Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Publicación cientíca en formato digital
ISSN-Versión Impresa 0798-1406 / ISSN-Versión on line 2542-3185
Depósito legal pp 197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.40 N° 74
2022
Recibido el 07/07/22 Aceptado el 23/08/22
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas
La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca ción aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to
de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co “Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias
Hu ma nas y So cia les, a tra vés de la di vul ga ción de los re sul ta dos lo gra dos por sus in ves-
ti ga do res; es ti mu lar la in ves ti ga ción en es tas áreas del sa ber; y pro pi ciar la pre sen ta-
ción, dis cu sión y con fron ta ción de las ideas y avan ces cien tí fi cos con com pro mi so so cial.
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al año y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con
avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
ESTA PU BLI CA CIÓN APA RE CE RE SE ÑA DA, EN TRE OTROS ÍN DI CES, EN
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Re vicyhLUZ, In ter na tio nal Po li ti cal Scien ce Abs tracts, Re vis ta In ter ame ri ca na de
Bi blio gra fía, en el Cen tro La ti no ame ri ca no para el De sa rrol lo (CLAD), en Bi blio-
gra fía So cio Eco nó mi ca de Ve ne zue la de RE DIN SE, In ter na tio nal Bi blio graphy of
Po li ti cal Scien ce, Re vencyt, His pa nic Ame ri can Pe rio di cals In dex/HAPI), Ul ri ch’s
Pe rio di cals Di rec tory, EBS CO. Se en cuen tra acre di ta da al Re gis tro de Pu bli ca cio-
nes Cien tí fi cas y Tec no ló gi cas Ve ne zo la nas del FO NA CIT, La tin dex.
Di rec to ra
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OIRALITH
M. C
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P
ORTILLO
Co mi té Edi tor
Eduviges Morales Villalobos
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Ma ría Eu ge nia Soto Hernández
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Co mi té Ase sor
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J. M. Del ga do Ocan do
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Ri car do Com bel las
An gel Lom bar di
Die ter Nohlen
Al fre do Ra mos Ji mé nez
Go ran Ther born
Frie drich Welsch
Asis ten tes Ad mi nis tra ti vos
Joan López Urdaneta y Nil da Ma rín
Re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas. Av. Gua ji ra. Uni ver si dad del Zu lia. Nú cleo Hu ma nís ti co. Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas. Ins ti tu to de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co
“Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che”. Ma ra cai bo, Ve ne zue la. E- mail: cues tio nes po li ti cas@gmail.
com ~ loi chi ri nos por til lo@gmail.com. Te le fax: 58- 0261- 4127018.
Vol. 40, Nº 74 (2022), 648-661
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
The Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–
2022: A Historical Retrospective
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4074.35
Iryna Kovalska-Pavelko *
Oksana Vyhivska **
Tatiana Voropayeva ***
Valentyna Olyanych ****
Oleksandr Babichev *****
Abstract
The article analyzes the origins and development of the
Russian-Ukrainian war through the prism of the study of the
historical background of the conict. The purpose of the article is
a historical and retrospective analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian
war of 2014-2022. The historical-comparative method was
important for the research. Using the method of historical analogy,
the methods of the war between Russia and Nazi Germany are
compared. Structural-functional, retrospective, synchronic and diachronic
research methods are also used in the work. The results show that the
origins of the Russian-Ukrainian war have a certain civilizational basis.
Only the conquest of Ukrainian lands by the Russian Empire and the
domination of the USSR “silenced” the previous wars. In recent years, V.
Putin initiated an aggressive revival of Russia’s inuence in the post-Soviet
space. In its policy, Russia has relied on easy-to-manage enclaves, which
have become preparatory bases for further expansion of Russian inuence
in the region. The conclusions show that Russia is losing the war. Russia
is gradually becoming a terrorist state, while Ukraine is receiving strong
comprehensive international support.
* Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor, Oles Honchar Dnipro National University,
Faculty of History, Department of History of Ukraine, Dnipro, 72 Gagarin Ave. ORCID ID: https://
orcid.org/0000-0001-8307-9751
** Ph.D. in History, Associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences Department of Social
Sciences, Korilov Zhytomyr Military Institute (Zhytomyr, Ukraine), Zhytomyr, 22 Mira Avenue. ORCID
ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2395-5577
*** Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Associate Professor, senior researcher at the Center for Ukrainian
Studies Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Faculty of Philosophy, Center for Ukrainian
Studies, 60 Volodymyrska Street, City of Kyiv, Ukraine, 01033. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0001-8388-7169
**** Doctor of Historical Sciences Associate Professor, Professor of History and Socio-Economic Disciplines
Municipal Institution «Kharkiv Humanitarian and Pedagogical Academy» of Kharkiv Regional Council,
Faculty of Preschool and Special Education and History, Department of HistoryandSocio-Economic
Disciplines, Ukraine,Kharkiv Rustaveli Lane 7. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7880-6579
***** Associate Professor, PhD in History (Candidate of Historical Sciences) Department of History of
Ukraine State Institution “Luhansk Taras Shevchenko National University”, Kovalia Str., 3, Poltava.
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4682-0971
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Keywords: Ukraine; conicts in Eastern Europe; contemporary wars;
political forecasting; historical retrospective.
La guerra ruso-ucraniana de 2014-2022: una
retrospectiva histórica
Resumen
El artículo analiza los orígenes y el desarrollo de la guerra ruso-
ucraniana a través del prisma del estudio de los antecedentes históricos del
conicto. El propósito del artículo es un análisis histórico y retrospectivo de
la guerra ruso-ucraniana de 2014-2022. El método histórico-comparativo
fue importante para la investigación. Utilizando el método de la analogía
histórica se comparan los métodos de la guerra entre Rusia y la Alemania
nazi. En el trabajo también se utilizan los métodos de investigación
estructural-funcional, retrospectivo, sincrónico y diacrónico. Los
resultados muestran que los orígenes de la guerra ruso-ucraniana tienen
una cierta base civilizacional. Sólo la conquista de las tierras ucranianas
por el Imperio ruso y la dominación de la URSS “silenciaron” las guerras
anteriores. En los últimos años, V. Putin inició un agresivo resurgimiento
de la inuencia de Rusia en el espacio postsoviético. En su política, Rusia
se ha apoyado en enclaves fáciles de gestionar, que se han convertido en
bases preparatorias para una mayor expansión de la inuencia rusa en la
región. Las conclusiones muestran que Rusia está perdiendo la guerra.
Rusia se está convirtiendo poco a poco en un Estado terrorista, mientras
que Ucrania está recibiendo un fuerte apoyo internacional integral.
Palabras clave: Ucrania; conictos en Europa del este; guerras
contemporáneas; pronóstico político; retrospectiva
histórica.
Introduction
From a historical point of view, wars have always acted as companions
to the development of human civilization. Obviously, in the XXI century,
despite all the features of globalization, digitalization will not be an
exception to the rules, and periodic wars will accompany Europe in the
coming years. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine is special. It
is the rst powerful engagement in the post-Soviet space where regular
armies and auxiliary volunteer units on both sides are fully engaged.
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The Russian federation’s aggression denes the counter-arms, so it is
of global signicance, that is, the authoritarian aspirations of the former
imperial center and the unproblematic democratic Ukrainian society have
converged in Ukraine. Bypassing the military aspects of the confrontation,
we will note its political overtones and direct comparisons with World War
III. So, the events in Ukraine aect the development of the general world
geopolitics.
Note that at this point events are still unfolding, so the consequences of
the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022 can only be predictions. However, to
consider the development of the situation, which led to the deployment of
the largest-scale European conict in the new millennium, is quite realistic.
The relevance of this issue is indisputable because we are talking about the
resumption of a hidden conict, which, in fact, has lasted for more than a
century. Russian-Ukrainian relations are “overshadowed” by the imperial
past of Russia, in which there is simply no place for free Ukraine, the richest
“colony” of the Romanov Empire.
Although the fall of the Soviet Union (the Bolshevik empire) and the
economic decline of the 1990s postponed the “solution of the Ukrainian
question” for a while, the Kremlin elite, led by V. Putin used all possible
nancial, human and diplomatic resources to try to restore former Russian
possessions. Thus, the purpose of the article is to conduct a historical and
retrospective analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
1. Materials and methods
In the paper are used logical research methods: analysis, synthesis,
induction, and deduction. At the same time, the study is built on the use
of special historical research methods. In particular, the historical and
comparative method is important for the study. Based on the latter, it was
possible to compare the historical origins of the policy of Russia and Ukraine.
