Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Publicación cientíca en formato digital
ISSN-Versión Impresa 0798-1406 / ISSN-Versión on line 2542-3185
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Vol.40 N° 74
2022
Recibido el 16/06/2022 Aceptado el 12/09/2022
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
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Vol. 40, Nº 74 (2022), 268-292
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Transformation of civil society
in the context of political radicalism
in eastern Europe
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4074.14
Tetiana Madryha *
Oleksandr Kornievskyy **
Yevgen Pereguda ***
Irina Bodrova ****
Stepan Svorak *****
Abstract
The aim of the article was to identify the current state of the
process of civil society transformation in the context of political
radicalism in Eastern Europe. Comparative law and statistical
analysis were the main methodological tools. The research
showed that the development of political radicalism in Eastern
Europe leads to the transformation of civil society. A more persistent
and contentious public makes new demands on the political process. It
also creates multidimensional tensions and conicts. Representatives of
radicalism gain strong positions in the political environment of society by
supporting illiberalism, ethno-nationalism, culture wars and alternative
knowledge. The process of merging militant and violent radicalism with
family ethnonationalism is ongoing in the countries of Eastern Europe. It
is concluded that this phenomenon requires constant implementation of
political, legal and security strategies to prevent manifestations of political
radicalism. The appropriateness and prospects of the activities of the
Radicalization Awareness Network, developed by the European Union,
were established.
* PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor of Department of Political Institutions and Processes,
Faculty of History, Politology and International Relations, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National
University, 76018, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7761-9811
** Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, Chief Researcher of Department of Humanitarian Policy and
Civil Society Development, National Institute for Strategic Studies, 01054, Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1512-0326
*** Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, Head of the Department of Political Sciences and Law, Faculty
of Urban Studies and Spatial Planning, Kyiv National University of Construction and Architecture,
03037, Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7561-7193
**** PhD of Legal Sciences, Associate Professor of Department of State Building, Yaroslav Mudryi National
Law University”, 61024, Kharkiv. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4507-8544
***** Doctor of Law, Professor of Department of Theory and History of State and Law, Vasyl Stefanyk
Precarpathian National University, 76018, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.
org/0000-0003-3116-1221
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Keywords: nationalism; xenophobia; extremism; critical level of
radicalization; protest culture.
Transformación de la sociedad civil en el contexto del
radicalismo político en Europa del Este
Resumen
El objetivo del artículo fue identicar el estado actual del proceso de
transformación de la sociedad civil en el contexto del radicalismo político
en Europa del Este. El derecho comparado y el análisis estadístico fueron
las principales herramientas metodológicas. La investigación mostró
que el desarrollo del radicalismo político en Europa del Este conduce
a la transformación de la sociedad civil. Un público más persistente
y contencioso plantea nuevas demandas al proceso político. También
crea tensiones y conictos multidimensionales. Los representantes del
radicalismo ganan posiciones fuertes en el entorno político de la sociedad
al apoyar el antiliberalismo, el etnonacionalismo, las guerras culturales y
el conocimiento alternativo. El proceso de fusión del radicalismo militante
y violento con el etnonacionalismo familiar está en curso en los países de
Europa del Este. Se concluye que este fenómeno requiere la implementación
constante de estrategias políticas, legales y de seguridad para prevenir
manifestaciones de radicalismo político. Se establecieron la idoneidad
y las perspectivas de las actividades de la Red de Sensibilización sobre la
Radicalización, desarrollada por la Unión Europea.
Palabras clave: nacionalismo; xenofobia; extremismo; nivel crítico de
radicalización; cultura de protesta.
Introduction
In modern democracies, protest is promoted by the diculties currently
facing political representation, and manifests itself within direct rather than
representative democracy. The spread of protest attitudes and behaviour
observed in many countries around the world is related to the current
climate of widespread distrust of institutionalized and representative
mediation in politics.
Recently, there has been a gradual growth of more critical forms of civic
consciousness to the detriment of institutional forms of civic and political
participation. A more demanding and protest political culture has led to
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Tetiana Madryha, Oleksandr Kornievskyy, Yevgen Pereguda, Irina Bodrova y Stepan Svorak
Transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in eastern Europe
greater familiarity with a repertoire of protest thoughts and/or actions, as
well as increased tendencies toward extremism and radicalization.
In today’s world, the use of social media for news has often produced
a potentially harmful eect on citizens’ understanding of public policy.
Social media platforms began to shape public discourse and contribute
to a less informed and increasingly fragmented society. Various websites
have contributed to a gradual increase in the level of radicalization of users
due to the self-organizing nature of online digital content. Besides, there
are also trends of decreasing interest in citizen participation, which are
characterized by a decreased voter turnout and the eroded activity of civil
society.
