Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Esta publicación cientíca en formato digital es continuidad de la revista impresa
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197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.41 N° 77
Abril
Junio
2023
Recibido el 08/02/23 Aprobado el 12/04/23
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas
La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca ción aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to
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En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias
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Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al año y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con
avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
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Vol. 41, Nº 77 (2023), 405-421
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
The role of the USA in the Western
Europe’s security policy making
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4177.27
Alina Korniienko *
Abstract
The article aimed to determine the role and place of the
United States as a key factor inuencing the denition of Western
European security policy, in the context of existing threats. The
research methodology was based on the determination of the
general geopolitical situation in the countries of the European
Union EU and the United States, a comprehensive analysis of
existing risks, a graphical analysis of the total defense costs,
an analysis of the main approaches to the security policy of
the European Union, with a view to the inuence of the United
States. Everything indicates that the U.S. is basing its position on
the construction of an autonomous system to ensure the defense
capability of the European Union. It is concluded on the need to strengthen
the EU security implementation system based on the expansion of military
potential will enhance the capabilities of NATO, which will allow the U.S.,
radically respond to other global threats.
Keywords: security policy-making; Western Europe; military threats;
transatlantic relations; geopolitics in the 21st century.
* PhD., in Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Modern and Contemporary
History of Foreign Countries, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, 01033, Kyiv, Ukraine.
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-0792-9020
406
Alina Korniienko
The role of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making
El papel de los Estados Unidos en la elaboración de
políticas de seguridad en Europa Occidental
Resumen
El artículo tuvo como objetivo determinar el papel y el lugar de los
Estados Unidos como un factor clave que inuye en la denición de la
política de seguridad de Europa Occidental, en el contexto de las amenazas
existentes. La metodología de investigación se basó en la determinación
de la situación geopolítica general de los países de la Unión europea UE y
Estados Unidos, un análisis exhaustivo de los riesgos existentes, un análisis
gráco de los costes totales de defensa, un análisis de los principales
enfoques de la política de seguridad de la Unión Europea, con miras a la
inuencia de los Estados Unidos. Todo indica que EE.UU., basa su posición
en la construcción de un sistema autónomo para asegurar la capacidad de
defensa de la Unión Europea. Se concluye en la necesidad de reforzar el
sistema de implementación de la seguridad de la UE basado en la expansión
del potencial militar mejorará las capacidades de la OTAN, lo que permitirá
a los EE. UU., responder de manera radical a otras amenazas globales.
Palabras clave: formulación de políticas de seguridad; Europa
occidental; amenazas militares; relaciones
transatlánticas; geopolítica en el siglo XXI.
Introduction
Until recently, the prevailing opinion was that the end of the Cold War
would stop devastating conicts, and the main issues would be related to
climate change, the ght against infections or the control over terrorist
activities. The regional security in Western Europe was ensured by the
alliance with the USA for a long time, which was gradually expanding.
Accelerating globalization, the emergence of new rival contenders, and
uncertainty about US global leadership have made concerns about the
permanence of the US international order-maintaining role more acute.
A supercial understanding of the nature of modern threats has led to a
decline in the defence capabilities of European countries and underfunding
of military expenditures.
Russian military aggression against Ukraine caused radical changes
in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance. Leaders of states and
military agencies drew attention to the inadequacy of collective defence and
the need to build resilience to threats in the context of a military conict on
the European continent.
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Vol. 41 Nº 77 (2023): 405-421
The need to develop an integrated concept of a sustainable society in
NATO, as well as in the European Union, suggests that this should become
a key concept in the development of European and Atlantic security policy.
The recent events have urged the need to prepare for both non-military
(cyber threats, pandemics) and military threats associated with Russian
military aggression against Ukraine, and the use of military tools in
international relations (Wywiał, 2022).
The academic literature has a certain gap on issues of changing
the nature of alliances or the orientation of individual state strategies,
including the EU. The existing studies address issues of alliances in conict
and cooperation (interaction between exclusive mechanisms of collective
defence and inclusive institutions of collective security) (Prokopenko et al.,
2023; Rynning and Schmidt, 2018). Many other studies of alliance politics
focus on US activities. Separate studies examine the security activities of
US allies in determining the nature of the changing regional order and US
inuence on security dimensions.
