emphasizes that the national security
sector is connected with the world of ICT, was used when shaping the
author’s position. It is concluded on the developing transformation of
intelligence technologies and methods, the emergence of cross-border
solutions for data collection. The importance of comprehensive protection
of state and national systems, critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks was
noted.
An article by Willett (2022) on the cyber dimension of the Russian-
Ukrainian war is worth noting. The author emphasized the importance
of the reliability of Ukrainian cyber security supported by Western aid.
The researcher focuses on the fact that there is uncertainty about the true
nature of cyber operations, their responsible use, and the application of
international law to them.
Urych and Matyasik (2022) compare military and defence training,
education and socialization in a number of European countries. The need
for the development of defence education in each country was noted. The
authors analysed possible shortcomings in this area, which are related to
the cyber space. The importance of each country’s experience aimed at
strengthening national security is claried.
An active study of the issues under research points to the fact that
identication of new threats to the national security of the country should
be given special attention. The diversity of studies in this eld is also noted.
Therefore, it is necessary to carry out research according to new research
criteria.
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2. Methods
The research on the topic of the article involved a set of methodological
tools aimed at fullling the objectives outlined by the aim of the study.
Figure 1 shows the research design, which makes it possible to single out the
main elements used to draw the author’s conclusions. During the research,
the authors studied and shaped their own position regarding regulatory
documents and studies on the issue under research. The study comprises
information from thirty-seven sources with relevant references in the text.
A synergistic approach was used to identify the high level of self-
organization of states on the way to solving the issue of countering
innovative threats to national security, as well as to shape the author’s vision
of strengthening interstate ties against the background of the exacerbation
of militarized conicts on the way to the prevention of the studied threats.
This approach made it possible to minimize the multivariability of paths and
accidents when identifying new threats, and determine universal packages
of actions in the studied area. Some have been fragmentarily implemented
into the EU legislation. This approach was also tested while considering
the debatable positions of the representatives of legal schools and nding
a single vector of agreement for supranational changes in the studied area.
332
Ivo Svoboda, Mykhailo Shevchuk, Oleksandr Shamsutdinov, Pavlo Lysianskyi y Oleksii Voluiko
Identication of new threats to the national security of the state
Figure 1. Research design on the topic being studied. Own elaboration.
The observation method was applied to identify the criteria for the
riskiness of making a unique behavioural prole of each network user in the
current realities. This methodological tool also made it possible to monitor
the decrease in the level of cyber security in the EU in the context of full-
scale military operations in Ukraine.
The method of comparative legal analysis was used to reveal the essence
and content of risk assessment and threat monitoring, as well as outline the
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 41 Nº 78 (2023): 326-344
primary vectors of the planning strategy of preventive security measures
of the EU member states. This method helped to determine the positive
practice of Belgium in the eld of increasing protection against cyber threats
at all levels. The results of prevention and eective protection developed
and implemented by this state deserve attention and further testing.
The forecasting method helped to specify the vectors of adaptation of the
Belgian practice of identifying the latest threats on the territory of European
countries, determine the mechanisms of identifying fake information. It was
established that the Bug Bounty Programme for detecting vulnerabilities in
technologies initiated by Belgium has been implemented in Ukraine despite
the challenges of the martial law in the country.
The historical method was applied when tracking the genesis of the
emergence and identication of threats to the national security of states in
recent years, and proving the accelerated pace of growth in the number and
complexity of new threats.
The statistical method identied trends in the transformations of
current threats. This methodological tool also made it possible to analyse
the National Cyber Security Index. The clustering method was also used
in the analysis of the sample in this study. It was used when studying the
classications of cyber threats, cyber incidents and possible response
measures.
3. Results
The identication of threats involves the assessment of events,
phenomena, processes, and other factors that lead to the danger of realizing
vital national interests. Cyber threats have the following basic components:
collection, modication, leakage, and destruction. Internal threats spread
from employees of organizations, software, and hardware. External sources
of threats can be represented by computer viruses and malware.
Incident categories contain malicious (oensive) content and distribute
spam. Malicious software code provokes malware infection and distribution.