Civil society acts as a positive mechanism that works within the state
and contributes to its development. It becomes politicized amongst a
variety of new connections between traditional and non-traditional politics.
But instead of working to strengthen and complement liberal political
institutions only, civil society is being transformed to spread right-wing
populism, radicalism, and xenophobia (Cossa et al., 2021). The studies on
civil disobedience emphasize the fragility of the border for the transition to
radicalization.
Besides, the crisis caused by the pandemic has aected the citizens-
government relationship, raising the ethical question of the privacy
compromise in order to eectively restrain and track COVID-19 (Della Croce
and Nicole-Berva, 2021). The borders of radicalization have also become
more transparent, in particular at the polling stations. Protest voting and
disposition to radical parties have become more common among young
people than among the older generation.
Socio-psychological features of youth, their supercial and uncritical
perception of social life determine the inclination of the representatives of
the younger generation to protest-activist methods of raising their own life
status (Mukhitov et al., 2022). Confrontation and violence began to be used
as a subversive force and aect at least the social system, if not the political
one.
In view of the foregoing, the aim of the article is to consider the
transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in
Eastern Europe. The aim involved the following research objectives:
1. summarize the main directions of the development of political
radicalism in Eastern Europe;
2. reveal the current state of civil society transformation in the context
of political radicalism in Eastern Europe on the example of Ukraine
and Poland;
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
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3. consider the state of implementation of political, legal and security
strategies to prevent political radicalism.
1. Literature review
In the current realities, Central and Eastern Europe is characterized
by retreat from democracy, Euroscepticism, the rise of right-wing radical
populism and a general authoritarian negative reaction in the entire post-
communist space, which pose an open threat to democratic values (Mörner,
2022). The tone of more or less the entire political agenda began to shift
toward a more isolationist or protectionist nationalism.
The socio-economic status is the main dening feature of party identity
in developed democratic countries. In contrast to Central Europe, relevant
cultural factors are dominant in ethnically and religiously heterogeneous
societies, which is characteristic of many Eastern European countries
(Bushtikova, 2018). Nationalism also plays an important historical role
in the eastern region as the motivation of the opposition in the struggle
against communist regimes.
Radical tendencies characterize both individual and group attitudes
and behaviour, create a whole complex of values and actions, which are
expressed in a wide variety of ways. Radical views are realized in the form
of values and beliefs, and radical actions imply specic actions in a legal
context. These include, in particular, participating in a demonstration or
joining a radical organization.
The transformation of civil society under the impact of political
radicalism can lead to the emergence of an illegal context, for example,
committing acts of violence, causing damage to public or private property,
and, as a result, can lead to terrorism (Burchett et al., 2022). It is currently
urgent to develop and implement political, legal and security strategies
aimed at preventing manifestations of political radicalism remain relevant
today.
The choice of the research topic correlates with the modern vectors of
the theoretical research in dierent states. The work (Prislan et al., 2020)
became the background and the main tool for the article. In the course of
research, the researchers summarized the grounds for dening the concept
of civil society, and proposed their own denition. The work (Mörner,
2022) also had an inuence on the author’s position on the subject under
research. The researcher’s achievements allowed outlining the research
vector of civil society transformations in the context of political radicalism
in Eastern Europe.
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Transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in eastern Europe
In turn, the article (Umland, 2020) revealed the essence of the transition
from the politics of right-wing parties to an “uncivil” society for the author.
The ndings (Muxel, 2020) on the dynamics of the development of political
radicalism among the younger generation were taken into account during
the research. The studies (Mukhitov et al., 2022) on the analysis of the main
structural measures to prevent radicalism among young people, as well as
on the features underlying violence, communication, and civil disobedience
deserve special attention.
The studies of Suraya and Mulyana (2020) used in the article emphasize
the inuence of digital media on the development of political radicalism
among young people. The research (Burchett et al., 2022) that focuses
on the need to introduce innovative means of legislative prevention and
combating criminal radicalism is worth noting. These works helped to trace
the transformation of the main directions of the innovative approach to the
processes of counter-radicalism politics.
The authors outline such relevant vectors as innovativeness (novelty),
objectivity, subjectivity, purposefulness, demand, implementation in
practice, eciency. An active study of the problem conrms that the process
of transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism require
special attention. It is necessary to continue to improve regulatory and legal
initiatives aimed at preventing the development of political radicalism in
order to ensure the well-being of civil society.
Therefore, it is urgent to conduct research with due regard to new
research criteria.
2. Methods
A qualitative research design of the study with the introduction of a set
of practical and theoretical tools contributed to obtaining balanced research
results (Figure 1).
The conducted research was based on the research design referred to
above and the author’s selection of the sample according to the subject of
the article. In particular, forty-eight sources were surveyed and covered in
the article.