The aim of the article is to determine the role and place of the United
States in Western Europe’s security policy making based on real modern
threats. This implies the need to identify the main threats that individual
countries represent; determine the list of allied countries; comprehensive
identication of potential threats to EU countries; analysis of the state of
defence nancing of individual countries and associations; identication
of the problems of the US and EU defence policy; selection of the main
approaches to resolving contradictions that have arisen in the relations
between the US and the EU in the eld of security policy.
1. Literature review
Signing of the Joint Declaration in July 2016 has marked a new phase
in the EU-NATO relations, as the EU launched several defence initiatives.
Closer relations with NATO were a necessary step for the EU in order to
strengthen the security environment. The EU published its Global Strategy
in June 2016, which prescribed the association to implement autonomous
defence and deterrence capabilities of its member states (European Council,
2016).
In June 2020, EU defence ministers agreed to develop a Strategic
Compass to set operational objectives and identify capabilities. But these
discussions caused the dierences between the USA and the EU. NATO has
positively perceived the EU defence initiatives (PESCO) in the case of their
addition to the NATO potential (NATO, 2020). NATO’s agenda has been
extended to 2030 (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2021). Unfortunately, the UK’s
withdrawal from the EU has made the problem of coherent dialogue more
acute (Ewers-Peters, 2021).
408
Alina Korniienko
The role of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making
In the face of the growing power of some countries, the US are expected
to work together with the EU to balance the rising powers and maintain its
global and regional power. On the other hand, the behaviour of Russia and
China could potentially also challenge EU unity and therefore weaken their
relationship (Riddervold and Rosén, 2020).
In 2021, with D. Biden’s accession to power, the issue of European
ambitions as a NATO competitor begins to subside. In turn, NATO members
reached a compromise on PESCO, maintaining a dialogue with the EU. The
combination of the NATO mission and the EU security policy is a complex
issue of forming a certain model. It should be expected that international
organizations with signicant institutional potential and autonomy will
also be able to establish separate duplicative entities (Schuette, 2022).
Most American presidents followed the eort of US geopolitical accents to
dene NATO as a basis for internal changes in the EU to serve as a guarantee
of continental stability (Poast and Chinchilla, 2020). NATO’s capability to
create an integrated Europe and spread democratic foundations in post-
communist countries could unite Eastern and Western European states
into a single security system. Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union
is the basis of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),
which obliges to provide assistance to victims of armed aggression on its
member state territory.
The creation of new defence entities is problematic as all major EU
member states are also NATO members. This strengthens the possibility of
providing NATO’s protection everywhere it is assigned a key role. But the
European Union lacks the NATO level of operational activity. So, the USA
and NATO supplemented by EU security entities remain the key actors in
European defence (Virkkunen, 2022; Colbourn, 2020).
Maintaining order on the European continent, which is based on regional
integration through the EU and NATO, remains an important driving force
behind Germany’s joining the USA. Germany’s foreign policy is based on
the need for European strategic autonomy. Only Poland seeks to create an
alliance with the US to ensure its survival among neighbouring countries.
The Baltic states are wary of Western Europe’s attempts to be autonomous
from US-led arrangements.
Allies and partners are trying to use the US to achieve their own national
goals. Besides, the network of alliances is likely to become fragmented as
disagreements between allies and partners grow over the role of the US
and the changing international order. The choices and actions of allies
can aect regional dynamics and order. More countries want to form their
autonomies, revise their relations with the US, and shape regional and
global orders (Goh and Sahashi, 2020).
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The events of 2022 evidence that the founding principles of the OSCE,
including refraining from the threat or use of force, the inviolability of
borders, the territorial integrity of states and the peaceful resolution of
disputes, are more important than ever. There should also be an institutional
connection with NATO — an important guarantor of the continent’s security
with the USA (Jones, 2022).
2. Methods
The research methodology is based on several stages. The rst stage
involved determining the general geopolitical situation of the EU countries
and the United States based on the analysis of the general policy regarding
the acceptance of other countries as threats or allies of the EU countries and
the United States in accordance with the Munich Security Report (Bunde
et al., 2023). The next stage was a comprehensive analysis of existing
risks based on the use of international indices (GPI — Global Peace Index,
Global Risk Report, Fragile States Index) (Institute for Economics & Peace,
2022; The Fund for Peace, 2022; World Economic Forum, 2023). This
was followed by a graphical analysis of the total defence spending in 2014-
2021 of the main geopolitical players — EU, USA, Russia, China (European
Defence Agency, 2022b). The last stage provided for the analysis of the main
approaches of the European Union to security policy taking into account the
US inuence on the basis of current research and international agreements
in the eld of security. The research methods used primarily included the
analysis of source materials (documents of international institutions),
studies and publications of government bodies on security issues.
