Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Publicación cientíca en formato digital
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ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.40 N° 74
2022
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cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
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avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
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nes Cien tí fi cas y Tec no ló gi cas Ve ne zo la nas del FO NA CIT, La tin dex.
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Vol. 40, Nº 74 (2022), 741-763
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Recibido el 15/07/22 Aceptado el 01/09/22
Improved Planning of Information
Policy in the Cyber Security Sphere under
Conditions of Hybrid Threats
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4074.41
Viacheslav Dziundziuk *
Olena Krutii **
Roman Sobol ***
Tetiana Kotukova ****
Oleksandr Kotukov *****
Abstract
The study aimed to consider the current state of planning
information policy in the eld of cybersecurity under intensied
hybrid threats, using the methods of comparison and observation.
The study conducted showed that in the face of intensied hybrid
threats, states must develop common approaches to implement
state information policy and ensure information cybersecurity. In the face
of Russia’s hidden and direct aggression, governments should develop an
eective system for implementing national information policies to ensure
information security and introduce new state structures and mechanisms
for timely detection and neutralization of threats to national interests in
the sphere of information security. It concludes on the need to counter
the destructive behavior of states using hybrid threats at the national and
supranational levels and explains the low level of information protection
in individual states and international institutions. The European Union
and NATO can play a key supporting role and oer support where national
responses to cybersecurity threats have proved insucient.
Keywords: information threats; hybrid threat; state cybersecurity;
disinformation; information policy.
*Doctor of Science in Public Administration, Professor, Department of Public Policy, Institute of Public
Administration, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 61022, Kharkiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0622-2600
** Doctor of Science in Public Administration, Professor, Department of Public Policy, Institute of Public
Administration, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 61022, Kharkiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5180-2842
*** Candidate of Sciences in Public Administration, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy,
Institute of Public Administration, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 61022, Kharkiv, Ukraine.
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3176-3807
**** Candidate of Sciences in Public Administration, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy,
Institute of Public Administration, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 61022, Kharkiv, Ukraine.
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8332-0330
***** Candidate of Sciences in Sociology, Associate Professor, Department of Public Policy, Institute of
Public Administration, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 61022, Kharkiv, Ukraine. ORCID
ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2494-5298
742
Viacheslav Dziundziuk, Olena Krutii, Roman Sobol, Tetiana Kotukova y Oleksandr Kotukov
Improved Planning of Information Policy in the Cyber Security Sphere under Conditions of
Hybrid Threats
Mejora de la Planicación de la Política de
Información en el Ámbito de la Ciberseguridad en
Condiciones de Amenazas Híbridas
Resumen
El estudio tuvo como objetivo considerar el estado actual de la política de
información de planicación en el ámbito de la seguridad cibernética bajo
amenazas híbridas intensicadas, utilizando los métodos de comparación y
observación. El estudio realizado mostró que, ante la intensicación de las
amenazas híbridas, los Estados deben desarrollar enfoques comunes para
implementar la política de información estatal y garantizar la ciberseguridad
de la información. Frente a la agresión oculta y directa de Rusia, los
gobiernos deben desarrollar un sistema efectivo para implementar políticas
nacionales de información para garantizar la seguridad de la información
e introducir nuevas estructuras y mecanismos estatales para la detección
y neutralización oportunas de amenazas a los intereses nacionales en la
esfera de la seguridad de la información. Se concluye sobre la necesidad
de contrarrestar el comportamiento destructivo de los Estados que utilizan
amenazas híbridas a nivel nacional y supranacional y se explica el bajo nivel
de protección de la información en los Estados individuales y las instituciones
internacionales. La Unión Europea y la OTAN pueden desempeñar un
papel clave de apoyo y ofrecer soporte cuando las respuestas nacionales a
las amenazas a la ciberseguridad hayan resultado insucientes.
Palabras clave: amenazas de información; amenaza híbrida;
ciberseguridad estatal; desinformación; política de
información.