By means of the method of historical analogy comparative methods of war
of Russia and Nazi Germany.
At the same time, the work also used other historical research
methods, in particular, structural-functional, retrospective, synchronic,
and diachronic methods of research, which serve as auxiliary methods of
revealing signicant temporal transformations in the historical reality.
The study is built on the use of general scientic methods. Based on the
axiological method, it was possible to move from general considerations to
specic conclusions and recommendations.
Using the predictive method, an attempt has been made to establish
approximate results of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is currently
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ongoing. It should be noted that these forecasts are used in the discussion
because it is impossible to collect authentic information about the
subsequent stages of the unfolding of the conict.
2. Literature Review
The study of the peculiarities of the development of the Russo-Ukrainian
war is a relevant topic for contemporary historical research. In particular,
Kuzio (2021) investigated the peculiarities of the Russian-Ukrainian war
through the prism of Ukrainian political discourse. The researcher paid
special attention to the denition of the main prerequisites of this war. Kulyk
(2019) analyzed the problem of the Russian-speaking population in post-
Soviet countries. In his study, the author characterized the transformation
of the identity of Russian speakers in independent Ukraine.
In particular, based on a survey and public discourse data, he analyzed
the hierarchy of identities of those people who use predominantly Russian in
their everyday life. In his article, he concludes that in independent Ukraine,
Russian-speakers were completely “transformed” from Soviet people into
Ukrainians (Kulyk, 2019). Bînă and Dragomir (2020) investigated the
development of the Russian-Ukrainian information war and analyzed the
specics of its conduct and ways of possible promotion.
These experts also highlighted the main propaganda mechanisms used
by the media (Bînă and Dragomir, 2020). Note that many foreign historians
and political scientists have studied the peculiarities of hybrid warfare.
At the same time, they focused on characterizing the concept of “hybrid
warfare” and highlighting its main components. For example, Almäng
(2019) in his article attempts to illuminate the hybrid concept in terms of
analyzing philosophical debates regarding the uncertainty of the concept.
On the other hand, Manolea (2021) analyzed key aspects of the hybrid
warfare that the Russian federation wages to retain and strengthen its
zones of inuence. Separate attention is given to the tools and means used
by the Russians in the current hybrid warfare (Manolea, 2021). At the same
time, Martz (2022) explored the crimes of the Russian Federation against
Ukraine.
Consequently, the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian war is now quite
popular. However, the problems of establishing detailed military strictures
and intentions (of both the Russian and Ukrainian sides), the real
consequences of the end of the war, which we believe, nominally, can be
determined based on historical and retrospective analysis, remain little-
studied.
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The Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2022: A Historical Retrospective
3. Results
The traditions of modern Russian statehood are directly linked to the
Ulus Dzhuchi (Golden Horde), from which the authoritarian method of
government began. At that time, the only ruler was the khan. Later on,
having outgrown the traditions of the Golden Horde, the Moscow prince, or
the Moscow tsar, was regarded as the only source of power.
All other people in this state were powerless. Ukrainian historian V.
Lipinski described this type of government as ochlocracy. It is about rule
based on coercion over the crowd (ochlos). At the same time, the said ochlos
is passive and incapable of making independent decisions. Consequently, it
is dependent on the authorities, on which it is completely entrusted.
The political culture of Ukraine has its original origins. It was formed
under the inuence of the Kyiv-Russian tradition, later developed in the
Galicia-Volhynia state. Consequently, during the Middle Ages and early
modern times, it used a dierent model of government. Behind it, the main
carriers of power were the military-powered strata of the population.
In Kievan Rus and Galicia-Volhynia, we are talking about military
boyars (Parshyn and Mereniuk, 2022); in the early modern period, this
role was played mainly by the nobility and the Cossacks. The Cossacks even
managed to create their own statehood, which at one time was characterized
by democratic principles. For this reason, it is obvious why Ukrainians have
such traits as dignity, freedom, individualism, freedom-loving, and other
values of a free person. Now, these European democratic signs are clearly
represented in Ukraine, where in contrast to Russia, there is freedom of
speech and tolerance.