The attacker collects information using scanning, sning, and phishing.
Incident categories also include attempts to interfere by exploiting a
vulnerability and logging into the system.
The availability violation category is characterized by a denial-of-service
attack, sabotage, and failure. Violation of information properties is possible
with unauthorized access to information and modication. Fraud is carried
out through the use of a fraudulent website. Known vulnerability is also a
characteristic category.
334
Ivo Svoboda, Mykhailo Shevchuk, Oleksandr Shamsutdinov, Pavlo Lysianskyi y Oleksii Voluiko
Identication of new threats to the national security of the state
Digital technologies have changed the dynamics of conict. Cyber war
has evolved from propaganda to espionage, from defacing websites to
disrupting power grids and water systems. Threats related to information
activities and cyberspace have got a military-political orientation. The
information and technical threats, as well as information and psychological
inuences have become part of military strategies.
Lethal autonomous weapons based on articial intelligence have become
a particular threat. Their use leads to new ethical problems. An example
would be the substitution of human ethical judgments during conicts.
Articial intelligence algorithms that focus on attracting people’s attention
use human cognitive abilities. A social media post containing an indignant
disagreement based on moral emotional words gets a lot more reposts. This
can spread both economic and political discontent in countries with the
help of articially created negative events.
Many social consequences of new technologies began to be stated only as
they expanded. Quantum computers have signicant computing capacity. It
became possible to use them for hacking encryption algorithms of Internet
websites, for attacks on state systems and institutions.
Social networks are increasingly becoming the target. Methods and tools
with dierent levels of complexity and innovation are used. Solutions based
on deep learning techniques use generative adversarial networks (GAN).
Two systems of competing articial neural networks —a generator and
a discriminator — make it possible to create hyperrealistic videos, audio,
images or text. Relevant digital content is determined to be unreliable only
using sophisticated forensic methods. Once created, the content, known as
synthetic media or deepfake, can be used as a threat to national security.
Another example of a malicious use of GAN could be targeting servers
that distribute patches to disrupt scheduled updates. In general, the list of
identiers of new threats and their manifestations can be replenished daily
with the latest developments, but it is proposed to single out the basic ones
(Figure 2).
Figure 2. The main threats to the country’s national cybersecurity.
Own elaboration.
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The process of identifying deepfake videos can be divided into three
types. The rst type is based on learning, where features that make it
possible to distinguish the reality from a fake are learned explicitly. The
second type is based on artifacts in which low- to high-level features are
designed to distinguish real from fake.
The third type is identity-based, in which biometric style features are
applied to detect whether the person depicted in the video is who he/
she says he/she is. The diculty of implementing these methods is that
they require an individual model created from several hours of authentic
video record. An integrated model of the face, gestures and voice should
be prepared, which captures the distinctive features of the person’s speech.
Approximately 700-800 behavioural features are needed to achieve the
identication accuracy. (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Deepfake video identication process. Own elaboration.
The attackers’ task is to collect data from all aspects of life to create an
accurate and unique behavioural prole of each user. By 2030, the volume
of behavioural data collection will increase exponentially (ENISA, 2023).
Criminal activities can be aimed at gaining access to data arrays to adapt
social engineering attacks based on a user’s behavioural prole. Adversely
impacting users through collected behavioural proles may pose a threat to
national security.
The combination of software, hardware, and component-based code
began to create uncontrolled interactions and interfaces, disrupting the
respective supply chains. Cyberattacks are becoming more sophisticated,
and may be combined with physical or oine attacks. Hybrid operations
are characterized by the diculty of detection and protection due to their
complexity and insucient training of specialists who are trained to
consider each attack separately.
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Ivo Svoboda, Mykhailo Shevchuk, Oleksandr Shamsutdinov, Pavlo Lysianskyi y Oleksii Voluiko
Identication of new threats to the national security of the state
A lack of skills and personnel is the cause of most cybersecurity threats,
which can negatively impact businesses, governments, and citizens. It is
also possible to note the fact of the growth of cybercrime with the use of
digital currencies, the use of data from the electronic healthcare database
and genetic data.