Introduction
Information can be dened as statistical and qualitative data and as
beliefs that motivate professionals and mobilize the public (Maor, 2020). In
the conditions of the development of innovative technologies, information
can be considered a strategic national resource due to its increasing role
in the national security system (Hlushko et al., 2022). Information policy
provides a set of principles that guide decision-making. The use of modern
information resources requires a broad set of information policies.
At the state level, the top priority is the development of information
policy, comprising the laws, regulations and doctrinal positions, as well
as other decisions and practices that aect society as a whole, including
the creation, processing, ows, access and use of information. Information
policy includes such issues as net neutrality, ltering, intellectual property,
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e-government and major social problems arising from the convergence of
policies – levels of access and availability of infrastructure, social support of
digital literacy, and digital integration of dierent population groups.
Digital technological developments and their growing interconnection
with changes in social relations have allowed some states to challenge
unfriendly countries using so-called “hybrid threats” – coordinated and
synchronized actions, that specically target the vulnerabilities of states
and institutions through various online platforms (Dragos et al., 2020).
This method of warfare entails the use of a wide range of well-designed tools
that remain below the thresholds of detection, attribution and retaliation
(Balcaen et al., 2022). Disinformation campaigns result in undermining
vulnerable places of democracy, such as freedom of speech, and freedom
of the media, exacerbating existing ethnic, religious, political or economic
dierences, which leads to decreased social cohesion (Wigell, 2019).
Countries around the world have also faced a urry of disinformation about
COVID-19, which puts human lives at risk, raising doubts about the safety
of approved vaccines and the reliability of imposed restrictions (Luo et al.,
2021).
Resilience – the ability of states and societies to deter, resist, and
overcome the impact of external interference – is needed to seriously
confront hybrid threats in cyberspace, resulting in a demonstration of
institutional capacity, good governance, and social cohesion (Bērziņa
Čerenkova et al., 2019).
Countries dier in their approaches to countering hybrid threats in
terms of the security organization and the scale of measures taken to deter
the enemy’s activities. At the same time, countries detect and respond to
hybrid attacks in a similar way, which can be explained by the nature of
hybrid threats (Wijnja, 2022).
National governments are developing the necessary information policy
tools used in cybersecurity to counter hybrid threats, in the rst place –
means of communication with citizens and the possibilities of responding
to cyber incidents and countering hybrid threats (Kalniete and Pildegovičs,
2021). Increasing user awareness allows us to avoid or neutralize undesirable
consequences of information intervention that may occur during the digital
transformation of the system (Taherdoost et al., 2021).
In modern conditions, Ukraine is the object of constant informational
and psychological inuence due to its geopolitical position and political and
economic interest on the part of a large number of states. Ukraine is in a
state of war, characterized not only by aggressive military attacks but also
by the use of modern information technologies for hybridizing established
rules of war (Veselova, 2021). In this context, the problem of ensuring
the information security of national interests by improving approaches
744
Viacheslav Dziundziuk, Olena Krutii, Roman Sobol, Tetiana Kotukova y Oleksandr Kotukov
Improved Planning of Information Policy in the Cyber Security Sphere under Conditions of
Hybrid Threats
to planning information policy in the eld of cyber security is becoming
increasingly important (Bondar and Rakutina, 2019).
Thus, given the above, the study aims to consider the current state of
planning the information policy in the eld of cyber security under hybrid
threats. The research objectives are 1) to identify the main ways of improving
information policy planning in the eld of cyber security under conditions
of hybrid threats in the case of Ukraine; 2) to reveal the current state of
planning information policy mechanisms in the eld of cyber security in the
European Union and NATO in the context of helping Ukraine in the ght
against hybrid threats.
1. Literature Review
The major toolkit and basis for the article was Howlett’s (2019) work,
dedicated to some signicant and procedural tools of information policy
in the era of globalization and innovative technologies, principles and
methods, necessary for their implementation. The researcher evaluated
the advantages, and disadvantages and provided a rationale for the use
of specic information tools, revealed several problems and proposed
recommendation solutions to them. The authors’ position on the research
topic was inuenced by Maor’s (2020) comprehensive analysis of the
theoretical and legal foundations of policy design, the consequences of
suboptimal plans, and the role of information quality in policy development.