Subsequently, in the XVIII and XIX centuries, the Moscow area
became an empire. Moscow became an empire, which was called Russian,
thus trying to appropriate the patrimony of Kievan Rus’. Revolutionary
upheavals during World War I led to the collapse of this country. However,
the Bolsheviks who seized power restored an empire called the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Unfortunately, many Ukrainian scholarly gures
inuenced the development of this imperial project.
However, Ukraine played a key role in this structure. Ukraine was
decisive for the functioning of the USSR and its collapse because this
imperial project was simply impossible without Ukraine (Ishchuk, 2020).
Consequently, by launching aggression against Ukraine, Acting Putin wants
to restore the Russian empire of the 19th century, for which reason Ukraine
is an important component.
At the same time, from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the
present, Ukraine went through a dicult period of nation-building. This
period had peak rises, in particular during the Ukrainian Revolution of
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1917-1921, World War II, independence in 1991, and the Revolution of
Dignity in 2013-2014. Consequently, Ukrainians gained weighty experience
in the creation of the state.
Despite many trials, Ukrainians are becoming a consolidated nation.
The Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity, and the resistance to
Russian aggression since 2014 showed a further strengthening of national
categories (Ghilès, 2022). On the other hand, the beginning of Russia’s
large-scale war against Ukraine led to a great consolidation of Ukrainians to
defend the homeland (Kuzio, 2021). From this time on, a truly nationwide
war against the Russian occupiers began.
It should be noted that as early as February 27, 2022, on the third day
after the beginning of direct Russian aggression against Ukraine, the website
of the Russian state agency RIA Novosti published a scandalous article by
the well-known pro-Kremlin columnist Pyotr Akopov entitled “The coming
of Russia and the new world”. The article was almost immediately removed
by the editors, but it was copied and circulated on the Internet. The column
was apparently written much earlier and posted on the site for automatic
updating.
The material was jointly authored by anonymous political analysts, the
name of P. Akopov was put there as a cover, with or without the knowledge
of this “gure”. This is indicated by the overall style and pathetic rhetoric
of the text, certainty of speech turns, and conviction in their quick victory,
inherent in the ocial Kremlin on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities.
In the column, the authors noted on behalf of Akopov about the “nal
solution” of the Ukrainian issue. They also pointed out that, for now, the
brothers were still ghting among themselves, hinting at an obvious victory,
the capture of Kyiv, and the Ukrainian capitulation. At the same time, on
the third day of the invasion, the military situation for Russian troops was
not as successful, and all attempts to encircle the Ukrainian capital and
capture other strategic cities failed (Johnson, 2022).
An important element in the material on the authorship of P. Akopov
had only one detail. According to the authors of the RIA Novosti piece,
the “new Russia” began its journey after V. Putin’s Munich speech. Putin’s
speech on February 10, 2007. During his speech, the then president of
Russia pointed out the fallacy of the unipolar model of world politics and
noted that Russia seeks to regain the leading position in world geopolitics
(Martz, 2022). Many Western politicians expressed indignation at the
openly hostile rhetoric of the Russian head of state but could not hinder the
implementation of his plans.
The Russian authorities were afraid of “color revolutions”, so the events
in Georgia and primarily in Ukraine (the Orange Revolution) in 2003-
2004 were perceived as extremely hostile. Ocial Moscow felt that “former
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The Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2022: A Historical Retrospective
colonies” after 1991 took tangible steps towards independence from the
Russian center and ocially declared it. It was probably then that the rst
real decisions were made about future aggressive actions against these
countries (Kos, 2022). Russian archives are classied, so it is impossible to
ocially conrm this version (Kuzio, 2021). However, the following harsh
rhetoric and change of political vector on the part of Russia point to this
conclusion.
The position of ocial Moscow in 2007 was based on strong fundamentals.
Export prices for energy and other minerals, actively exported from Russia,
allowed the accumulation of tangible material resources in domestic and
foreign accounts. The heads of state corporations had grandiose plans for
the further development of this sector of the economy. Connections with
Western politicians were maintained by skillful lobbyists.
In general, the image and. Putin was viewed positively by European
politicians and society, despite the gradual curtailment of democratic
freedoms (Kulyk, 2017). Russia’s managed democracy still left a semblance
of respect for basic human rights. Thanks to the sale of gas and oil, it was
possible to maintain contact with leading industrial producers for a long
time, which allowed Russia to be lled with quality goods.