As of April 2023, there were 5.18 billion Internet users worldwide. A
total of 4.8 billion of the population were social media users (Statista,
2023). Global costs from cybercrime could reach $10.5 trillion annually by
2025 compared to $3 trillion in 2015 (CompTIA, 2023).
After the beginning of the aggression of the Russian Federation against
Ukraine, cyber-attacks on energy networks, transport infrastructure and
space facilities of the EU showed the relevant risks and threats. The EU’s
cyber defence policy aims to expand the EU’s cyber defence capabilities
and strengthen coordination and cooperation. Back in 2019, the European
Parliament and the Council adopted the Cybersecurity Act (European
Parliament and of the Council, 2019).
The main goals of cyber security are information security, access control,
vulnerability assessment, monitoring of user activity, cyber resilience. The
EU Agency for Cybersecurity Security (ENISA) has been given permanent
powers. It takes into account the most relevant and widespread standards
in the eld of risk management. The international ISO/IEC 27002, the
American NIST Cybersecurity Framework are applied. The EU supports the
US Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC) model.
In the EU, it is proposed to impose cybersecurity obligations on all
products with digital elements (European Parliament and of the Council,
2022) It is also proposed to increase the level of preparedness, detection
and response to threats and attacks in the eld of cybersecurity in the EU
(European Parliament and of the Council, 2023). As a result, the European
Cyber Shield should be created. It is planned to introduce operational
security centres in it, which should be interconnected throughout the EU.
A positive example of the implementation of the identication of new
cyber threats is the relevant activity in Belgium. According to the National
Cyber Security Index (NCSI), Belgium has a score of 94.81, which equates to
No. 1 in the ranking (NCSI, 2021a). The Centre for Cyber Security Belgium
(CCB) is the national cybersecurity authority (CCB, 2023). Belgium has a
federal CCB cyber emergency response team (CERT.be).
The CCB site Safeonweb.be informs and advises Belgian citizens in their
daily life on cyber security issues and the main current digital threats. The
Cyberfundamentals Framework created by CCB helps Belgian citizens in
the workplace. The Cyberfundamentals Framework includes well-known
cybersecurity frameworks: NIST CSF, ISO 27001/ISO 27002, CIS Controls,
and IEC 62443.
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The Cyber fundamentals Framework has prepared four levels, the
purpose of which is to respond to the severity of the threat. The Baseline
Security Guidelines (BSG), the Executive Summary (FR) for the public
sector contain dierent levels of guidance. Federal Public Services (FPS)
Policy and Support oers cybersecurity training for federal government
employees.
In Belgium, the identication of operators of essential services operating
in critical infrastructure is legislated (Chancellerie du Premier Ministre,
2019). An Early Warning System (EWS) has been established for CCB’s
critical infrastructure. Authorized businesses have access to ltered cyber
threat alerts through a common platform.
Belgian organizations widely use a coordinated vulnerability disclosure
policy (CVDP), as well as the Bug Bounty Programme for identifying
vulnerabilities in technologies. CCB conducts various classes, courses,
training and academic research on cyber security in Belgium.
Despite the martial law introduced in Ukraine, the state continues to
implement the necessary legislative initiatives. The National Security
Strategy of Ukraine (Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 392/2020,
2020) is based on the principle of deterrence through the improvement of
defence and security capabilities, stability and interaction with key foreign
partners.
The Law of Ukraine No. 2163-VIII “On the Basic Principles of Ensuring
Cyber Security of Ukraine” dated October 5, 2017 denes the legal and
organizational foundations of ensuring the protection of the vital interests
of citizens, society, the state, and national interests of Ukraine from cyber
threats.
According to the National Standard of Ukraine ISO/IEC 27032:2016,
cyber threats aect digital assets. In Ukraine, a list of categories of cyber
incidents has been developed, and the TLP Protocol, which contains general
rules for exchanging information about cyber incidents, has been in eect
since February 2023.
According to the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI), Ukraine has a
score of 75.32, which equals 24
th
place in the ranking (NCSI, 2021b). Table
1 provides a detailed information on Ukraine’s cyber security indicators
(NCSI, 2021b).
