Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
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Vol. 40, Nº 72 (2022), 785-798
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Recibido el 19/10/2021 Aceptado el 27/12/2021
The impact of anti-democratic values on
the deconsolidation of liberal democracy
in Western Europe: an empirical analysis
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4072.47
Rashid Tazitdinovich Mukhaev *
Elena Evgenievna Prokopenko **
Sergey Alexandrovich Barkov ***
Dmitry Nikolaevich Zemliakov ****
Ilya Viktorovich Okhotnikov *****
Abstract
This article tries to answer the question: “What is happening
with liberal democracy: the model collapses or experiences
diculties while adapting to uncertainty?”. As the methods of the
research the authors of the article have considered international
practices of democratic development in the 21st century and
revealed reasons for the divergence of institutional orders and
cultural practices. This discrepancy is manifested in the deconsolidation of
democracy, i.e. there are no guarantees of certain democratic procedures,
agreement on political rules, and behavioral patterns. The study aims at
revealing the degree of correlation between the deconsolidation of liberal
democracy and the eect of institutional and cultural variables. The study is
relevant since it provides well-grounded scenarios of regime transformations
in dierent countries, depending on the existing institutional environment
based on generalized reciprocity, including reciprocity in the recognition
and observance of dominant cultural values and constitutional norms by
all actors.
Keywords: political-cultural approach; emancipatory values;
institutional order; cultural practices; anti-democratic
values.
* Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0001-5686-8544
** Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0001-6317-9907
*** Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-
7382-767X
**** Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-
5560-7668
***** Russian University of Transport (MIIT), Moscow, Russia. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-
0455-8514
786
Rashid Tazitdinovich Mukhaev, Elena Evgenievna Prokopenko, Sergey Alexandrovich Barkov,
Dmitry Nikolaevich Zemliakov y Ilya Viktorovich Okhotnikov
The impact of anti-democratic values on the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Western
Europe: an empirical analysis
El impacto de los valores antidemocráticos en la
desconsolidación de la democracia liberal en Europa
Occidental: un análisis empírico
Resumen
Este artículo trata de responder a la pregunta: «¿Qué está pasando con
la democracia liberal: el modelo se derrumba o experimenta dicultades
para adaptarse a la incertidumbre?». Como métodos de investigación, los
autores del artículo consideraron las prácticas internacionales de desarrollo
democrático en el siglo XXI y revelaron las razones de la divergencia de
los órdenes institucionales y las prácticas culturales. Esta discrepancia
se maniesta en la desconsolidación de la democracia, es decir, no hay
garantías de ciertos procedimientos democráticos, acuerdo sobre reglas
políticas y patrones de comportamiento. El estudio pretende revelar el
grado de correlación entre la desconsolidación de la democracia liberal y
el efecto de variables institucionales y culturales. El estudio es relevante
ya que proporciona escenarios bien fundamentados de transformaciones
de régimen en diferentes países, dependiendo del entorno institucional
existente basado en la reciprocidad generalizada, incluida la reciprocidad
en el reconocimiento y la observancia de los valores culturales dominantes
y las normas constitucionales por parte de todos los actores.
Palabras clave: enfoque político-cultural; valores emancipadores;
orden institucional; prácticas culturales; valores
antidemocráticos.
Introduction
The obvious attractiveness of democracy as a system of government and
a type of political relations explains the fact that today most people live
in democratic countries (Mironyuk, 2015). Scholars emphasize the merits
of the democratic system and its ability to create favorable conditions for
human life. Compared to autocracies, democracy promotes economic well-
being (Amartya, 2000) and equitable distribution of public goods (Reuveny,
Li, 2003); does better at protecting human rights of their citizens (Poe, Tate,
Camp Keith, 1999); promotes happiness and life satisfaction (Inglehart et
al., 2008; Russett et al., 1993); less inclined towards military resolution of
international conicts; reduces the likelihood of a civil war (Gurr, 2000).