The population of the country, which received its smaller share of the “oil
and gas pie,” was exposed to the rst sprouts of total propaganda about the
greatness of their country and felt an increase in living standards (Kulyk,
2017). All these factors allowed Kremlin politicians to feel condent in the
post-Soviet space.
Georgia was the rst to be hit by the “new Russia”. The war of 08.08.2008
shook the country and brought down the pro-European course of Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili. The powerful Russian invasion supported
and consolidated the positions of several enclaves on the territory of the
small mountainous country - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They were not
recognized in the world at the time; even ocial Moscow was in no hurry
to recognize their independence. However, they became convenient tools
for stopping all attempts by Georgia to join NATO. In addition, a kind of
mechanism was specied in the case of “protests” in another post-Soviet
country.
Perhaps the condent victory in Georgia and the joyful perception
of this act by the public has given Russian politicians condence in the
correctness of their chosen tactics: the creation of convenient puppet
enclaves, military pressure, and non-interference by Western democracies.
This set of techniques was complemented by the deployment of insane
propaganda and hybrid informational inuence - through a network of
Kremlin-controlled analysts, print media, TV channels, and other media
(Kuzio, 2021).
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Their goal is to increase patriotic fervor among the Russian population,
sow discord among potential enemies, and form a certain picture of events
for European and American audiences. In 2008, this strategy was successful,
although the military forces of Georgia and Russia were not comparable.
A similar plan of action apparently took shape with regard to Ukraine
as well, but Russia’s military advantage did not seem convincing. For
this reason, during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, who held a pro-
Kremlin political course, the military department was headed by ethnic
Russians (Kuzio, 2021). As a result, Ukraine’s Armed Forces were stranded
by constant funding cuts and restructuring of army units (formation of
smaller and better equipped military units).
Also, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, as the following
investigation revealed, was one of the main initiators of the so-called
Kharkiv agreements (Martz, 2022). According to the provisions of this
document, adopted in April 2010, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian
Federation was allowed to stay at the ports of the Crimean Peninsula until
2042 and increase its presence uncontrollably.
The events of February and March 2014 demonstrated that the
Kremlin’s strategies had some success. Ukrainian society and especially
the authorities were disorganized after the bloody confrontation in Kyiv,
V. Yanukovych’s ight to Russia’s Rostov-on-Don, and the murder of the
Heavenly Hundred. Thanks to this, the military advantage gained and the
active propaganda of the “Russian world” and the “Russian Spring” spread
by Moscow-controlled resources, the Russians fairly quickly seized power
in Crimea. Because of the pre-planned “referendum,” the annexation of the
peninsula was formalized. At the same time, the main objectives in eastern
Ukraine were not achieved (Ghilès, 2022).
The Ukrainian military, volunteers, society, and government, through
an established consensus of action, were able to stop pro-Russian ghters
and cadres within parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Large cities
(Donetsk, Luhansk, Makiivka, etc.) were informally occupied, but Ukraine’s
industrial potential was not broken, and many settlements remained under
the control of the AFU (Elliott, 2022).
The armed forces of the ghters and the Russians who fought on their
side suered casualties. The reaction of the international community was
important: although the mechanism of sanctions was repeatedly criticized
by experts, it began to work against Russia and became a signal that the
democratic world will not allow the restoration of imperial projects in
Eastern Europe.
The shaky truce established in 2015 lasted until 2022, which reduced
the number of civilian casualties compared to the active phase of hostilities.
Thus, based on a brief summary, we can draw certain conclusions regarding
the political and military retrospective:
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The Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2022: A Historical Retrospective
1. We believe that the announcement of intentions to restore Russia’s
political inuence after the fall of the Soviet Union was the so-called
Munich speech of V. Putin in the 2007 Munich Speech.
2. In its politics Russia has staked on enclaves, which are easy to
manage. These formations, which are not recognized in the world,
are becoming preparatory bases for further expansion of Russian
inuence in the region. For example, the situation unfolded in Georgia
(in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) in 2008. “Zones of inuence” were
created in Crimea as a result of the Kharkiv Agreements of 2010
(Kulyk, 2017). Note that potential crisis territories are the territory
of the unrecognized Transnistrian Republic, where the Operative
Group of Russian Forces (former 14th Guards Combined Arms
Army) is located. In the future, this territory and Russian military
bases in other countries could become new sources for conict
zones.