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Identication of new threats to the national security of the state
Table 1. Indicadores de seguridad cibernética de Ucrania según el ranking del
Índice Nacional de Seguridad Cibernética (NCSI).
General cyber
security indicators
Basic cyber
security indicators
Indicators of incident and
crisis management
Cyber security policy
development - 100%
Analysis and
information about
cyber threats - 80%
Education and
professional
development - 89%
Contribution to global
cyber security – 33%
Protection of digital
services - 20%
Protection of basic
services - 100%
Electronic
identication and
trust services - 100%
Personal data
protection - 100%
Responding to cyber incidents
- 67%
Cyber crisis management -
60%
Combating cybercrime – 100%
Military cyber operations –
17%
The given data indicate that Ukraine currently needs to improve the
protection of digital servers, response to cyber incidents, and cyber security
management. Special attention needs to be paid to improving the level
of incident management related to military cyber operations. A total of
1,374 cyber incidents in 2021, and 2,194 cyber incidents and cyber-attacks
in 2022 were processed manually (CERT-UA, 2023). A more destructive
nature of the attacks was recorded. New cyber threats were noticed during
the military aggression of the Russian Federation.
This is the rst military cyber conict in which the respective capabilities
of the two countries are almost identical. Most of this conict in the eld
of cyber technologies consists of information operations, which are based
on cognitive components. Hacking and disruptions of critical national
infrastructure of Ukraine became a characteristic feature.
New cyberattacks are being carried out with the aim of revenge or
attempts at informational and psychological inuence to convince the
population that the state is not capable of protecting them. Critical “silent”
attacks are also committed. They are aimed at military espionage, the
main targets of which are high-ranking ocials, diplomats and other
professionals who have access to the most sensitive information.
The most popular methods of penetration are phishing, using known
vulnerabilities. The cyber techniques are shifted from destructive attacks to
attacks aimed at obtaining information, and the interest is shifted to new
industries.
Table 2 contains groups of the most frequent combined cyberattacks of
the Russian Federation during hostilities in Ukraine (CERT-UA, 2023):
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Table 2. The vectors of cyber-attacks committed by the Russian Federation
during a full-scale invasion of Ukraine
Operations of information
inuence
Cyber espionage
Technical
vulnerabilities
- mass media;
- civil infrastructure websites
(state institutions and critical
infrastructure facilities (especially
the energy sector);
- websites of defence organizations.
- “silent” operations;
- phishing.
- destruction of data,
infrastructure.
Source: according to CERT-UA data (2023).
The scope of cyber fraud using social engineering techniques signicantly
expanded in Ukraine during the wartime, when the citizens needed
social assistance. The population’s demand for military- and electricity-
related goods has grown. Cash payments from the state and international
organizations have become the subject of close attention of fraudsters.
“Cyber looters” started issuing loans for missing servicemen and citizens
who went abroad (EMA, 2023).
The draft Ukraine Recovery Plan has been developed. Much attention is
paid to increasing the cyber resilience of the state and the eective response
to cyber security incidents.
4. Discussion
It can be stated that digitization, generation of more data and expansion
of connectivity leads to the emergence of new threats to national security.
Globalization and the development of ICT have aected national security
as threats have become much more abstract and complex (Abd Al Ghaar,
2020). A new approach to predicting and identifying cyber-attacks at an
early stage is needed, which is based on a preventive approach to identifying
security threats, especially in the eld of critical infrastructure (Alqudhaibi
et al., 2023).
The researchers propose to ensure the accuracy of forecasts through the
minimization of false-positive alarms. The identication mechanism can be
based on the specics of the attacker’s motivation and the nature of the
critical infrastructure.
Tested on several hours of authentic video, the identication-based
deepfake detection approach was found to capture distinct gestures, facial
and voice features. In this way, the use of deepfakes against world leaders
during elections or during armed conicts is minimized (Boháček and
Farid, 2022).