In turn, Bondar and Rakutina (2019) dened the role of information
security in information policy and determined possible prospects for
optimizing the implementation of information policy and information
security. The study took into account Wijnja’s (2022) research on the
specicity of individual countries and international cooperation on the
liability for the actual use of counter-hybrid measures.
Special attention should be paid to the scientic work by Taherdoost
and others (2021) on the systematization of scientic approaches to the
concepts of “cyber security” and “information security” and the article by
Zvezdova and Vakalyuk (2022) on the cyber security problem, challenges
and dangers of high-tech cybercrime and cyber terrorism in modern hybrid
warfare. Wigell (2019), Nilsson and others (2021) emphasized the need to
develop a comprehensive approach to detecting, analysing and countering
hybrid threats.
Kalniete and Pildegovičs (2021) stressed the need to intensify cooperation
between the EU, NATO and the Eastern Partnership countries for further
progress in cooperation against hybrid threats. Ratsyborinska (2022) traced
the transformation of an innovative approach to the information policy
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Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 741-763
planning processes in the eld of cyber security at the supranational level
and its characteristics: innovativeness (novelty), objectivity, subjectivity,
dedication, demand, implementation in practice, eciency.
Multiple studies on this problem conrm the fact that special attention
should be paid to the improvement of planning information policy in the
cyber security sphere in light of hybrid threats. Therefore, it is necessary to
conduct a study based on the new criteria of scientic research.
2. Methods
The research design was structured (Figure 1) given the multidimensional
nature of the chosen research topic and the rapid dynamics of empirical
material in the context of geopolitical transformations. The study is based
on comparative research of dierent counties’ positive experiences in the
eld of cyber security and on the grouping of the data obtained.
Figure 1: Research design
746
Viacheslav Dziundziuk, Olena Krutii, Roman Sobol, Tetiana Kotukova y Oleksandr Kotukov
Improved Planning of Information Policy in the Cyber Security Sphere under Conditions of
Hybrid Threats
The main method of research is the method of observation, which
allowed to achieve the aim and research objectives and identify the main
vectors of improving information policy in the cyber security sphere of
Ukraine in the context of modern challenges and draw attention to the
expediency of improving coordination of activities of all state institutions
in the information space.
The comparison method allowed us to judiciously compare the key
statistical indicators of the implementation of the state’s information policy
and propose conceptual changes based on the most eective EU practices
and new hybrid threats. The expediency of adopting EU practices into the
legal eld of Ukraine as soon as possible, which would also correspond to
the declared postulates of future EU membership, was substantiated by this
method.
The empirical content of information policy planning processes was
based on the historical-genetic method, which allowed to describe the
essential characteristics of information policy in the cyber security sphere,
to uncover causal relationships in the development of hybrid threats and
further transformations of state planning for eective protection, as well as
in the organization of the state bodies activities regarding the prevention
and protection of the population from disinformation.
In addition, an empirical basis for further evaluation of activities of state
bodies and scal decentralization was created on the example of the state’s
development and indicators of its information security.
The historical-comparative method was used to determine the essential
characteristics of government participation in the implementation of
information policy and cyber security programs at dierent stages and to
nd positive features and critical disagreements in the implementation of
eective information policy planning during dierent periods of statehood.
The statistical method was used to analyse the dynamics of
implementation of cyber security programs at the national and supranational
(the EU) levels, as well as to study a signicant array of data on the actions
of Ukraine and the EU.
A large amount of data was carefully analysed in the research, among
which forty-three sources were cited within the text of the article.
3. Results
Information policy is used to denote political initiatives, that promote the
use of tools and concepts related to the global information society, to realize
their potential in achieving national, social and economic development
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 741-763
goals. The process of choosing the most eective and protable options is the
main way to make the necessary changes in creating reliable mechanisms
for eective development of information policy, information planning and
information management.