3. Russian agents in Ukrainian politics have also joined the situation as
of 2022. Yanukovych’s pro-Russian activities in the military sphere
have degenerated into complete capitulation. For this reason, in the
spring of 2014, there was not enough strength among the Ukrainian
military to oppose the annexation of Crimea. There was also disarray
among Ukrainian political elites, some of whom did not even allow
for the possibility of Russian aggression against Ukraine.
4. The passive reaction of Western politicians to the crisis situation
in Georgia in 2008 led to the fact that the actions of the Russian
Federation were not properly condemned and punished.
Consequently, this conrmed among Kremlin elites the belief that
the collective West was not set up to contain it and recognized the
territory of the former Soviet Union as a zone of its inuence. The
certainty of impunity provoked aggressive actions against Ukraine
(Manolea, 2021).
In the discussion we try to analyze the prospects for the development of
the Russian-Ukrainian war and determine its specics, using the prognostic
method.
4. Discussion
Why was Russia doomed to lose?
The English historian Dominic Lieven wrote a book about the collapse
of the Russian Empire during World War I (Ling, 2022). He noted that
more than anything else in the world, the fate of World War I depended on
what was being done in and around Ukraine. Such a statement may seem
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somewhat exaggerated, but in fact, such a conclusion is valid. Historians
are now proving that Ukraine was not secondary in World War I: it was
the primary territory where the fate of the world was determined (Kuzio,
2021). So, it was in World War II, so it is now. Consequently, the Russian-
Ukrainian war is not a local conict but a geopolitical one.
On the other hand, historical retrospect justiably proves the view
that Russia is losing this war (although it started it insidiously against
Ukraine). To conrm this view, let us provide several arguments based on
the principles of historical development.
As noted above, Russia’s state traditions date back to the Golden
Horde. Later, its political culture developed in the prism of autocracy,
where ochlocracy reigned: the people were completely dependent on the
ruler. Similar parallels can be drawn with today’s Russia, where the people
depend on the ruler and believe that their fate depends on the will of the
government.
We believe that the war against Ukraine may end in the defeat of the
Russian federation. It is quite obvious that the president of Russia and.
Putin uses the algorithms of dictators of previous times. For example, he
has often expressed sympathy for Stalin. However, it is likely that he is
coping Hitler more than anything else. This opinion is conrmed by the
fact that the current Russian regime, which has moved from kleptocracy
and authoritarianism to all-out dictatorship, is copying the Nazi regime in
many areas. This is clearly visible in the direction of ideology. Note that
researchers are now debating the denition of this ideology. In particular,
they propose such varieties as “Putinism,” “Rashism,” “Russian Nazism,”
etc.
The features of this ideology emerged:
1. Militarism.
2. Isolationism from the European world.
3. Autocracy.
4. Xenophobia.
5. Ethnophilia.
6. Expansionism.
7. Chauvinism.
Despite this, we emphasize that a signicant part of the aggressor’s
ideology is the so-called “Russian World” concept. At the same time, if
previously the Nazis chose the Jews as their main negative target, then the
Putin regime chose the Ukrainians. It should be noted that the Russian
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Oleksandr Babichev
The Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2022: A Historical Retrospective
authorities began to deliberately emphasize their anti-Ukrainian policy in
1991, that is, since the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence.
However, since 2014, this policy has become mainstream Russian
propaganda. Clear evidence of this is the destruction of the civilian
population, repeated non-compliance with standards of warfare, and the
destruction of civilian infrastructure and housing in many Ukrainian cities
(Johnson, 2022).
In addition, Russia is actively introducing new totalitarian military
symbols into social appeals. In particular, the Latin letter Z, which denotes
most of the occupant’s equipment, is actively popularized in Russia along
with the St. George’s ribbon. Western European media call these signs
“Putin’s swastika”. At the same time, and. Putin is trying to copy some of
A. Hitler’s actions. For example, a direct analogy can be traced between the
anschluss of Austria and the anschluss of Belarus.