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Ivo Svoboda, Mykhailo Shevchuk, Oleksandr Shamsutdinov, Pavlo Lysianskyi y Oleksii Voluiko
Identication of new threats to the national security of the state
The responsibility for the danger of programmes that can later simulate
deepfakes should rest with the inventors of the software. It should occur
before the release of the technology into open access, as the corresponding
software can be used as a cyber threat (Farid, 2021).
It can be stated that the identication of a cyber threat is an eort that
requires serious analysis. Reports from people using radio intelligence
tools can help gather evidence to support attribution analysis (Devanny et
al., 2022). According to the researchers, an understanding of the technical
operational methods of the alleged criminal will be ensured.
It can be concluded that the scale, variety and complexity of cyber
threats are growing signicantly. The existing security strategies, which
are mandatory to combat cybercrime, will not be able to meet the future
requirements that will arise in the post-war crisis era (Guitton and
Fréchette, 2023). The researchers state that network dynamics with the
help of articial intelligence for specic tasks should be implanted in the
process of exchanging accumulated experience between experts.
It was established that the positive example of Belgium indicates the
need to implement constant tracking and use of advanced technologies
in the eld of cyberspace. Socialization, education and training of young
people to ensure national security is becoming extremely important
(Urych and Matyasik, 2022). Countries need to increase their spending on
developing infrastructure such as rewalls and developing cybersecurity
talent (Hung, 2022). A serious task in this eld is the employment of the
younger generation, which better perceives the digital world (Dobák, 2021).
It can be concluded that the components of cyber-attacks against Ukraine
are new hybrid threats with characteristic criteria. Ukraine has shown
sucient capacity to recover from detected cyber intrusions and develop
cyber resilience (Willett, 2022). In Ukraine, it is necessary to develop a
programme of state strategic forecasting and planning (Bondarenko et al.,
2022). According to researchers, it should be related to the entire structure
of state activity, be based on models of the future security environment, and
correspond to the national interests of the state.
It can be stated that the identication of informational fakes and
deepfakes is one of the main tasks of the state in ensuring the information and
cyber security of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Armed Forces
of Ukraine. This will contribute to counteracting adverse informational and
psychological inuences on the personnel of the Armed Forces (Semenenko
and Frolov, 2023).
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Vol. 41 Nº 78 (2023): 326-344
Conclusions
New information technical threats and information psychological
inuences are becoming components of military strategies. An autonomous
weapon with articial intelligence appeared to simulate and create negative
events. Deepfakes become a tool used to deceive in order to inuence
the decision-making processes of community members. The increasing
malicious use of quantum computers is recorded. The criminal use of users’
smart devices to create a unique behavioural prole has emerged. Cyber
threats have become hybrid. New threats require an urgent evaluation of
events, phenomena, and processes.
The EU’s cyber defence policy has set the expansion of cyber defence
capabilities, strengthening of coordination, cooperation as its goal
through the proposed laws regarding cyber solidarity and cyber resilience.
A characteristic feature of the future European Cyber Shield will be a
comprehensive mechanism for responding to relevant emergency situations.
The activities of the established Centre for Cyber Security Belgium
(CCB) are a positive example of the implementation of the identication
of new cyber threats. CCB centrally carries out activities related to the
identication, monitoring, and analysis of online security problems.
States need to step up eorts to improve targeted interventions in
national education to ensure future skilled cybersecurity professionals. It
is also necessary to pay attention to the issue of involving the capabilities of
national intelligence special services for the processes of identifying cyber
threats to national security.
New cyber threats to national security in Ukraine are characterized by
attempts to disrupt critical national infrastructure. New cyberattacks are
being carried out with the aim of revenge, attempts at informational and
psychological inuence, military espionage. Phishing attacks and the use of
known vulnerabilities are being improved. “Cyber looting” with the use of
social engineering techniques has emerged.
Ukraine still needs to strengthen the levels of protection of digital
servers, response to cyber incidents, and cyber security management. The
positive example of Belgium indicates the need for continuous monitoring
and application of advanced technologies in the relevant eld. It can be
implemented in the relevant activity in Ukraine.
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Vol.41 Nº 78