The information policy is aimed at the development of mechanisms that
would promote compliance with reliability and availability of information,
privacy, intellectual property rights, and storage of archival copies of
materials. Its main areas are shown in Figure 2.
Planning of information policy is necessary to transform appropriate
tactics into a set of actions. Approaches to strategic planning are
distinguished by the following parameters: objectives, formalities,
time period, completeness, organizational, inter-organizational and/or
geographical focus, emphasis on data and analysis, degree of participation,
place of decision-making, and links with implementation. In this context, it
is necessary to identify and acknowledge the problems, to further develop,
implement, and evaluate information policy.
Figure 2: The main spheres of inuence of information policy (compiled by the
authors).
Information policy includes infrastructural, vertical, and horizontal
levels. The infrastructural level deals with the development of the national
(or in recent years regional) infrastructure, necessary to support the
information society. As a rule, telecommunications policies are reviewed
rst, then the focus is given to separate policies. Vertical information policy
involves such sectoral policies as education, tourism, production, and
health care.
748
Viacheslav Dziundziuk, Olena Krutii, Roman Sobol, Tetiana Kotukova y Oleksandr Kotukov
Improved Planning of Information Policy in the Cyber Security Sphere under Conditions of
Hybrid Threats
Horizontal information policy aects broad aspects of society, for
example, policies on the freedom of information, tari and pricing, and the
use of information and communication technologies by the government
within the country and in its relations with citizens, businesses, workers,
and academia.
The target audience should be provided with truthful and convincing
information based on national priorities, which leads to the great importance
of the development of specialized scientic institutions, analytical centres,
and mass media, which contain many information resources. Their primary
task is to reect the interests of citizens and state priorities.
The development of information policy in the cyber security sphere
is inuenced by the fact that hybrid threats in the information eld are
becoming more frequent and sophisticated and combine military and
non-military, as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation,
propaganda, cyber-attacks, special informational and psychological
inuence, economic pressure, the deployment of irregular armed formations
and conventional armies.
Hybrid action is ambiguous, as hybrid actors blur the lines of
international policies and operate at the intersections between external and
internal, legal and illegal, peace and war. Each action has its algorithm,
forms and methods of implementation. For example, the methods of
external information aggression of special information operations are
based on disinformation, diversication of public opinion, psychological
pressure, and the spread of rumours.
The subjects of information security are directly the state, individual
citizens, groups, and associations, which full special functions for ensuring
information security, given to them by law. The object of information
security should be considered the psyche of a person, his/her consciousness,
and even the consciousness of the masses, information systems for various
purposes.
Objects of cyber protection include all types of communication
systems, including relevant systems that are used for public inquiries and
government electronic services and management. A special place is given to
the objects of critical information infrastructure. A set of measures within
various information protection regimes is of particular importance in
today’s reality (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Measures of the main regimes of information protection (compiled by
authors).
According to forecasts, the global information security market will
reach 366.1 billion dollars by 2028 (Varonis, 2022). Information systems
in cyberspace comprise all information infrastructures accessible through
the Internet, including its largest and long-established segment web 2 with
its social networks and platforms.
The communication network also includes a segment of mobile
applications web 3 (on smartphones, tablets, and other similar devices);
payment processing networks such as Paypal, SWIFT, Bitcoin and others;
onboard processors for various objects of industrial and household
infrastructure. Cyber-attacks can disrupt essential services and endanger
the lives and safety of ordinary citizens.
They can be committed by organizations or private individuals who
express their disagreement with the country’s policy and promote their
political agenda. Cyber actors can compromise information technology (IT)
networks; develop mechanisms to support long-term permanent access to
IT networks; withdraw sensitive data from IT networks and operational
technologies; disrupt critical industrial control systems by installing
destructive malware.
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Viacheslav Dziundziuk, Olena Krutii, Roman Sobol, Tetiana Kotukova y Oleksandr Kotukov
Improved Planning of Information Policy in the Cyber Security Sphere under Conditions of
Hybrid Threats
Cyber-attacks occur due to the use of unlicensed software and anti-
virus software by state organizations and a low level of security of internal
information and communication networks at critical infrastructure objects.