At the beginning of the 21st century, the trend towards a gradual decrease
in the world average level of democracy became obvious, which also aected
the Western developed economies. According to the Economist Intelligence
Unit, a UK company, only eight out of 28 countries did not face a drop in
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Vol. 40 Nº 72 (2022): 785-798
the quality of democratic institutions between 2006 and 2019 (Table 1). On
average, the level of democracy for such countries decreased by 0.26, and
equated to 7.99.
Table 1. A drop in the quality of democratic institutions
Country 2006 2019 Fluctuation
Ireland 9.01 9.24 0.23
Estonia 7.74 7.90 0.16
Canada 9.07 9.22 0.15
Latvia 7.37 7.49 0.12
Lithuania 7.43 7.50 0.07
France 8.07 8.12 0.05
Finland 9.25 9.25 0.00
Australia 9.09 9.09 0.00
Spain 8.34 8.29 -0.05
Bulgaria 7.10 7.03 -0.07
Portugal 8.16 8.03 -0.13
Germany 8.82 8.68 -0.14
Italy 7.73 7.52 -0.21
Slovakia 7.40 7.17 -0.23
USA 8.22 7.96 -0.26
Luxembourg 9.10 8.81 -0.29
Denmark 9.52 9.22 -0.30
Austria 8.69 8.29 -0.40
Slovenia 7.96 7.50 -0.46
Croatia 7.04 6.57 -0.47
Czech Republic 8.17 7.69 -0.48
Sweden 9.88 9.39 -0.49
Belgium 8.15 7.64 -0.51
788
Rashid Tazitdinovich Mukhaev, Elena Evgenievna Prokopenko, Sergey Alexandrovich Barkov,
Dmitry Nikolaevich Zemliakov y Ilya Viktorovich Okhotnikov
The impact of anti-democratic values on the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Western
Europe: an empirical analysis
Romania 7.06 6.49 -0.57
Netherlands 9.66 9.01 -0.65
Poland 7.30 6.62 -0.68
Greece 8.13 7.43 -0.70
Hungary 7.53 6.63 -0.90
Average score 8.25 7.99 -0.26
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. The EU countries, the USA,
Canada, and Australia.
The falling dynamics of democracy indicators are conrmed by the data
of Freedom House, Polity IV, and Varieties of Democracy. In addition, other
indicators closely related to the functioning of democratic institutions have
worsened over the past decade. Thus, all the quality indicators of public
administration for the same sample of 28 countries decreased in the period
from 2006 to 2018. This contradicts the position of Western science that
countries with a consolidated democratic regime cannot experience a state
of democratic backsliding.
However, protests in the USA (BLM movement), France (“yellow vests”),
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, large-scale protests
against coronavirus restrictions in Western Europe have shown that even
countries with a developed democratic tradition were unable to provide an
eective response to the economic, migration and energy crises triggered
by the COVID-19 pandemic. This conditioned deep frustration with the
existing democratic institutions. Moreover, the leaders of some Eastern
European countries, for example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,
declared that they wanted to “build an illiberal state” (Tóth, 2014). The
concept and institutional model of liberal democracy came into conict
with the new reality, which was the reason for statements about the “end of
the consolidation paradigm” (Foa, Mounk, 2017a).
1. Causes of the crisis of liberal democracy
• The institutional approach
For a long time, the deconsolidation of democracy had remained outside
the consideration of Western scholars and poorly studied. At the turn of
the 20th and 21st centuries, stable and continuous development associated
with democratic institutions and values faced global threats and challenges.
These transformed the benecial eects of exogenous and endogenous
factors of the former material well-being of the Western countries.
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In the context of growing social diversity supplemented by the
information revolution and the migration crisis, democratic institutions
were unable to ensure the systemic integration of various groups based
on the values and norms of generalized reciprocity. Such principles as the
equality of citizens before the law, the recognition of individual rights and
freedoms, and their guarantees by public authorities gradually replaced
privileges. At the microenvironment level, the political self-organization
and coordination of individuals are based on the norms and values of
specic reciprocity (ethnic, friendly, group, kin, or clan ties).
There was a gap between formal relations governed by universal rules of
law and morality and particular (local) relations, which led to the divergence
of the institutional order and cultural patterns. At the beginning of the 21st
century, Western science provided extremely controversial assessments.