3. Results
Considering the general perception of individual countries as a threat or
an ally, it should be noted that the year 2022 caused major changes in the
security system of the European Union and its partners (the USA). Russian
military aggression against Ukraine identied Russia as one of the biggest
threats, while Ukraine signicantly strengthened its perception as an ally
by other countries (Table 1). In the table, the “-” sign reects an increased
threat compared to November 2021, the “+” sign reects a strengthening
of the position as an ally relative to November 2021. The BICS countries
include Brazil, India, China and South Africa. At the same time, China
is also positioned by the EU countries and their partners as a signicant
threat.
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Alina Korniienko
The role of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making
Table 1. Perception of other countries as threats or allies (change between
November 2021 and October–November 2022), group average (Bunde et al.,
2023).
Global perception Perception among G7
countries
Perception among BICS
countries
Ukraine +22 Ukraine +29 Ukraine +10
Poland +11 Poland +12 Estonia +10
Estonia +8 United Kingdom +8 USA +9
USA +7 Estonia +7 Poland +9
United Kingdom +7 USA +6 Hungary +7
Finland +6 Finland +6 United Kingdom +6
Germany +5 Germany +5 Finland +6
Italy +5 Italy +5 France +5
Hungary +4 Hungary +3 Germany +5
China -4 China -12 Italy +5
Russia -20 Russia -30 Russia -3
In France, the perception of Russia as a threat has risen sharply from
25th place to rst. However, French respondents are less concerned than
their European counterparts about the risks posed by nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons. In Germany, Russia is similarly seen as a threat and
received a risk index of 78 points, which is higher than in any other European
country. Other risks (use of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons) rose by
20 points or more.
The risk posed by Russia to Italy has increased by 22 points, but with
an index of 67, it still ranks only sixth among Italian respondents. This is
the second lowest score among all the G7 countries surveyed, after the US
(where it has 66 points). Great Britain ranks only second after Ukraine in
perceived inevitability of the Russian threat. Russia has jumped to the top
of US respondents’ perceived risk, having risen 13 positions in just one year
(Bunde et al., 2023).
NATO published its new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit of
2022, where it calls Russia a direct threat to the security of the Alliance
members, as well as to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.
NATO members also announced the strengthening of military measures on
the eastern ank, as well as an increase in the high-alert force from 40,000
to 300,000 servicemen. The 2023 Munich Security Index is evidence of
signicant changes in security policy marked by a sense of insecurity
(Bunde et al., 2023). Such a change in threats involves the implementation
of immediate measures to adjust the security policy, which should be
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Vol. 41 Nº 77 (2023): 405-421
combined both in the system of cooperation between NATO countries, and
in the adequate response by the European Union directly.
For a more detailed analysis of the security situation and response,
the security situation in the countries of Western Europe according to the
Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022), the Fragile
States Index (The Fund for Peace, 2022) and the global risk report (World
Economic Forum, 2023) will be considered comprehensively (Table 2).
Table 1. Comprehensive indicators of the state of security of EU countries.