The authors obtained the research results through the use of particular
methodological tools. The research methodology is based on a set of
principles, where the principle of the unity of theory and practice is the
main one. The research methodology is also based on the principles
of historicism and objectivity, a combination of political history and
comparative historical approaches. A comprehensive approach was used
in the course of the research, and became the methodological background
of the research and allowed to comprehensively review the selected issues.
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Statistical analysis and comparative law were the main practical
methods. These methods were applied to reveal the main indicators of
the civil society transformation process. The comparative law allowed
forming the author’s position on the relationship between the political
elite and representatives of political radicalism. This method was used to
nd common and distinctive features of radical political movements on
the territory of Ukraine and Poland. Qualitative and quantitative analysis
of statistical data became particularly important in the study for outlining
the main vectors of the further development of political radicalism in the
context of existing social trends.
Figure 1: Research design
The historical genetic method was used to full the research objectives
and reveal the specics of the development of political radicalism in the
territory of Eastern Europe. The methodological tools referred to above
also allowed tracing the dynamics of the development of political radicalism
in relation to the changing internal political situation. The method of
comparative politics turned out to be useful for considering dierent
approaches of representatives of variable types of political radicalism
to transformational social processes. A universal model of political risk
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Tetiana Madryha, Oleksandr Kornievskyy, Yevgen Pereguda, Irina Bodrova y Stepan Svorak
Transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in eastern Europe
management in the activities of representatives of political radicalism was
built by applying modelling of political processes.
3. Results
Political radicalism conveys a message about certain deviations in the
socio-political environment and ensures the removal of social tension
due to the release of accumulated discontent. It also exerts pressure on
existing political institutions, the processes of preparation, adoption and
implementation of political decisions, adjusts the political course. Violence
can be part of a political strategy aimed at radical change in society or
the destruction of its institutions (revolution, terrorism). The political
radicalism is characterized by many-sided dispositions, forms of expression
and action, the interpretation of which depends on the socio-historical and
political context.
The political radicalism is institutionalized as a result of the emergence
and spread of the inuence of groups, movements, parties, and individual
politically active individuals in a society. Left-wing and right-wing
radicalism can be called the main types of radicalism (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Typology of political radicalism in modern realities
The subject of political radicals’ aggression are particular politicians and
statesmen with whom social deformations are associated. Radical social
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
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changes necessitated by the respective communities must take place by
the redistribution of power through the legal or violent removal of political
opponents. While the far right is inherently anti-democratic and, in some
cases, legitimizes the use of violence to achieve its political goals, the radical
right opposes liberal aspects of democracy (such as minority rights) and
does not encourage the use of violence.
Radical right-wing parties declare against cultural values, social equality
and socio-political structures of modern Western democracies, in addition
to destroying their basis; advocate ethnic homogeneity in society. Their
activity is also characterized by an orientation towards neoliberal economy,
protection of every citizen of society from corruption and arbitrariness of
state institutions. Such parties are usually headed by a charismatic leader.
Centralized and hierarchically organized associations are a fundamental
characteristic, which often use populism as a way of obtaining votes.
The far-right parties of Eastern Europe reect this trend in view of the
diversity of Eastern European countries in terms of ethnic heterogeneity,
economic performance, and cultural heritage. Ethnicity and language
create divisions that structure far-right politics in some countries, such
as Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia. At the same
time, ethnic divisions are less pronounced and right-wing radical politics
focus either on anti-Roma mobilization or on social and religious issues
linked to specic party systems in more ethnically homogenous countries,
such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland.
The division of parties into left-wing, centrist, and radical right-wing
parties in Ukraine is characterized by political distribution based on
language and culture. In 2019, a chronic decit of trust in power institutions,
current political parties and politicians facilitated the rise of the activity
of political radicalism in Ukraine. More than 80% of respondents did not
trust the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the Government and the political
machinery. At the same time, only about 10% of respondents trusted
political parties, while 80% did not (Razumkov Center Project, 2020).
The radicalization of public attitudes in Ukraine is reected in electoral
preferences. The result of the elections of the respective parties is the
implementation of a particular state policy and legislative regulation.
All Ukrainian radical nationalists are characterized by an ethnic
interpretation of the nation, the desire to create a mono-ethnic Ukrainian
state, a negative attitude towards Russia and Russians, and anti-
communism.
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Tetiana Madryha, Oleksandr Kornievskyy, Yevgen Pereguda, Irina Bodrova y Stepan Svorak
Transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in eastern Europe
Figure 3: Ultra-right radical parties of Ukraine
After the 2014 Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution and subsequent Russian
aggression, nationalist views and groups gained considerable legitimacy in
society at large. However, they never (except for the parliamentary elections
of 2012) achieve signicant success in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada.