Cyber fatigue or apathy towards proactive defence against cyber-attacks
aects up to 42% of companies in all countries (Cisco Cybersecurity Report,
2020).
Personal attacks include negative and hurtful comments on victims’
social media pages, usually anonymously or using pseudonyms. An example
of hybrid threats to citizens in cyberspace can be the activities of troll farms,
that is the creation of space in social networks to promote trolling as a kind
of serious criticism. Besides, there are controversial, instructive posts to
form the necessary opinion.
The provocative nature of the post is fuelled by anonymous and pseudo-
anonymous comments, made by digital attackers. Meta trolling in videos
is used by content creators (often acting as micro-inuencers) to criticize
popular political issues and is usually politically motivated and targeted
at government and military websites. Placing or reposting memes on
various forums disrupts the conversation, inames emotions, and makes
imperceptible but obvious changes to the information space.
In modern conditions, special attention is drawn to the information
policy of Ukraine, which strongly resists Russian cyberattacks. Russian
information operations are focused on encouraging and supporting
separatist armed forces that create chaos and territorial disintegration;
increasing polarization between elites and society to provoke a value crisis
with a further process of reorientation towards Russian values; demoralizing
the military and undermining their commitment; undermining socio-
economic stability; provoking a socio-political crisis; intensication of
psychological warfare to demoralize the armed forces and the population
to break their determination to ght; inciting mass panic and undermining
condence in the most important state institutions; false information about
political leaders who do not share Russia’s interests; the informational
undermining of trust in international alliances and partnerships.
Thus, the purpose of the information policy of Ukraine is the activity
of state authorities concerning the creation, collection, obtaining, storage,
use, distribution, and protection of information data (Law of Ukraine No.
2657-XII, 1992). The hybrid information war is a threat to national security
(Law of Ukraine No. 2469-VIII, 2018).
Therefore, a lot of attention should be paid to cyber security, that is,
the implementation of policies, processes, and technologies to protect
organizations, their critical systems and condential information from
digital attacks (Law of Ukraine No. 2163-VIII, 2017). The main task in
improving this structure is to preserve the cyber stability and cyber security
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of the set of state information institutions, management systems, and
communication in the digital transformation (Decree of the President of
Ukraine No. 392/2020, 2020).
The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine has broad
powers in the coordination of information security in Ukraine. Part of the
coordination functions is assigned to the National Security and Defence
Council of Ukraine (the NSDC) (Law of Ukraine No. 183/98-BP, 1998).
In turn, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of
Ukraine is responsible for the creation and implementation of a national
course in the eld of television and radio broadcasting (Resolution of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 341, 2014).
The Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Committee on Digital
Transformation of Ukraine carry out a huge amount of work on cyber
security. Considering the discretion of the powers of state bodies, planning
Ukraine’s state information policy in the cyber security sphere in conditions
of direct aggression by the Russian Federation should contain mandatory
components (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Mandatory components of planning the state information policy of
Ukraine in the cyber security sphere in conditions of direct aggression by the
Russian Federation (compiled by the authors).
Ukraine is making a lot of eorts to improve the planning of information
policy in the cyber security sphere. In December 2021, the Information
752
Viacheslav Dziundziuk, Olena Krutii, Roman Sobol, Tetiana Kotukova y Oleksandr Kotukov
Improved Planning of Information Policy in the Cyber Security Sphere under Conditions of
Hybrid Threats
Security Strategy of Ukraine was put into eect (Decree of the President
of Ukraine No. 685/2021, 2021). Accordingly, on August 11, 2022, the
Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine proposed a public
discussion of the draft Strategy implementation plan.
In March 2021, the Centre for Strategic Communication and
Information Security was established under the Ministry of Culture
and Information Policy of Ukraine. On March 11, 2021, the Centre for
Countering Disinformation was established in Ukraine (Decree of the
President of Ukraine No. 106/2021, 2021). Its main areas of activity include
immediate notication of the population; detection of disinformation and
manipulation; guarantee of information security; ght against information
terrorism.