Various factors were considered as reasons for the crisis of liberal
democracy, which conditioned dierent approaches to its interpretation
and evaluation.
The crisis of liberal democracy is most evident within the institutional
approach. While considering the British model of democracy, E.
Grayling concluded that the “failure of democracy” in Great Britain was a
consequence of the dysfunction of political institutions (Grayling, 2017).
Among the causes of institutional dysfunction, the author mentioned the
merger of powers; the dictate of corporate interests; the majority system
or the “rst-past-the-post” voting; an ideological gap between the elite and
the population.
In his opinion, the necessary measures to combat these institutional
vices are extremely dubious options, including the introduction of
proportional representation and compulsory voting, the separation of the
executive and legislative powers. This raises the following questions: “Why
did the institutional order that has been ensuring the eective functioning
of British democracy for a long time suddenly become dysfunctional?”
and “What is the likelihood that a change in the institutional structure can
overcome the crisis of the democratic system if even co-social democracies
with proportional representation and separation of powers have not been
able to avoid it?”.
The thesis that the crisis of Western democracies resulted from the
dysfunction of institutions was mentioned by S. Levitsky and D. Ziblatt
(2018). The emphasis is placed on the modern Western political elite
that proved to be unable to construct a democratic agenda and support
democratic norms. According to S. Levitsky and D. Ziblatt, the signs of an
impending authoritarian setback comprise the heterogeneity of the elite.
Its structure includes the following types of politicians: those who deny
in word or by action democratic rules of the game; those who doubt the
790
Rashid Tazitdinovich Mukhaev, Elena Evgenievna Prokopenko, Sergey Alexandrovich Barkov,
Dmitry Nikolaevich Zemliakov y Ilya Viktorovich Okhotnikov
The impact of anti-democratic values on the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Western
Europe: an empirical analysis
legitimacy of their opponents; those who encourage violence as a method
of political struggle; those who encroach on the rights and freedoms of
their opponents, including mass media. In their opinion, the crisis of elites
was manifested in the following forms: Brexit, the election of D. Trump
as President of the United States, and the right-wing populism across
continental Europe. In general, S. Levitsky and D. Ziblatt blamed the
crisis of democracy on modern Western political elites. The authoritarian
trend within the ruling class expressed itself in the governance of radical
right-wing leaders (the leader of the Austrian People’s Party, S. Kurz)
and the growing inuence of neo-nationalists. Thus, the nationalist party
“Alternative for Germany” (ADG) became the third parliamentary faction
in the German Bundestag in 2017.
• The political and cultural approach
Under the political and cultural approach, the crisis of liberal
democracy is associated with the growth of anti-democratic values among
the population of Western countries. For example, S. Foa and J. Munch
explained the ineectiveness of formal institutions of liberal democracy by
generational shifts that form new priorities.
The political system causes discontent among young people since
it does not create social elevators and cannot integrate its potential into
social creation (Foa, Mounk, 2017b). The decline of liberal democracy was
mainly inuenced by the growth of authoritarian views among the youth.
The authoritarian cultural transformation was caused by a drop in living
standards, an increase in social inequality, and, as a result, widespread
populism, the rise to power of neo-Nazis in some Western European
countries, Brexit, and the election of D. Trump as President of the United
States.
Not all scholars agree with the pessimistic conclusions of S. Foa and
J. Munch, some of them dierently assess the values of young people in
Western countries (Zilinsky, 2019). For instance, the British Pippa Norris
highlights the illogical judgments of S. Foa and J. Munch (Norris, 2017).
If growing dissatisfaction with the democratic system among the younger
generation causes the erosion of democratic institutions, how to explain the
fact that the supporters of Brexit and D. Trump were mainly senior people?
In turn, Pippa Norris provided a dierent assessment of the erosion of
democratic institutions. She believed that uctuations in the indicators of
loyalty to democratic institutions in Western countries were insignicant,
in contrast to the indicators of some countries in Eastern Europe.