The parties National Corps, Svoboda (Freedom), Pravyi Sector, veterans
and public organizations took part in the extraordinary parliamentary
elections of 2019 as part of the United Nationalist Bloc.
In the 2019 parliamentary elections, the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”
received only 2.15% of the votes, thereby failing to pass the threshold.
However, in November 2020, according to surveys of respondents, 2.5% of
voters would vote for this party (Razumkov Center Project, 2020).
The rating of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” in the elections to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine among the age groups of the population was
the following: 18-29 years — 1.6%, 30-39 years — 1.5%, 40-49 years — 2.1%,
50-59 years — 2.1%, 60 years and older — 2.5% (Ilko Kucheriv Democratic
Initiatives Foundation, 2019). According to the results of regular elections
for 2010-2020, the representation of the All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda” in
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 40 Nº 74 (2022): 268-292
local councils of all levels was: 2010 — 1.01%, 2015 — 1.32%, 2020 — 2.11%
(Razumkov Center Project, 2020). According to sociological research, the
national-radical trend most corresponded to the beliefs of citizens in 2020
in the following regions of Ukraine: west — 3.8%, centre — 3.8%, south —
0.8%, east — 1.7% (Razumkov Center Project, 2020). The main problem of
Ukrainian right-wing radicals is the absence of the dominant need of the
majority of Ukrainian citizens for extremely nationalist ideology, rhetoric
and politics.
Pravyi Sector was initially an informal association of activists of a
number of Ukrainian nationalist far-right organizations, which was formed
during the protest actions in Kyiv (December 2013 - February 2014). In
2014, Pravyi Sector was transformed into a political party based on the
legal and personnel background of the (the Ukrainian National Assembly —
UNA) and a paramilitary wing (Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence — UNSO)
party.
The military wing of the movement is the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps
(leader O. Stempitkyi), the political wing is Pravyi Sector party (O.
Tarasenko). There is also a certain youth movement — Prava Youth. The
party primarily adheres to “street politics”, while parliamentary politics is
secondary. Cooperation with Ukrainian communities occupies a special
place in its struggle. For the national liberation movement, Pravyi Sector is
a means of carrying out nationalist revolutionary transformations both in
society and in the state in general.
The Azov unit was originally formed as a volunteer group in May 2014
from the ultra-nationalist association Patriot of Ukraine and the neo-Nazi
group Social National Assembly (SNA). The unit was headed by A. Biletskyi,
who managed both Patriot of Ukraine (founded in 2005) and SNA (founded
in 2008). After recapturing the strategically important port city of Mariupol
from pro-Russian separatists on November 12, 2014, this unit was ocially
included in the National Guard of Ukraine and received high praise from
the then President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko.
In 2016, A. Biletsky created the far-right National Corps party, with the
core made up by Azov veterans. The unit received support from Ukraine’s
Interior Minister in 2014, as the government recognized that its own
armed forces were too weak to ght pro-Russian separatists and relied on
militarized volunteer units. A signicant part of the population associates
them with the struggle for independence, not with a radical ethnocentric or
xenophobic ideology.
In 2016, the Azov Regiment was accused of violating international
humanitarian law (United Nations, 2016). The UN report described
incidents between November 2015 and February 2016 in which Azov used
its weapons and forces and evicted residents from buildings after pillage of
civilian property.
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Tetiana Madryha, Oleksandr Kornievskyy, Yevgen Pereguda, Irina Bodrova y Stepan Svorak
Transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in eastern Europe
The unit was also accused of raping and torturing citizens detained in
Donbas. In January 2018, Azov deployed its street patrol called the National
Guard to “bring order” in Kyiv. Instead, the unit organized pogroms against
the Roma community and attacked representatives of the LGBT community.
In 2018, the Israeli government’s annual report on anti-Semitism
(Liphshiz, 2018) covered Ukraine extensively as having more incidents
than all post-Soviet states combined. According to the Facebook’s policy
on dangerous individuals and organizations, Azov was banned from its
platforms in 2019. Facebook classied this group as a Tier 1 category,
which includes groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and ISIS. Users glorifying,
supporting or representing Tier 1 groups were also banned (Cacciatore et
al., 2018).
The National Corps platform advocates the political system of naciocracy,
which denes nationalism as the main goal of the state. The wing supports
a number of far-right and ultra-nationalist political positions, and also
supports Ukraine’s return of nuclear weapons. Outside of Ukraine, Azov
plays a central role in a network of extremist groups from California
through Europe to New Zealand. More than 17,000 foreign ghters from
50 countries have arrived in Ukraine over the past six years.