There are also some Ukrainian non-governmental organizations,
engaged in fact-checking: “StopFake”, “VoxUkraine”, “FactCheck” and
“Slovo i Dilo”. On March 19, 2022, considering Russia’s direct military
aggression and the martial law, the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky signed
a decree on the unication of all national TV channels into one platform
according to the decision of the NSDC on the implementation of a single
information policy (Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 152/2022,
2022).
Round-the-clock information is presented on the consolidated platform
“United News”. The decree also stops the activities of private media
companies. The goal of the development of a unied information platform
is to counteract the active spread of disinformation that justies or refutes
the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
The modern development of cyberspace in Ukraine is inuenced by
both civilizational and specic components, which are a consequence of the
hybrid threat from the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, a list of categories
of cyber incidents has been developed (Computer Emergency Response
Team of Ukraine, 2021).
These include malicious (oensive) content, malicious software code,
collection of information by an intruder, attempts to interfere, interference,
violation of accessibility, violation of properties of information, fraud, and
known vulnerability. Since the beginning of the war, 796 cyber-attacks
have been carried out in Ukraine (State Service of Special Communications
and Information Protection of Ukraine, 2022). Government and local
authorities were most often subjected to attacks – 179 times, the defence
sector was attacked 104 times, the nancial sector – 55 times, energy sector
– 54 times. The most common methods of cyberattacks were the collection
of information by an intruder – 242 times, malicious software code – 192
times, interference – 92, attempts to interfere – 82 times, and violation of
accessibility – 56 times.
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The Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine was approved on August
26, 2021 (Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 447/2021, 2021). On
February 1, 2022, the plan for implementing the Strategy was put into eect
(Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 37/2022, 2022), which denes
strategic goals: eective cyber defence; protection against cybercrime and
cyberterrorism; implementation of appropriate deterrence mechanisms;
high-quality technical knowledge in the cyber security sphere; protection
of digital public services; increasing the level of appropriate coordination;
development of international cooperation in this eld.
A set of measures for the implementation of the plan should be carried
out annually with corresponding indicators of implementation based
on the best practices of the USA and EU member states and considering
modern challenges in the cyber security sphere. A lot of attention was paid
to the establishment of systematic exchange of information on destructive
activities in cyberspace and the development of cooperation with the USA,
EU member states and NATO member states. Information on the state of
implementation of the plan must be provided to the National Coordination
Centre for Cybersecurity (Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 96/2016,
2016).
To counter hybrid threats, the decision of the NSDC of May 14, 2021,
provides for the creation of cyber troops within the structure of the
Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Decree of the President of Ukraine No.
446/2021, 2021). The establishment of the National Centre for Reserving
State Information Resources in 2021 was an important step forward cyber
security (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 94, 2021).
The strategic task on implementation of the state information policy and
ensuring information security of Ukraine in the cyber protection sphere
and its main problem is to increase the level of coordination of activities of
all state institutions in the information space.
Unlike the European Union or other international organizations, the
national governments of the member states have the necessary tools,
including intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies (both civilian and
military), security forces (enforcement of public order and security), means
of communication with citizens and capacities to counter hybrid threats.
At the same time, while national security is a vital concern of each
member state, hybrid threats often transcend borders, leaving the EU
with a critical complementary role in supporting member states’ eorts.
In April 2016, the European Commission presented the Joint Framework
on Countering Hybrid Threats (Joint Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council, 2016). In June 2018, the European Commission
published the Joint Communication on increasing resilience and
bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats (Joint Communication to
the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 2018).
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The EU’s strategic agenda for 2019-2024 clearly emphasizes resilience to
hybrid threats and disinformation as one of the key areas of future work.
In December 2019, the European Council Conclusions on complementary
eorts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats were adopted
(Council of the European Union, 2019), which states the possibility for
member states to invoke the EU solidarity clauses when dealing with a
serious crisis caused by hybrid threats. The Security Union Strategy adopted
by the EU (EUR-Lex, 2020) is based on coordinated EU support to member
states on several issues, ranging from organized crime and terrorism to
cyber security and hybrid threats.