Fragile
States
Index
Global
Peace
Index
Global Risk Report, ranking of
importance/substance
Austria 25.4 1.3 4 Geoeconomic confrontation
5 Geopolitical competitions for resources
Belgium 31.9 1.526 5 Geoeconomic confrontation
Bulgaria 51.6 1.541 4 Interstate conict
5 Disintegration of the state
Czech Republic 39.9 1.318 4 Geopolitical competitions for resources
5 Interstate conict
Denmark 18.1 1.296 4 Geoeconomic confrontation
Finland 15.1 1.439 1 Geoeconomic confrontation
4 Interstate conict
Estonia 37.7 1.662 2 Geoeconomic confrontation
3 Interstate conict
France 30.9 1.895 3 Social cohesion erosion
Greece 55.8 1.838 5 Interstate conict
5 Geoeconomic confrontation
Spain 44.4 1.603 5 Geopolitical competitions for resources
The Netherlands 22.1 1.522 3 Geoeconomic confrontation
3 Geopolitical competitions for resources
Ireland 20.8 1.288 3 Geoeconomic confrontation
Lithuania 38.6 1.724 2 Interstate conict
4 Geoeconomic confrontation
Latvia 42.8 1.673 2 Interstate conict
Romania 50.8 1.64 2 Geoeconomic confrontation
3 Interstate conict
Slovakia 37.1 1.499 4 Interstate conict
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Alina Korniienko
The role of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making
Germany 23.6 1.462 3 Interstate conict
4 Geopolitical competitions for resources
Poland 42.2 1.552 3 Geoeconomic confrontation
5 Interstate conict
Slovenia 27.7 1.316 2 Geoeconomic confrontation
5 Geopolitical competitions for resources
Sweden 20.9 1.564 5 Geoeconomic confrontation
Hungary 50.8 1.411 3 Geoeconomic confrontation
Italy 43.4 1.643 2 Interstate conict
(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2022; The Fund for Peace, 2022; World Economic
Forum, 2023)
As the results show, despite the relatively satisfactory indicators of the
Global Peace Index and the Fragile States Index, almost all EU countries
have risks related to interstate conict, geoeconomic confrontation, and
geopolitical competition for resources. Moreover, all the specied risks
occupy positions from 1 to 5 in terms of the degree of threat.
EU defence spending increased to €214 billion in 2021 (up 6% from
2020) and is estimated to increase by a further €70 billion by 2025
(European Defence Agency, 2022a). Compared to the 26 EU member states,
other international players, namely the US, Russia and China, consistently
allocate a larger share of their economic resources to the defence sector.
The share of GDP allocated by EU member states has uctuated between
1.3% and 1.6% over the past two decades.
During the same period, US defence spending ranged between 3.4%
and 5.2% of GDP, Russia spent up to 4.8% of GDP, China — from 1.6%
to 2.3% of GDP. In absolute terms, the US spent €686 billion on defence
in 2021, China — €241 billion, the EU 26 Member States — €214 billion,
and Russia — €56 billion (European Defence Agency, 2022b). European
policy has led to certain problems in the development of the armed forces,
and this is evidenced primarily by the level of defence spending in the EU.
Figure 1 presents data on the share of GDP allocated to defence by individual
countries and interstate associations.
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Vol. 41 Nº 77 (2023): 405-421
Figure 1: Total defence spending as % of GDP, 2014-2021
(European Defence Agency, 2022b).
The level of European defence spending and the size of its collective
forces should make it a global power with one of the strongest armies in
the world. But Europe does not act as a single entity in defence. This was
the defeat of the American strategy towards Europe after the Cold War.
Europe’s dependence on the US for its security means that the US has a de
facto veto power to block the European Union’s defence ambitions. This
political approach was a strategic mistake that weakened NATO in military
terms, and contributed to the relative decline of Europe’s global inuence.
As a result, one of America’s closest allies is not as powerful as it could be.
The US response to a certain military incapacity of the EU involved
encouraging the majority of European NATO member states to increase
defence spending. For several decades, the US has tried to force European
countries to expand NATO’s technical and nancial capabilities.
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Alina Korniienko
The role of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making
Accordingly, making a coherent security and defence policy would be a
balanced approach to the integration of defence capabilities in the EU. It
should be noted that these actions are implemented quite slowly. NATO’s
key role is to unite the armed forces of the Allies in a military alliance for
the purpose of joint action.
Unfortunately, qualitative changes in the security system cannot be
achieved due to a simple increase in costs, which are distributed among the
participating states. Moreover, the transformational processes of Europe
require certain adaptations from NATO. US policy reects the need for
greater activation of the EU in the eld of defence, although the defence
system of the EU and NATO should strengthen each other. The tasks of the
US and NATO should be to focus on the integration of the defence eorts
of the European Union into NATO and the integration of the EU into the
Atlantic model.
But the enormous activity of the USA in European defence matters is
also undeniable. The USA opposes the fragmentation of European foreign
and defence policy at the EU level. The American support for European
proposals initiated the European project.
A united and strong Europe is needed in the era of renewed US
geopolitical competition. Today, Europe remains partially dependent on
the US military for the purposes of ensuring security in Europe. Continued
US support and involvement in EU defence can lead to real progress.
Russia’s armed attack on Ukraine has raised more concerns about the
state of European security. Back in 2014, the NATO summit decided on
defence spending at the level of 2% of GDP (U.S. Department of Defense,
2016). Given the prerogative of European countries to ensure their own
security within NATO, problems arise regarding signicant duplication
of functions, fragmentation and ineciency of spending by EU member
states. The essential dependence of European countries on the USA for any
active defence activity is manifested.
Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine has radically changed the EU’s
approach to intensifying defence initiatives and actions related to military
support for Ukraine. Recent years have demonstrated the EU’s ability to
create security institutions, which have strengthened the overall capacity
and contributed to the expansion of autonomy. One of the signicant
results of the EU in the eld of security was the creation of PESCO in 2017
for defence cooperation between member states, and the European Defence
Fund (EDF).
Control over PESCO is exercised by the European Commission, as well
as by an intergovernmental body (EU Council), which includes EU member
states. Commitments on investment income and the implementation of
joint defence initiatives have been agreed by 25 member states (PESCO,
415
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 41 Nº 77 (2023): 405-421
2023). A security assistance programme — the European Peace Facility
(EPF) — has also been created, which should ensure that the EU acquires
and supplies weapons to partner countries. This programme provides for
the allocation of €5 billion during 2021-2027.
Further development of the EU’s military potential may lead to the
duplication of certain NATO actions. Although the active actions in the eld
of security could improve the EU coordination with NATO. Strengthening
the defence capabilities of the EU will allow NATO to focus on existing global
threats (for example, China, Russia). It may seem to the American partners
that the manifestation of the EU as an active participant will complicate
transatlantic relations and cause problematic relations in NATO. In fact,
the strengthening of the EU will be a positive moment for the US in light
of the expanding geopolitical struggle against the ambitions of autocratic
states.
In case of intensifying competition with China, the US should redistribute
resources not in favour of European interests. This could weaken the
alliance, given the refocusing of US actions, and European NATO partners
will turn to nding options for guaranteeing security. The Asian interests
of the EU are not fundamentally established, therefore, barring of NATO
members belonging to Western Europe from US policy is possible. In the
case of increased US demands for assistance from European partners in the
confrontation with China, it is possible to assume that the alliance will end.
US policy towards NATO is currently creating signicant instability and
unsustainability in a region that is poised for an unprecedented level of
stability, in part due to previous US eorts. In this regard, the J. Biden’s
administration should consider the possibility of developing directions
with the aim of signicantly reducing the US presence in the security sphere
through NATO.
Against the background of growing calls to strengthen the alliance’s
presence on the eastern ank because of deteriorating relations with
Russia, the US government should encourage European NATO members
to bear the primary responsibility for defence commitments, shifting the
burden of defence in Europe to high-powered states in the region to reduce
US defence commitments.
It should be realized that the implementation of US policy aimed at
ensuring European security must be of a fundamental nature in the current
dicult conditions, because threats to European allied countries directly or
indirectly aect the US security. The joint statement of the leaders of NATO
countries at the end of 2019 regarding the danger of Russian aggression for
the entire Euro-Atlantic bloc conrms that. As long as the debate on the
need for a strategic vision of European defence autonomy continues, an
understanding of the current state, when European and American positions
416
Alina Korniienko
The role of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making
on actions in the eld of security are similar, is emerging more and more
clearly. This causes the need for the US to eliminate the existing weak
points of the joint security policy with due regard to complex geopolitical
challenges.
4. Discussion
The study of the general state of risks and dangers associated with
military conicts in the countries of Western Europe has certain limitations
and reservations. As an example, the perception of other countries as
threats or allies relies on the answers of respondents engaged in dierent
types of activities, which are mostly not related to either political or military
analysis. That is, it has a certain percentage of subjective result. Besides,
the available data contain only a limited number of countries (21), which
primarily does not show the full picture regarding the EU countries and
NATO member states.
The problems of European security have a structural nature, which
requires a comprehensive consideration when shaping US policy in the eld
of European security. There are critical structural problems that hinder
the development of European defence capabilities and weaken NATO.
Improving the situation of the transatlantic alliance requires concerted
action to solve structural problems.
The US must shape new models in the defence system of Western Europe,
which will involve stimulating the EU’s defence eorts by directing it to
adopt innovative approaches and promoting closer cooperation between
NATO and the EU. The goal of the US strategy should be to create a strong
European support within NATO, organized and led by the EU and included
in the global Euro-Atlantic structure.