In addition, the Nazis used slogans about the protection of the German
population outside of Germany, while the Russians are now “protecting”
Russian-speakers outside of Russia. Obviously, such protection serves as
a pretext for open aggression. Based on a continuation of the associative
series of comparisons between Hitler’s Germany and Putin’s Russia, the
latter appears to be only an imperfect copy of the former.
Another argument for Ukraine’s victory is that Russia is turning into a
terrorist state. Having received a strong Ukrainian response, the Russian
military has shifted to a strategy of terror, deliberately implementing war
crimes prohibited by all world conventions. However, we note that in
scientic literature, the phenomenon of terrorism is always considered a
strategy of the weaker.
In addition, the support of other major countries was of great
importance for the victory of Ukraine. Ukrainian historians have quite often
investigated the reasons for the defeat of the rst liberation struggle during
the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 -1921 and analyzed the defeat during the
second liberation struggle (1938-1950). Many have noted that a decisive
role in these failures was played by a low level of national consciousness,
weak Ukrainian elite, lack of unity in the actions of Ukrainian forces, and
the like.
Historians increasingly go back to the fact that these were not the main
reasons. For example, the Lithuanian movement, which was also active in
the Russian Empire, was much weaker than the Ukrainian. However, the
Lithuanians were able to get their own state, while the Ukrainians were not.
Ukraine was geopolitically more important than Lithuania. Its existence
depended primarily on the consent of major political players.
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Consequently, neither World War I nor World War II agreed to create
Ukraine as an independent state, so the Ukrainian movement was in a
geopolitical vacuum. For this reason, the key dierence between these two
wars and the modern war is that Ukraine has emerged from this state of
geopolitical isolation. We are now seeing Ukraine receiving substantial
support, both militarily and diplomatically.
On the other hand, Russia is isolated, which is subject to condemnation
from many countries around the world. This means that the chances
of Ukraine winning are very high. Consequently, we believe that the
geopolitical factor is important for future victory: Russia does not have
such signicant support, so Ukraine has a great chance of winning.
Conclusion
Thus, the origins of the Russian-Ukrainian war have a denite
civilizational basis. Ukraine is a product of the development of the Kyiv-
Russian civilization matrix, while modern Russia appeared on the ruins
of the Mongol Empire. For centuries there have been conicts between
the two peoples, and only the conquest of Ukrainian lands by the Russian
Empire and the domination of the Romanovs “muted” these wars. The
USSR succeeded the Romanov dynasty and suppressed the attempts of
the Ukrainians in 1918-1921 to establish their own state, so the policy of
denazication of the Ukrainians continued.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was allowed to develop
independently. However, economic and political defeat briey stopped
Russia. As a result of the policies of V. Putin’s policies began an aggressive
revival of its inuence in the post-Soviet space. We dene this process as
nally starting with Putin’s Munich speech on October 10, 2007.
In its policy, Russia has staked on enclaves that are easy to manage.
These formations, which are not recognized in the world, are becoming
preparatory bases for further expansion of Russian inuence in the region.
For example, the situation unfolded in Georgia (in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia) in 2008. “Zones of inuence” were created in Crimea as a result of
the Kharkiv Agreements of 2010. Russian agents in Ukrainian politics also
joined the situation as of 2022.
Yanukovych’s pro-Russian activities in the military sphere were
capitulative. Part of the Ukrainian political elites did not even allow for
the possibility of Russian aggressive actions against Ukraine. The passive
reaction of Western politicians to the crisis situation in Georgia in 2008
led to the fact that the actions of the Russian Federation were not properly
condemned and punished. Accordingly, condence in impunity provoked
aggressive actions against Ukraine.
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Iryna Kovalska-Pavelko, Oksana Vyhivska, Tatiana Voropayeva, Valentyna Olyanych y
Oleksandr Babichev
The Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2022: A Historical Retrospective
We note that Russia is losing in this war family. It is quite obvious that
the president of Russia and. Putin uses the algorithms of the dictators of
previous times. In particular, based on the formation of associative rows
comparing the activities of Hitler’s Germany and Putin’s Russia, the latter
appears to be only an imperfect copy of the former. Russia is also turning
into a terrorist state.
We also see Ukraine receiving substantial support, both militarily and
diplomatically, from other countries. On the other hand, Russia is isolated
and subject to condemnation from many countries around the world. This
means that the chances of Ukraine winning are very high.
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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
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Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
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