The European Parliament has also established a Special Committee
on Foreign Interference in All Democratic Processes in the EU, including
Disinformation (INGE). With a strong political mandate and a high-prole
political platform, the INGE Committee can provide visibility and political
support to the EU’s eorts to investigate and counter foreign interference,
including through a series of hearings, testimony sessions and public
debates.
The European Union states that Russia’s military aggression against
Ukraine is accompanied by information manipulation and interference
(European Commission, 2022a). There is a constant risk of manipulation of
audio-visual materials and disinformation, which Russia may try to use as a
pretext for new military attacks, resulting in the weakening of determination
and unity of the Ukrainian people, division of the international community
in its rejection of the war, and the emergence of doubts about Russia’s
violations of international law.
The Strategic Compass (ANNEX, 2022), commits the EU to react
harshly to foreign information manipulation and interference, to increase
its resilience and ability to counter such threats. Russia’s aggressive war
against Ukraine has strengthened cooperation in the eld of cyberspace.
In this regard, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) are working on
sharing, situational awareness and coordinating responses to malicious
cyber activities against Ukraine.
They also work on supporting Ukraine and other countries in the
region by working with partners, including the US and NATO, to ensure
complementarity. The creation of the European Centre of Excellence for
Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in April 2017 was a notable event
in EU-NATO cooperation. This organization is a key contributor to the
deepening of trust and information sharing between the EU and NATO
at the strategic level, the expansion of the EU’s research and analytical
capacity, as well as the organization of joint exercises for strengthening
training capabilities and resilience to counter a hybrid intervention.
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The work on exposing Russia’s manipulations was intensied, in
particular, through the EUvsDisinfo website. From March 2, 2022, the
broadcasting of the Russian state media RT and Sputnik channels in the
EU or diverted to the EU was stopped. Online platforms, leading social
networks, advertisers, and the advertising industry, which signed the Code
of Practice on Disinformation (European Commission, 2022b), are taking
urgent measures to limit disinformation related to Russian aggression
against Ukraine.
The EU works closely with its Member States through the EU Rapid
Alert System and the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, as well as with
international partners such as NATO, the US, Canada, to share information
on Russia’s manipulation tactics.
The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) created a
disinformation task force after the outbreak of war in Ukraine and coordinates
fact-checkers and researchers across its network. This format provides for
the annual approval of the NATO-Ukraine National Cooperation Program
at the state level. Eective civil society engagement may strengthen social
resilience, including through eorts to support information pluralism,
investing in civic awareness through education, and supporting an
independent press that responds quickly to any disinformation.
A successful example of such cooperation in the Baltic States was the
involvement of investigative media “Re:Baltica” (2020) in ocial fact-
checking for Facebook, which helped to detect and prevent the rapid,
uncontrolled spread of malicious content.
4. Discussion
It may be concluded that hybrid threats are multifaceted, ambiguous
and hidden by nature, which makes them very dicult to contain, identify,
counter or attribute (Bērziņa Čerenkova et al., 2019). The main task of the
hybrid threat is not to directly confront the state or attack it, which would
lead to an immediate response, but to weaken the country’s determination
to confront through covert means of intervention, aimed at undermining
the internal cohesion of the state (Wigell, 2019). Hybrid threats are a
constant feature of today’s security environment and part of the current
security landscape of the EU, NATO, and Eastern Partnership countries.
Joint adaptation to future challenges will mark the transition to a better
vision of security and strengthen strategic thinking regarding hybrid threats
(Ratsyborinska, 2022).
The nature of hybrid threats is constantly changing, which requires
continuous vigilance. Most countries need to develop a more strategic
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approach to countering hybrid threats, implement national adjustments,
and develop active community participation (Bajarūnas, 2020). The Euro-
Atlantic governments and institutions should develop a more eective
and comprehensive transatlantic counter-hybrid strategy in cooperation
with the private sector and civil society to strengthen their counter-hybrid
capacity.