The Dutch political scientist Eric Voeten supported this opinion and
associated growing dissatisfaction with the democratic system and declining
trust in democratic institutions with increased demands of citizens and
wishes for their own political system (Voeten, 2016).
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Such German scientists as E. Alexander and C. Welzel did not see any
signs of declining democracy in Western developed economies (Alexander,
Welzel, 2017). In their opinion, the slight decline in the indicators of
democracy is temporary and is due to a constantly growing value gap
between dierent generations and social classes. Most young people have
pro-democratic and pro-liberal views, while the older generation professes
anti-democratic and anti-liberal attitudes.
The methodology for measuring the internalization of anti-democratic
values used by S. Foa and J. Munch also gives rise to doubt. R. Inglehart who
studied cultural values in 80 countries believed that citizens’ commitment
to democracy or their inclination to anti-democratic tendencies, such as
the desire to have a strong leader, could not be regarded as harbingers of
democratic governance.
It is paradoxical but the population of some autocracies has an
extremely positive attitude to democracy and, nevertheless, continues to
live in an autocratic environment (Inglehart, 2016). According to the World
Values Survey Wave 6, the population of authoritarian states often (Egypt
– 98.7%; Zimbabwe – 96.8%; Ghana – 95.6%) is much more supportive of
democracy than the population of some democratic countries (Netherlands
– 80.6%; USA – 79.7%; New Zealand – 77%). Nevertheless, most citizens
of authoritarian countries do not like the concept of democracy since there
is no direct relationship between democratic governance and the real life of
the population.
The deconsolidation of democracy in Western countries is interpreted
in dierent ways, and methods of its analysis are not fully developed. As a
result, the statements and conclusions of dierent authors are sometimes
directly opposite. There is no consensus on how to x those values that
inuence the functioning of institutions.
In addition, no empirical studies prove the connection between anti-
democratic values and the deconsolidation of democracy in developed
Western countries. To understand the nature of destructive processes
occurring in Western democracies, it is necessary to conceptualize the
discourse of “democratic deconsolidation”, form its theoretical model, and
identify its driving forces.
• The deconsolidation of democracy
The consolidation of democracy is among the key discourses in the theory
of democracy. Since its introduction into science (Linz, Stepan, 1996),
various authors have been trying to determine criteria for the consolidation
of a democratic institutional order.
Democratic consolidation is understood as the process of rooting
democratic values and attitudes in the minds of individuals, which claries
792
Rashid Tazitdinovich Mukhaev, Elena Evgenievna Prokopenko, Sergey Alexandrovich Barkov,
Dmitry Nikolaevich Zemliakov y Ilya Viktorovich Okhotnikov
The impact of anti-democratic values on the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Western
Europe: an empirical analysis
the implementation of the roles and functions of institutions and increases
the predictability of decisions based on competition-cooperation relations.
Markers of consolidation quantication are as follows: the internalization
of democratic norms by various groups of elites (Linz, Stepan, 1996), the
role of civil society organizations in the political process (Paxton, 2002),
the distribution of post-material (Inglehart, 1997) or emancipative (Welzel,
2013) values in society, etc.
Despite dierent approaches, the common thing that unites all the
authors is that the eective functioning of democratic institutions is possible
only if there are indispensable conditions. Their suciency excludes the
subsequent erosion of institutions and the possible deconsolidation of
liberal democracies.
The hypothesis about the relationship between the deconsolidation of
democracy and the growth of anti-democratic values requires a theoretical
reection on the “democracy” term that has no clear denition in modern
political science. To distinguish between democracies and non-democracies,
we used the matrix of R. Dahl who understood it as a political regime that
meets two criteria: a) fair, competitive, and inclusive elections; b) the
observance of civil and political rights (Dahl, 2010).
R. Dahl called all the regimes that meet procedural and civil-legal criteria
“polyarchies” or democracies. Thus, liberal democracy is a political regime,
whose functioning is based on the fair, competitive, and inclusive elections
of government bodies that guarantee the observance of civil and political
rights of individuals.