On February 24, 2022, Russian troops invaded Ukraine. Demilitarization
and de-Nazication of Ukraine, protecting people from Nazism and
genocide by the Ukrainian government was declared by the Russian
Federation as the purpose of the so-called “special operation”. Combat units
clashed with ghters of the Azov Regiment in Mariupol, Kyiv, Kharkiv and
other settlements. On February 24, 2022, after Russia began its invasion,
Facebook lifted its ban, saying it would allow expressing oneself about Azov,
supporting their role in the defence of Ukraine, or service in the Ukrainian
National Guard.
In Ukraine, one can observe the presence of a number of “non-
civilian” organizations — far-right radical movements and groups. The
representatives of informal groups are politicized due to the rapprochement
with the associations of political radicals and the gradual saturation of
the consciousness of informal youth with politicized ideas. The activities
of such organizations began to be based on radical fragments of various
political and ideological doctrines. Their composition varies from several
dozen to several hundred participants.
For the most part, they are not interested in the electoral political
process, but are known for aggressive statements and illegal activities. The
examples include: Bratstvo (Brotherhood), S-14, Karpatska Sich, Tradition
and Order, National Resistance, Edelweiss, Municipal Guard, Centuria,
Freikorps, Unknown Patriot, Demsokyra, Sokil, Ukrainskyi Stiah, etc. The
period of 2020-2021 was characterized by a decentralized but organized
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rise in political street violence in Ukraine (Marker, 2021; Marker, 2022).
Statistics are provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Recorded cases of political street violence in Ukraine
for 2020-2021
2020 2021
Illegal activities of far-right
radical movements and groups
(including unidentied ones) —
total number
119 177
Including cases of confrontation 38 89
Including the total number of
cases of violence 81 88
Including are cases of violence
against people
66 (106 people
were injured,
including 18 law
enforcement
ocers)
58 (83 people
were injured,
including 29 law
enforcement
ocers)
In turn, Table 2 shows the participation of the most prominent far-right
parties, organizations, groups or their individual representatives in illegal
activities committed in 2020 (Marker, 2021).
Table 2. Recorded cases of involvement of far-right parties, organizations,
groups or their individual representatives in illegal activities in 2020 on the
territory of Ukraine
The total
number of
recorded
cases
Including violent
illegal acts
Including
violent
illegal acts
with victims
National Corps 23 16 15
Tradition and Order 17 10 9
Azov 4 4 4
National Resistance 4 4 3
Pravyi Sector 4 3 3
Edelweiss 4 2 2
S-14 4 2 2
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Tetiana Madryha, Oleksandr Kornievskyy, Yevgen Pereguda, Irina Bodrova y Stepan Svorak
Transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in eastern Europe
In 2021, the following far-right parties, organizations, groups or
their individual representatives were detected in illegal activities the
most — National Corps, S-14, Tradition and Order, National Resistance,
Brotherhood, Ukrainskyi Stiah (Marker, 2022). After 2014, far-right
radicals in Ukraine maintained or partially expanded their contacts with
relevant groups in Eastern and Central Europe (Poland, the Baltic states,
Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria,
Belarus, Slovenia, Macedonia).
This activity evidences the transnational nature of their activities.
The main branch of Azov engaged in international aairs is a branch of
the movement called Intermarium Support Group. This group became a
means of communication between the Ukrainian right-wing and radical
nationalists from the Eastern European countries. Current Eastern
European far-right discourses seek to establish a separate civilizational
predominance in Eastern and Central Europe that will dier from both the
liberal EU and authoritarian Russia.
A new concept of a multinational economic and defence bloc between the
Baltic, Black, and Adriatic seas is being proposed, which will challenge both
the pluralistic West and imperial Eurasia. In recent years, Intermarium
conferences have gathered representatives and participants from 13
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Prevention of political radicalization of civil society, which can lead to
extremism, is one of the main directions of state policy on ensuring national
security of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2018). According to the
results of a representative sociological study “Youth of Ukraine — 2018»
(Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 579, 2021), 56% of
youth in Ukraine do not know, are not interested, and do not show a desire
and interest in participating in public life.
A total of 27.3% of young people were informed about certain forms of
participation, know about various participation tools, hesitate and do not
use them; 16.7% of young people participate in social life in one way or
another. As of 2018, 71% of young people believed that the country needs
radical changes (Sociological Group Rating, 2018).
The elimination of the causes for various forms of deviant behaviour
should be the priority direction of preventing manifestations of political
radicalism. In this sense, 2021 became a turning point in the formation and
implementation of youth policy (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2021). The
goal, tasks, basic principles, directions and mechanisms of implementing
youth policy in Ukraine were determined. Figure 4 outlines the main
priorities of the 2030 National Youth Strategy (Ministry of Youth and
Sports of Ukraine, 2021).