These activities range from organizational initiatives at the national
and international levels to functional eorts related to resourcing, training,
adoption of laws and their implementation. Due to the strengthening of
hybrid threats shortly, including in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis,
transatlantic policymakers should consider this agenda an urgent priority
(Speranza, 2020).
Key international organizations should work together with various states
both within and outside international organizations and ensure cooperation
between sectors and levels (Nilsson et al., 2021). According to scientists,
this requires cooperation between the military, political, economic, civil
and information spheres both in the public and private sectors, as well as at
the local, regional, national, and international levels.
The need to collect qualitative information and carry out its multi-level
assessment and verication was established in the study. Scientists believe
that policymakers must precisely set the rigidity of restrictions within
which the intended policy will be implemented (Howlett, 2019). In the case
of short-term policy goals, the task of developers is to accurately assess the
rigidity of current restrictions and include this information into the design
process at the right time (Maor, 2020).
When it comes to long-term policy goals, the challenge is to establish,
which restrictions cannot be changed, which restrictions can be ignored, and
which ones can be changed (and how) at the beginning of their realization
to increase the chances of policy success. After that, this information,
according to the scientist, should be fully incorporated into the design
process at the appropriate time.
It can be concluded that carefully developed cyber protection should
be used for the information security of objects for dierent purposes. This
applies to both the protection of the object itself and the protection of the
information circulating in it (Zvezdova and Vakalyuk, 2022). Future ups
and downs in countering disinformation will be determined mainly by the
development of public-private partnerships, especially through cooperation
with the largest online platforms (Szymański, 2020).
Close collaboration with the private sector is the vital long-term impact
of any legal framework that may be developed to address hybrid threats
(Lonardo, 2021). According to the scientist, hybrid threats may lead to the
era of privatization of security and defence, or, at least, to the spread of
basic government functions in the private sector.
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The implementation in Ukraine of a virtual educational laboratory for
modelling processes in information policy for the needs of state and private
cyber security will become an eective tool in social processes. This will
allow Ukraine to move along its educational trajectory and will expand
the range of educational tasks and enrich them with modern content
(Arsenovych, 2021).
Conclusions
State information policy should reect current problems that have
emerged in the sphere of information security in the international arena.
It is necessary to implement legal and regulatory protection of the rights
and interests of all subjects of information relations, namely individuals,
social groups, society, and the state in general. The planning of changes in
information management should ultimately contribute to the achievement
of common national goals and priorities.
Improvement of current planning of information policy in cyber security
depends on the strategic approach, goals and context, and should be based
on unied conceptual principles. When planning information policy, it is
necessary to consider justications and sets of arguments, which form the
basis of the corresponding policy in the eld of cyber security.
Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine has shown how quickly
theoretical threats can become real and stressed the importance of
vigilance, coordination, and readiness. In the conditions of a hybrid war,
the state that has become the object of aggression should make every eort
to neutralize the corresponding threats. The conict with the Russian
Federation showed that the state information policy of Ukraine is aimed
at restoring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, ending the
conict, and stabilizing the post-conict socio-political situation.
Special attention is paid to constant objective monitoring of the
information environment, outlining the strategic narrative and coordination
of work of all state institutions in the information space. The planning
includes the principles and methodology of strategic communications,
detection, assessment and forecasting of the consequences of information
threats, security guarantees for the objects of critical information
infrastructure of Ukraine and raising media literacy of the population.
The improvement of information policy planning in the eld of cyber
security is also based on the need to develop a system of relevant views
and determination of the action plan of the military-political leadership of
Ukraine.
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The strategic task of implementation of the state information policy and
ensuring Ukraine’s information security in the eld of cyber protection is also
to increase the level of coordination of the activities of all state institutions
in the information space. The cross-border nature of cyber threats
contributes to the strengthening of international cooperation between
countries. National and supranational initiatives in the eld of information
cyber security can be involved in the planning of the information policy of
states and may become the object of further studies.
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