Modern democracies ensure the integration of society thanks to the
institutional order based on: the separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, free and fair elections, inclusive surage, the rule
of law, the freedom of opinion, alternative sources of information, the
protection of minority rights, etc. Some scholars call these institutions
inclusive (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012), while the others refer to them as an
“open access order” (North, Wallis, Weingast, 2009).
The functioning of democratic institutions is ensured by a set of
dispositions conditioned by values and cultural norms of generalized
reciprocity. Culture usually embraces the values and beliefs of various ethnic,
religious, or social groups passed down from generation to generation in a
relatively unchanged form (Alesina, Giuliano, 2015).
Within the political-cultural approach, any consolidated political
regime is the result of a balance between cultural patterns and institutional
practices at the current moment (Almond, Verba, 1963). The divergence of
cultural patterns and institutional practices leads to the deconsolidation of
any regime. It is worth mentioning that deconsolidation is a process, not a
result of certain changes within the political system.
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Many scholars associate the deconsolidation of democracy with the rst
signs of institutional anomalies that do not t into a common worldview,
including the election of D. Trump as the President of the United States or
the voting on Britain’s withdrawal from the EU (Grayling, 2017).
One can hardly agree with this statement since institutional practices
reect the content of dominant values and cultural norms. For this reason,
the analysis of democratic deconsolidation should focus not on certain
institutional practices but on cultural values and norms. The latter stipulate
the political self-organization of social groups.
The balance of any regime should be viewed as the interaction of cultural
patterns and institutional practices. Based on this rule, the main driver
of democratic deconsolidation is the divergence of cultural patterns and
institutional practices, between which the balance is upset. Institutional
practices are all forms of political communication within the framework of
the existing political institutions. Cultural patterns represent the dominant
political values and dispositions that develop sustainable behavior.
At the initial stage, developed democracies are characterized by the
democratic equilibrium of their cultural patterns and institutional practices,
which ensures the consolidation of any regime and its stability. At a certain
stage of their development, cultural patterns are inuenced by various
factors and begin to change, which upsets the initial balance.
The consequence is the deconsolidation of the regime. In this pair,
cultural patterns serve as the independent variable, and institutional
practices are the dependent variable. Due to changes in cultural patterns,
institutional practices also transform. This concept complies with the main
provisions of G. Eckstein’s congruence theory.
To maintain the stability of a political system, “the patterns of power
that characterize the political system of some country should be compatible
with the prevailing beliefs about power among the population” (Eckstein,
1997).
Thus, cultural patterns and institutional practices are two basic variables,
whose interaction determines the transition from the previous regime
equilibrium to a new state. Furthermore, deconsolidation is regarded as
a temporary process since the adaptation of institutional practices to the
changed cultural patterns creates a new regime equilibrium.
The theoretical matrix of the subsequent analysis of exible interaction
between institutional practices and changing cultural patterns can be
presented in the following combinations: the balance of cultural patterns
and institutional practices – divergence of cultural patterns and institutional
practices – deconsolidation of cultural patterns and institutional practices
– convergence of cultural patterns and institutional practices – new
equilibrium of cultural patterns and institutional practices.
794
Rashid Tazitdinovich Mukhaev, Elena Evgenievna Prokopenko, Sergey Alexandrovich Barkov,
Dmitry Nikolaevich Zemliakov y Ilya Viktorovich Okhotnikov
The impact of anti-democratic values on the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Western
Europe: an empirical analysis
The above-mentioned model can be used for describing regime
transformations of liberal democracies and consolidated autocracies that
dier only in the transformation of cultural patterns. The expansion of
democratic cultural patterns in autocracies leads to the deconsolidation of
the regime, an increase in the level of democracy, and quality improvement
of democratic institutions in an indenite continuum.
The deconsolidation of democracy caused by a change in cultural patterns
in favor of authoritarian values is manifested in democratic backsliding and
decline in the eective functioning of democratic institutions. A state in
which there is a signicant gap between cultural patterns and institutional
practices can last for a limited time. The existence of a stable authoritarian or
democratic equilibrium is possible even if cultural patterns and institutions
are not congruent. This state can be caused by the actions of leaders or
elites, as well as institutional inertia.
In this case, the duration of such a delicate balance is severely limited.