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Figure 4: The main vectors of the 2030 National Youth Strategy of Ukraine
The State Target Social Programme “Youth of Ukraine” for 2021–2025
(CMU Resolution No. 579, 2021) provides for the use of conceptually
updated approaches and the use of a wide range of innovative mechanisms
and tools for working with young people. The implementation of this
programme is based on the implementation of the recommendations of
Ukrainian and international experts, the youth sector of the Council of
Europe, the use of the experience of youth work in the EU countries, and
the UN recommendations on supporting young citizens in all spheres of
life.
Joint networks and practices involving the integration of civil society
organizations and government programmes are considered the most
eective in countering political radicalization. The active participation of
youth in building youth policy and the implementation of youth work is
ensured through various forms of their involvement, in particular through
the development of youth councils and associations (Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine, 2021a). At the regional level, for example, in the Zaporizhzhia
region in 2021, young people took an active part in the preparation of the
main document of youth policy — the Youth of the Zaporizhzhia Region
Programme for 2022-2026.
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The Eastern European democratic system is regressing towards
illiberal authoritarianism. Far-right parties are the main reason for this
phenomenon. Far-right parties mainly participate in the political process,
promoting nationalism and rejection of European integration as their
prerogative. From Slovenia to Estonia, the far-right parties that exist in
all the countries of Eastern Europe, are directing their eorts to achieve
partnerships in ruling coalitions. The radical right-wing parties of Eastern
Europe are primarily supporters of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia.
The nationalist prole emphasizes the interests of the indigenous
population, the racial and cultural homogeneity of the country, opposing
cultural minorities. All of them without exception usually represent policies
aimed at combating migration and refugees. Besides, they also often
adhere to authoritarian values that promote the existing social order while
opposing progressive cultural changes such as feminism and LGBT rights.
Euroscepticism is another ideology. Most of the radical right-wing parties
are considered Europhobes who simply disregard European integration in
general.
The sources that allowed right-wing radical parties to expand their
dominance in Poland were an unstable system of political parties and a
pessimistic view of socio-economic factors. The Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
(Law and Justice) party, which became the rst far-right ruling party in
Eastern Europe, reorganized the domestic political process into an illiberal
authoritarian system after coming to power. The Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
party strongly advocates a restrictive immigration policy and supports the
religious principles of Catholicism in politics without separation from the
state.
Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość, known as Konfederacja,
which is a radical right-wing political party, won 6.81% of votes in the
2019parliamentary elections in Poland. The Konfederacja’s supporters
routinely blame Jews in the online media for allegedly creating and
spreading the COVID-19 pandemic. Konfederacja uses various conspiracy
theories, social and economic fears of the people in its propaganda. At the
same time, it positions itself as a respectable and “caring” political party
that protects the interests of Polish families and Polish youth.
Many right-wing nationalist and right-wing radical organizations
and parties appeared in Poland in the 1990’s. All of them advocated the
priority of Polish national interests and Polish sovereignty and denied pan-
European unication. A number of right-wing radical formations were neo-
fascist and neo-Nazi organizations.
They included, for example, the Nationalist Party (Stronnictwo
Narodowe, SN), the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW), the
National Revival of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, NOP), and the
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National Party (Szczerbiec). They gradually built up their social bases and
networks at the local, regional, national and international levels over a long
period of time. They have reached a wider circle of young people by focusing
on new Internet communications and social networks.
For example, the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW) is a
nationalist youth organization known for its radicalism in the form of anti-
Semitism, opposition to abortion, feminism, LGBT rights, and the EU.
It belongs to two interconnected Polish far-right ultra-nationalist youth
organizations with a Catholic-nationalist philosophy.
Their agenda shows that the goal is to educate Polish youth in a Catholic
and patriotic spirit. The Polish National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-
Radykalny, ONR) refers to at least three groups that are fascist, far-right,
and ultra-nationalist Polish organizations with doctrines derived from
World War II nationalist ideology. The current manifestation, revived
in 1993, is a far-right movement in Poland, very similar to its historical
predecessors.
It is often called fascist, sometimes neo-Nazi. Since 2012, the
organization has been registered as an association of common interests.
The ONR considers itself an ideological descendant of the National Radical
Camp of the 1930’s, an ultra-nationalist, patriotic and anti-Semitic political
movement that existed in the Second Polish Republic before World War II.
ONR regularly participates in the festive march in honour of Independence
Day, which is organized by ONR together with Młodzież Wszechpolska.
In June 2021, more than 160 public gures supported an open letter
to the Minister of Culture of Poland calling for an “end to the funding
of fascism” after far-right groups received more than PLN 3 million
(€660,000) in grants from the state-run Patriotic Fund. The organizers
of Marsz Niepodległości (the March for Independence), an annual event
started by the ONR, and Straż Narodowa (the National Guard), which aims
to revolutionize the ght against far-left activists will receive the money. In
2022, Polish Prosecutor’s rejected requests to ban ONR after a four-year
investigation. It was stated that there was no evidence of gross or systematic
violations of the law by the organization.