The study conrmed the assertions of researchers (Ringsmose and
Rynning, 2021; Colbourn, 2020) on the need for continued US defence
eorts to develop the EU’s common defence potential. This could strengthen
the current state of European defence and the EU. The main strategic
reason for supporting the EU’s defence eorts is that the US needs the EU
as a strong global actor in the security system, adjusting its own approaches
to security policy.
Given the need for a signicant military capability in geopolitical
conicts, US policy should encourage the EU to strengthen its own role as
a defence player while anchoring it in NATO and the transatlantic alliance.
The US position regarding actions to activate and encourage the EU to build
a modern powerful model of its own defence seems to be important. As
certain actions, the US can use its own inuence on the countries of Eastern
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Europe, with which it closely cooperates and can inuence the support of
EU initiatives.
As the EU strengthens, it becomes expedient for the US to reorient its
diplomatic inuence on ensuring strategic alignment between the US and
the EU. The leading strategic goal of US foreign policy should be to ensure
close cooperation between the US and the EU. This will ensure that the
EU’s defence achievements lead to both a stronger EU, and a stronger
transatlantic alliance. The study proves that the constant coordination
of security issues between the USA and the EU gradually weakens the
mentioned activity, taking into account a certain policy of autonomy
towards the USA on the part of the EU member states. A similar conclusion
was drawn in the work of Riddervold and Rosén (2020).
At the same time, attention should also be paid to the opinions of other
researchers who show a dierent side of the US security policy. A review
of possible models of US actions in choosing strategic areas of security
demonstrates an orientation to events related to China’s policy (actions
around Taiwan or the South China Sea).
This could direct US eorts to the Eastern region, which would lower the
level of US interaction with Europe and reduce the role of European actions
in relations. The development of relations with the EU, apart from China-
related issues, would not nd support in the US. Faced with this position,
EU member states will need to independently resolve political dierences
regarding strategic autonomy (Martin and Sinkkonen, 2022).
The US position provides for further actions to strengthen the EU’s
institutional capacity and transform it into a more signicant global
participant in security activities. For the EU to become a stronger
geopolitical player, it must develop its powerful military potential, which
will not pose any threat or challenge to NATO.
The EU working to strengthen European defence could strengthen NATO
and transatlantic relations. In fact, taking into account the new challenges,
the EU, becoming a powerful defence force, could gradually secure a central
place in NATO and the transatlantic alliance.
There is a need to expand the political responsibility and actions of
the USA in Western Europe. The United States have undertaken certain
obligations, both domestic and international, and there is a certain
disappointment of the European members of NATO with the political
actions of the United States.
This becomes one of the factors regarding changes in the EU’s defence
initiatives to strengthen its own capabilities. At the same time, this
strengthening of the EU will enable reducing the active patronage of the
USA. The problems of US defence issues should also shift to other regions,
418
Alina Korniienko
The role of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making
where there is a need for appropriate inuence and control, which will
rationally distribute resources and allow more globalization of NATO’s
inuence in the world.
Conclusions
The research on the implementation of strategic and current security
policy objectives has become extremely relevant in view of the unprecedented
change in the situation in the eld of defence, in which the NATO and the
countries of the European Union found themselves because of the Russian
military aggression against Ukraine. The complex roles distributed between
NATO allies and EU member states have caused certain inconsistencies
and ineciencies in the performance of the collective security and defence
functions of the EU countries.
The results of the study conrmed the thesis that the concept of
sustainability occupies a very important place in NATO’s security policy.
This is primarily their response to the aggressive policy of the Russian
Federation (military aggression against Ukraine, NATO threats, attempts
to destabilize the situation in other regions of the world). NATO realized
the need to build eective mechanisms of collective defence and resistance
to military and non-military threats.
So, the research covered the problem of determining the role and place
of the USA in the Western Europe’s security policy making based on real
current threats. Analysis of changes regarding potential allies and countries
that represent threats, determination of potential risks in EU countries
demonstrated existing geopolitical problems, which primarily come from
Russia and China. Against this background, the problems of underfunding of
the EU defence system, substantial duplication of functions, fragmentation
and ineciency of EU member states’ expenditures were revealed.
In turn, the US position regarding the organization of the EU’s security
sphere is based on constant stimulation of the EU countries to create
a more autonomous system in ensuring their own defence capabilities.
Strengthening the EU as a geopolitical player by expanding its military
potential can improve NATO’s capabilities, and enable the US to signicantly
focus on existing global geopolitical threats.
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Vol.41 Nº 77