For example, there are demonstrations in support of the presidency of
Donald Trump and against the results of the 2020 U.S. presidential election,
followed by the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. Then
discontent reached its peak and began to decline thanks to the socially-
oriented actions of J. Biden’s administration. The balance was restored.
• The specic measurement of parameters and inductors
used in the model
To indicate democratic institutional practices, we will use the EIU
Democracy Index. It includes four parameters: electoral process and
pluralism, civil liberties, government functioning, political participation,
and political culture. Until the early 21st century, it had been dicult to
evaluate cultural patterns of democracy due to the lack of big data databases
and cross-national research in the eld of culture.
The main manifestation of anti-democratic values is the feeling of
hostility to the democratic political system and its institutions, which can
be assessed through four indicators:
1. skepticism – disbelief in the ability of democratic institutions to
eectively solve the existing problems, challenging the advantages
and merits of democratic political systems.
2. optionality – acceptance and approval of non-democratic
alternatives, the need for a strong leader to achieve stability and
order.
3. procedurality – a negative attitude towards democratic procedures:
free elections, the alternation of power, the desire to achieve a
practical result despite procedures.
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4. conformism – a disdain for the freedom of thought and speech, a
tendency to obey the imposed political will.
• The impact of anti-democratic values on the development
of liberal-democratic regimes
Some Western countries, whose political regime can be regarded as
liberal-democratic, experience an increase in the level of anti-democratic
values. However, it is not a universal but rather a local phenomenon, i.e.
many Western liberal democracies demonstrate a decline in the level of
anti-democratic values, including Great Britain, whose problems have been
actively discussed (Grayling, 2017).
In addition, the intensity of this process remains rather moderate,
namely, a sharp increase in anti-democratic values is observed only in a
few countries, including Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. It is
worth mentioning that none of these countries has a long experience of
democratic governance so the cases of Hungary, Poland, and Romania can
be viewed in the context of a failed or incomplete democratic transition
rather than the deconsolidation of democracy. The case of Greece has a
quite logical explanation in the form of economic problems associated with
the debt crisis and solving problems of a purely economic nature. After that,
the Greek cultural patterns will return to their previous state. In any case,
more empirical data is required for a better understanding of the ongoing
processes. Open access to the data of the seventh wave of the World Values
Survey in July 2020 shed light on the current changes.
Due to such ndings, alarmist claims about the widespread and
inexplicable decline of liberal democracy in the Western countries seem
exaggerated (Foa, Mounk, 2017). These conclusions are consistent with
the results of other studies analyzing cultural transformations in Western
countries (Alexander, Welzel, 2017).
Conclusion
Authors conclude thst, the reason for concerns about the impending
triumph of authoritarianism is that one of the most inuential Western
countries, the United States, is showing negative dynamics in terms of
democratic development. Nevertheless, the United States represents only a
part of the Western world, albeit a crucial one, and it does not mean that all
countries have the same problems.
Thus, we distinguish between two clusters of countries that dier in the
intensity of anti-democratic values:
796
Rashid Tazitdinovich Mukhaev, Elena Evgenievna Prokopenko, Sergey Alexandrovich Barkov,
Dmitry Nikolaevich Zemliakov y Ilya Viktorovich Okhotnikov
The impact of anti-democratic values on the deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Western
Europe: an empirical analysis
1. Countries with a rapid increase in anti-democratic values (Greece,
Hungary, Poland, Romania);
2. Countries with a moderate increase in anti-democratic values (USA,
Austria, Czech Republic, Belgium, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden).
On the contrary, the other countries demonstrate a decline in the
level of anti-democratic values, which shows no signs of democratic
deconsolidation.
Anti-democratic values have a statistically signicant relationship
with the level of democracy, while cultural patterns are associated with
institutional practices and determine their specics.
For our future research with the aim of better understanding the
deconsolidation of democracy in Western countries, it is necessary to nd
out how their cultural patterns have changed in recent years. Consequently,
it will be possible to answer the question: “Do Western countries go through
the process of deconsolidation and, if they do, how it is manifested and
what impact does it have?”.
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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
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Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
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