The events that took place in Poland after the Archbishop of Krakow, M.
Jędraszewski, delivered a sermon on August 1, 2019 strongly condemning the
activities of the LGBT community can be an example of the transformation
of civil society. A 15-year-old Pole, J. Baryła, blocked an LGBT parade in
August of the same year in the city of Płock, standing in the street with a
crucix wrapped in a rosary above his head (Nussman, 2019).
The teenager became a hero in radical Catholic, ethno-nationalist circles
for trying to stop the LGBT march. The actions of J. Baryła became the
focus of the struggle that is taking place both in Poland and in the Catholic
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Church, between LGBT ideology and the Catholic faith. Later, in an
interview on the YouTube channel, J. Baryła accused the left-wing parties
of spreading LGBT ideology, Jews — of brainwashing children in Polish
schools, Marshal J. Piłsudski — of killing hundreds of thousands of Poles.
This interview was viewed by 48,802 thousand people in a short period
of time. This example demonstrates how the symbols and values of specic
radical far-right groups in one national context move geographically in
the global Internet space and receive support in another far-right national
context.
Preventing radicalization is a core component of the EU’s holistic
approach to counter-terrorism. Figure 5 illustrates preventive actions that
oer a wide range of solutions to dierent aspects of this problem.
Figure 5: Preventive measures against terrorism on the territory of the EU in
the context of political radicalism
The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) is one of the EU’s agship
initiatives. The purpose of this transnational network is to bring together
practitioners from all member states and beyond, such as prison guards,
teachers, social workers, psychologists or communication specialists, to
share experiences and knowledge. Activities organized through RAN are
based on the provision of specic resources/guides such as handbooks,
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toolkits. The structure of the organization comprises nine thematic working
groups: Communications and Narratives (RAN C&N), Youth and Education
(RAN Y&E), Rehabilitation (RAN Rehabilitation), Local Authorities (RAN
Local), Prisons (RAN) Prisons), Police and Law Enforcement (RAN POL),
Victims/Survivors of Terrorism (RAN VoT), Mental Health (RAN Health),
Families, Communities and Social Care (RAN FC&S).
On December 4, 2018, the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on a
new Youth Strategy (European Commision, 2018). It identies the needs
and respond to the challenges that young Europeans face. The goals set
for 2019-2027 include supporting the personal development of young
people and developing the life skills they need to cope with a changing
world. Particular attention is paid to encouraging young people to be active
supporters of solidarity and change, inspired by European values and
identity. One of the main goals is also the elimination of poverty and all
forms of discrimination against young people, promotion of the policy of
social integration of young people.
In 2013, Poland adopted the National Strategy of Regional Development
2030 with the aim, in particular, of stimulating the mechanisms of youth
participation in social and political life and stimulating civic activity. An
example of the development of the civic activity of the young generation
can be the eective cooperation of the youth of 50 member states of the
European Cultural Convention (including Ukraine and Poland) in the
joint management of the Council of Europe, which includes the European
Steering Committee for Youth as the governing element.
4. Discussion
Representative democracy is in crisis, and support for illiberal options
for democracy and authoritarianism has become more popular than ever
(Casal Bértoa and Rama, 2021). The transformation of civil society towards
civil disobedience in the context of political radicalism always entails a
deliberate violation of the law (Smaznova, 2021). The relevant actions are
taken in order to convey the need for any legal or political changes to a wide
audience, in particular, public authorities and the general public.
The reason for this behaviour is the desire to achieve the necessary
changes in the shortest possible period (Baluta, 2018). Although violent
protests are outside the scope of institutionalized politics, they originate
in the actors’ political consciousness (Muxel, 2020). The researcher notes
that the growth of protest attitudes and behaviour in many countries
(especially among the younger generation) is related to the existing climate
of widespread distrust of institutionalized and representative mediation in
politics.
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The accountability mechanism through which citizen input can
inuence government actions is a strength of democracy. Otherwise,
the problems of failure of the principal and agent, rent-seeking, outright
corruption, etc. reduce eective management to meeting the needs of not
all citizens (Desrues and Gobe, 2021). Citizens cannot be passive under
such circumstances, and increased citizen participation in activities that
challenge elites can improve the functioning of government, which can be a
boon for modern democracies.
However, citizen participation in protests is more typical of rich
democracies than of developing ones (Sadovskava et al., 2019). Scholars
emphasize that the authorities may seek to suppress protests as a threat to
the new regime in countries with developing democracies, as a result some
protests may have an anti-systemic purpose.
It is necessary to continuously implement measures to prevent
manifestations of social radicalization in order to combat them. Special
attention should be paid to the principle of democracy, openness and broad
public participation. The future success of civil society and community
engagement in counter-radicalization depends to a large extent on
governments and law enforcement agencies and their willingness to change
their attitudes and working methods, as well as to take into account the
proposals of non-government actors and respond to their needs. This
should be achieved through a change in mentality, work methods and
adequate support (Prislan et al., 2020).
Political knowledge is a powerful antidote for mitigating uncivilized
behaviour in public discussion of collective grievances. Researchers
emphasize that a clear understanding of the consequences of the spread of
news in social networks is necessary in the context of the growth of global
political polarization and radicalization — the illegal protest behaviour of
citizens.
The process of preventing youth radicalism will be eective in case the
process of youth socialization is managed (Mukhitov et al., 2022). The
educational institutions should continuously raise awareness of digital
media literacy, especially Internet safety literacy, in adolescents and youth
aged 12 to 20 years in order to prevent manifestations of radicalism (Suraya
and Mulyana, 2020).
The ideological and political inuence of Ukrainian far-right nationalists
is more signicant than one might assume, relying on their electoral
support only (Rabotyazhev, 2020). The Azov movement managed to create
a multidimensional and distinctly modern identity, which is attractive to
part of the Ukrainian youth and has no regional limitations, unlike the
predominantly Western Ukrainian support for Svoboda (Umland, 2020).
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According to the researcher, the political and “non-civilian” branches
of the Azov Regiment can become the most long-term right-wing extremist
threat to the Ukrainian state. The development and application of a set
of preventive measures of educational, socio-cultural, informational and
psychological inuence on the youth environment of Ukraine remains an
urgent problem in the eld of preventing and countering manifestations of
radicalism (Vasilchuk, 2016).
Conclusions
Radical right-wing parties maintain their power in Eastern European
politics by taking advantage of the current political, economic and social
disorder. They propose an idea based on traditional values such as
family, Christianity and nation. The focus of representatives of right-wing
radicalism is a person, not a group. Motivation is most often related to
general discontent, and ideology is related to key issues of electoral politics.
The right-wing radical parties of Eastern Europe declared a course for
a cultural counter-revolution aimed at the permanent marginalization of
liberal-democratic elites, their civil society and their pluralistic, liberal
democratic values. Right-wing radical Ukrainian political organizations
such as Svoboda, Pravyi Sector and the National Corps, the Polish Nationalist
Party, the All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska), and the National
Revival of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski) are also considered
extremist political entities, which follows from their ideology and activities.
This indicates a departure from democracy in Eastern Europe.
The gradual transformation of associations of political radicals into
special politicized subcultures with their own aesthetic preferences, values,
internal ethics, logic and principles of relationships within their own
communities are a characteristic feature of the development of political
radicalism in Eastern Europe.
The right-wing radical symbols and discourses in the political, social
and cultural life of citizens is a source of misinformation at all levels,
including formal and informal organizations. This can contribute to a
false cognitive and moral perception of reality by representatives of civil
society. The transnational ties of the far right in Eastern Europe are directly
dependent on social media. In this case, the use of the Internet contributes
to the change and development of the necessary public opinion. Radical
right-wing parties and organizations carefully adjust their communication
strategies in order to expand their own inuence, relying on the interest of
the younger generation.
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Transformation of civil society in the context of political radicalism in eastern Europe
Radical political demands become a convenient excuse for representatives
of criminal groups to commit various crimes, including seizing property,
putting pressure on competitors, settling scores with them through the
use of violence, etc. This is why the spread of political radicalism in civil
society in Eastern Europe is caused by the dicult social situation of the
population.
The crisis of the established mechanisms of socialization, adaptation
and upbringing, the weakness of civil society institutions entail legal
and cultural deformation of value attitudes and orientations of citizens.
Moreover, young people are especially disposed to these changes. The
result is a signicant increase in the risk of involvement of citizens in illegal
activities.
Radicalization is becoming a more serious threat, especially in view of
the development of new technologies and the growing use of the Internet
and social media. Therefore, overcoming radicalism has a cross-border
dimension. However, the ght against radicalization is also strongly
decentralized and must rely on the involvement of a wide range of local
actors (local authorities, social services, security services, etc.).
The developed relevant regulatory and legal initiatives, as well as
specialized state programmes facilitate the prevention of the growth of
the radicalization of society in the Eastern European countries. The EU-
developed Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is an example of
prevention of radicalization. Relevant experience can be initiated in all
Eastern European countries and will require additional study of further
adaptive practices.
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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
en octubre de 2022, por el Fondo Editorial Serbiluz,
Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
Vol.40 Nº 74
